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INTRODUCTION 
 
Commercial banks meet the credit risk in every lending transaction. 
To reduce this risk, banks classify the debtors into different risk levels 
based on the set of information gathered from the clients. Such 
classification determines the assessed credit risk level for potential 
borrowers separating the default category and acceptable ones with a 
number of risk levels. Each risk class then gets priced at a premium which 
depends on the probability to repay the debt. These models measure the 
statistical probability that credit will be repaid and is based on the idea that 
it is possible to predict the future performance of loan applicants with 
similar characteristics to previous applicants. The credit risk assessment of 
customers largely relies on the availability of information. For business 
borrowers this information includes the financial and other data. The 
profitability, solvency, capital structure ratios of enterprises often are 
included into the credit risk assessment variables. In case of households 
loans banks are interested in the specific factors as employment status, 
income, education, personal property, marital status, past repayment history. 
The qualitative human credit risk assessment approaches in banks recently 
have almost completely been replaced by quantitative approaches. The 
credit records accumulated by banks are the the main background for the 
internal credit risk assessment models development. The lenders also share 
the information through the credit reference systems, but every bank makes 
the isolated decision. They can easily tell when the applicant is already 
heavily laden with debts from other lenders. Because of this, banks can 
avoid the irresponsible borrowers as they lend considering the information 
provided not only by the applicants, but also by other lenders. The most 
important criterion in the credit risk assessment process is to ensure that 
banks have the wholesome information when advancing the credits. 
Before the global financial crisis, the tendency of banks‘ loan 
portfolio growth was observed in many countries what indicates that the 
debtors highly relied to a large extent in bank funding. The high credit 
expansion was induced by the economic growth and the further positive 
expectations of banks, businesses and households. But the credit slump in 
the aftermath of the global crisis was as hard as the growth during the credit 
boom. The banks faced with the problem of non-performing loans (NPLs) 
as many debtors became unable to meet their financial obligations when the 
economy deteriorated. The decrease of GDP, investments, consumption 
expenditures of households, the growth of enterprises bankruptcies and 
unemployment caused the serious problems not only for business 
enterprises and households, but also for banks. The quality of loan portfolio 
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and the financial indicators of banks disimproved what indicates that in 
credit growth period the banks have not assessed the credit risk properly. 
Because the banks as the financial intermediaries play the the very 
important role in country‘s financial system and whole economy, the 
supervisors of banks also became concerned of these problems. The Basel 
III Accord suggests the guidelines for the consideration of macroeconomic 
factors in the credit risk assessment process. Banks can freely select the 
variables and the analysis methods striving to develop the precise internal 
credit risk assessment models. This objective is also common in the current 
scientific researches. So this study is directed for the understanding how the 
economic recession influences the credit risk in commercial banks. 
According to this the scientific problem can be raised – what is the main 
impact of the country‘s economic downturn on the debtors‘ credit risk in 
banks? The typical characteristics of these interrelations will be revealed in 
this study. 
 The object of this research is impact of macroeconomic changes on 
the credit risk in commercial banks. 
The aim of this research is to reveal the main impact of 
macroeconomic changes on credit risk in commercial banks. 
The tasks of this research: 
1. To explain the economic role of commercial banks in country‘s 
financial system. 
2. To select the main banks‘ performance measures that reflect 
banks‘ status. 
3. To analyze the main commercial banks‘ risks that must be 
managed in banks. 
4. To analyze the main peculiarities of credit risk management in 
banks. 
5. To reveal the macroeconomic impact on credit risk in banks 
analyzing the publications of other researchers. 
6. To present the Lithuanian commercial banking system. 
7. To estimate the problem of non-performing loans and the 
changes of financial condition in Lithuanian banks. 
8. To analyze the changes of commercial banks macroeconomic 
environment in Lithuania. 
9. To develop the enterprises credit risk assessment model 
considering the industry sectors sensitivity to the 
macroeconomic changes. 
10. To measure the business and households indebtedness in 
Lithuania and to evaluate it as factor of NPLs problem in banks. 
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11. To analyze the non-performing loans problem in European 
Union. 
12. To find the dependence of non-performing loans problem on 
macroeconomic conditions in European Union. 
13. To develop the NPLs in European Union countries prediction 
model. 
The methods of this research consist of the analysis of scientific 
publications and statistical data of commercial banks and economics. 
The novelty of this research. This study examines the 
macroeconomic factors that influence the credit risk of the Lithuanian 
banking system over the recent business cycle. Also the study aims to 
identify the determinants of non-performing loans using a cross-country 
modelling framework analyzing the consolidated banking and economic 
data of other EU countries. As the EU countries are possible non-
homogeneous, the study is directed to capture the timeline of financial crisis 
and to evaluate the impact of it on non-performing loans in banks. 
The theoretical significance of this study is that the recent scientific 
researches of banking were analyzed ant the main peculiarities of credit risk 
management considering the macroeconomic factors were generalized. The 
impact of business cycle fluctuations on the credit risk in banks was 
revealed what extends the knowledge of external factors causing the serious 
problems of non-performing loans in banks. The typical two-way direction 
relations of banking performance and the country‘s economy were 
estimated what are important for banks, their debtors and supervisors. This 
study supplements the other credit risk management researches that taken 
together can help to construct the sound credit risk management system that 
enables to keep the stability of banking sector and whole economy. 
The practical significance of this study is that it contributes to the 
empirical statistical analysis of debtors‘ credit risk by focusing on the 
relationship between non-performing loans, macroeconomic and industry-
specific variables in Lithuania, where the main risk of the domestic banking 
system relates to the weakening of its loan portfolio quality in the economic 
recession. The estimated interrelations can ease for bankers the 
understanding of the macroeconomic impact on credit risk and to develop 
the models that consider the business cycle fluctuations. The statistical 
analysis results also support the necessity of responsible borrowing because 
the households in this study can easily see what happened in recent financial 
crisis and understanding this to manage the personal finance more 
responsibly seeking to avoid the consequences of over-indebtedness and 
insolvency. 
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1. THEORETICAL EVIDENCE OF INTERRELATIONS 
BETWEEN CREDIT RISK AND MACROECONOMICS 
 
1.1. The role of commercial banks in country‘s financial system 
 
The commercial banks are the part of financial system that plays a 
fundamental role in the country‘s economy as the environment between 
agents who need to borrow and those who want to lend or invest and is 
naturally linked to all economic sectors. If the financial system does not 
function properly, its problems have a strong negative impact on the whole 
economy. For this reason the policymakers, regulators, academics and 
practitioners currently pay close attention to the soundness and stability of 
this sector (Rodriguez-Moreno, Pena, 2013). The main banks‘ deposit 
mobilization and credit allocation functions have important implications for 
economic growth and development. The significance of this intermediation 
process is likely to be greater in economies with thin financial markets and 
small non-bank sectors where a larger percentage of enterprises and 
individuals are likely to depend on banks for external funding (Gounder, 
Sharma, 2012). The banks as the financial intermediaries play a vital role in 
the processes of economic growth by intermediating scarce financial 
resources appropriately in time to productive sectors of the economy. 
Efficient financial intermediation has the ability of transferring their inputs 
into outputs that increases the volume of funds transacted in the country‘s 
economy. Conversely, the inefficient and uncompetitive financial 
institutions can increase the opportunity cost of capital in the economy, and 
consequently, financing of projects in such an economy is more expensive. 
Indeed, most of the financial intermediation in the developed ant the 
developing countries is carried out by commercial banks, and other 
financial institutions, and the financial markets play a relatively 
insignificant role (Reddy, Nirmala, 2013).  
The commercial banks perform specific tasks in the country‘s 
financial system, such as the mobilizing savings, allocating resources, 
diversifying risks, monitoring borrowers and exerting corporate control. The 
development of financial system positively affects economic growth of 
every country. The recent empirical works suggest growth rates are higher 
when the legal environment enables financial systems to perform their tasks 
more effectively. Such facts may explain cross country differences in 
economic growth: countries with more sophisticated financial systems 
achieve higher rates of economic growth (Williams, Gardener, 2003). So, 
the evaluation of banks‘ performance attracts significant attention from 
public and financial regulators as banks are the critical institutions in most 
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economies. Their ability to accumulate the financial resources, provide 
various credit operations and financial services activate financial flows that 
influence the growth and economic development of a country. Moreover, 
the banking sector is considered as a vital segment of modern economy, 
where the banks implement their important role and carry out specific 
functions (Stankevičienė, Mencaitė, 2012). As the profit seeking 
enterprises, the banks currently have also been increasingly focusing on 
customers’ demands. They have also switched their business models from 
the sale of traditional financial products to marketing and customer 
orientation. Nowadays banks perform towards the relationship marketing 
with a focus on long-term relationships and mutual benefits with customers. 
The long-term, stable, and cooperative relationships with customers enable 
the financial industry to provide different services for different customers so 
as to enhance the profitability and efficiency (Lee, Lin, Chen, 2010).  
The main source of commercial bank‘s interest income is loan 
portfolio which is the assets in the balance-sheet and it is created when the 
money fund is accumulated in the process of intermediation by accepting 
deposits. The basic function of intermediation is a source of credit and 
liquidity risks for any banking institution. Further, banks are exposed to 
various market and non-market risks in performing their functions. These 
risks expose banks to events, both expected and unexpected, with the 
potential to cause losses, putting depositors’ money at risk. Expected losses 
may  be mitigated by a combination of product pricing and accounting loss 
provisions, while capital funds are expected to meet unexpected losses. 
Thus the primary role of capital in a banking institution is to meet the 
unexpected losses arising out of portfolio choice of banks and to protect the 
depositor’s money (Jayadev, 2013). The banks typically face numerous 
risks, including credit, interest rate, currency, liquidity, systemic risk and 
other. Also compared to other industries, banking stability is very dependent 
on trust and reputation. Because banks are clearly important to national, and 
even global economic stability, the various indicators are needed to monitor 
the bank’s performance, financial status and operational competence (Chen, 
Cheng, 2013). 
The losses and instability in banking sector often is driven by the 
systemic factors. According to Rodriguez-Moreno & Pena (2013), the 
causes of malfunctions in banking sector can be related to multiple 
mechanisms such as: 
• Macro imbalances (e.g. excessive credit expansion in the private 
or public sector).  
• Correlated exposures (e.g. herding behavior). 
• Contagions. 
9 
• Asset bubbles. 
• Negative externalities (e.g. banks too big to fall). 
• Information disruptions (e.g. freezes in the interbank market).  
Given this incomplete list of possible mechanisms influencing 
systemic risk, it is evident that various risk measures are needed to capture 
its complex nature. In particular, the policymakers charged with the 
responsibility of ensuring financial stability should rely on a wide array of 
measures. These measures should warn about the imbalances within the 
financial sector or be able to capture the abrupt materialization of systemic 
risk. With regard to the potential systemic risk’s detectors, the measures 
should be based on the aggregate market level (e.g. interbank rates and 
stock market indices) or at the level of individual institutions. These kinds 
of indicators should be underpinned by measurable patterns of systemic 
stability which form the basis for early warning and correcting. If a 
systemic risk measurement indicates that destabilizing systemic events are 
looming, preventive policies such as stricter financial regulation and more 
rigorous supervision may be justified (Rodriguez-Moreno, Pena, 2013). 
The economic history of the past two decades clearly demonstrates 
that the origins of financial crises could be noticed by either incompetent or 
inefficient operations of banks (Reddy, Nirmala, 2013). One of the key 
lessons of the recent financial crisis was that the banking sector was too 
levered, not being able to absorb market and credit losses. This turned out to 
be very costly in terms of taxpayers’ money and highly disruptive to the real 
economy reflected, for example, in output losses and steep rises in 
unemployment. The minimization of the probability of these market 
disruptions occurrence, and therefore financial stability enhancement, sets 
the ground for banks’ capital requirements regulation (Antao, Lacerda, 
2011). Many studies after the last crisis have pointed out that the credit 
boom, preceding the crisis, contribute to the vulnerability of the financial 
system and that is why the consequences of this crisis where so harsh. 
Moreover, the credit booms are some of the best indicators of financial 
crisis throughout the history of financial markets and the different studies 
proved that the credit booms reduce the financial stability in a country 
(Kero, 2013). The decline in loan quality did not come unexpectedly in 
banks of many countries. The recent empirical findings also suggest that 
there has been an expansion of low quality loans in banks. Many of the 
loans granted during the credit boom preceding the financial crisis were of 
such a bad quality that banks must have been aware of the poor loan quality 
when the loan was granted. In addition, the decrease in lending standards 
before the crisis has been shown to be related to the market structure in the 
banking sector. The loan denial rates in the subprime segment decreased 
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more in areas with highly competitive banking markets and that the market 
entry of new financial institutions induced a further decrease in lending 
standards (Hakenes, Schnabel, 2010). The loan cyclicality effect is in line 
with the suggestion that in general the credit risk spreads become high in a 
recessionary economy. The researchers note that in a booming and 
prosperous economy, a firm‘s demand for capital increases, and borrowers 
are more solvent because of increased profitability. Therefore, banks adopt 
looser screening standards and lend actively. Conversely, in a recession, 
banks severely scrutinize borrowers and lend passively. At the same time, 
the loan supply affects economic development and further causes economic 
procyclicality. Thus, economic conditions may affect the strength of banks‘ 
screening practices. Usually, banks screen their borrowers loosely in a 
booming economy and strictly in a recessionary economy (Liu, Chen, 
2012). 
Addressing the procyclicality in bank lending behavior has become 
one of the priorities for banking regulators since the financial crisis of years 
2007 – 2008. Central banks across advanced countries maintain that the 
financial stability is the key objective of their policy. A stable financial 
system is a key presumption for a healthy and successful economy, so the 
central banks‘ role is to ascertain the stability of the country‘s financial 
system (Ali, Daly, 2010). The possibility that problems in one institution 
may spread and disrupt the normal function of the entire system reinforces 
the role of capital regulation. This regulation works at least in two ways: it 
provides a loss absorbing fund for unexpected events and, if properly 
designed, introduces incentives for banks to limit the risk of their activities. 
Although the importance of high capital requirements for financial stability, 
regulation on capital has an impact on the return on equity (capital is the 
most expensive source of banks’ funding) which potentially influences the 
competitive stance in the financial sector. Against this background, global 
harmonization of prudential supervision enhancing financial stability and 
ensuring a level playing field among banks in different countries is crucial 
(Antao, Lacerda, 2011). Bank failures generate the negative externalities for 
other banks in the form of a loss of confidence in the stability of the 
financial system as a whole, losses from interbank exposures to failed 
banks, and losses from assets that the failing bank is forced to sell. This is 
different in other industries, where competitors generally gain from the 
failure of another firm. These negative externalities associated with bank 
failures offer the main rationale for financial regulation: to prevent socially 
costly bank failures (Laeven, 2011). The regulation framework of Basel III 
merges the more advanced regulatory tools for the banks‘ implementation. 
In particular, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
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proposes to introduce a countercyclical capital buffer which will be made in 
banks during the periods of excessive credit growth in order to curb the 
credit cycle and protect the banking sector from the accumulation of 
financial imbalances. Also the BCBS suggests a change in loan loss 
provisioning behaviors toward more forward-looking provisioning 
practices. These measures seek to increase the cost of making loans in terms 
of capital and loan loss provisions during the upward phase of the business 
cycle. It is largely accepted that the borrowers and banks are overconfident 
during this phase about the investment projects and the ability to repay the 
loans. Banks‘ over optimism about borrowers‘ future prospects brings more 
liberal credit policies with lower credit standards requirements. As a 
consequence, during the recessions, banks face the high non-performing 
loans (NPLs) and specific provisions problem that requires them to tighten 
the further credit supply, complicating the prospects of the country‘s 
economic recovery. These variations in lending are more than proportional 
to the changes in economic activity, suggesting that there are changes in 
bank loan supply that tend to accentuate the business cycle (Bouvatier, 
Lopez-Villavicencio, Mignon, 2012). 
Bank revenues have a time variation pattern over the business cycle. 
Since revenues are a major determinant of bank capital and lending 
capacity, the time variation may have an impact on the real economy and 
may potentially amplify the business cycle. Banks may have a preference 
for smoothing total income and thus compensate for lower volumes by 
charging higher margins during recessions. Furthermore, credit risk and 
adverse selection may be more severe problems for banks during recessions 
and thus require higher risk premia. Also, the loan markets may be less 
contestable during recessions, meaning that incumbents who resort to limit 
pricing may maintain higher margins without encouraging potential 
entrants. All of these explanations rely on banks having some market 
power, and that market power may itself be stronger during recessions. The 
countercyclical behavior of margins acts as a financial accelerator, 
amplifying the effects of any shocks on the macroeconomy (Andersen, 
Berg, Jansen, 2012). 
To keep the banking system of a country stable, the activity of banks 
must be profitable. High bank profits may be market power or efficiency-
driven. If it is the case that profits are market power-driven, then households 
and firms are likely to experience high cost of borrowing, credit rationing 
and compromised banking services, among others. More importantly, these 
experiences are likely to have adverse consequences for the economic 
growth and development, thus aggravating the social and economic 
conditions of the regions where the economic growth and poverty reduction 
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policies are predominantly financed by banks and the capital markets are 
small or inactive. However, high profitability may also be due to greater 
efficiency such that the implications of market power effects on profits may 
be discarded (Sharma, Gounder, Xiang, 2013). One prominent feature of the 
studies of credit institution profit inefficiency has been an attempt to 
delineate the effects on inefficiency measures due to institution-specific (i.e. 
bad management) or environment-specific factors. Credit institutions in one 
country may have a relatively greater inefficiency level compared to a credit 
institution in another because of factors specific to the local economy (risk 
of problem loans, lower economic growth, etc.) or because of factors 
germane to the institution itself (poor-managerial practices). The potential 
of both of these factors to impinge on inefficiency levels is not in question 
(Fitzpatrick, McQuinn, 2008). According to Mamatzakis, Kalyvas & Piesse 
(2013) the domestic or foreign bank factor also influences the bank‘s 
performance efficiency. Considering the home advantage hypothesis the 
domestic banks can operate more efficiently than foreign banks in their own 
country as they are more familiar with the local business environment and 
institutional framework. In the alternative hypothesis of the global 
advantage, the foreign banks may possess enough firm-specific advantages 
to overcome the liability of foreignness and so even outperform local 
competitors in the host economy. In terms of emerging and developing 
economies most of the evidence supports the global advantage hypothesis 
(Mamatzakis, Kalyvas, Piesse, 2013). 
 The analysis results of this chapter allow to affirm that commercial 
banks have the crucial role in the country‘s financial system and the 
economic development. For this reason the banking sector is highly 
regulated to assure the banking system stability and the implementation of 
the financial intermediation and other financial services. Many studies have 
proved that macroeconomic imbalances have the very negative impact on 
banks‘ financial results that depend on the bank‘s internal and external 
factors. To measure the condition of the commercial banks the quantitative 
indicators are needed, so the next chapter of this study aims to analyze the 
main rates of commercial banks‘ performance. 
 
1.2. The main banks‘ performance measures 
 
The stability of the banking system depends on the efficiency level 
of banks, as measured by a bank’s ability to operate close to the best-
practice frontiers. The issue of bank efficiency has become more important 
following the financial crisis and its widespread impact on the stability of 
the financial system. During the crisis, the banks demonstrated resilience to 
13 
external shocks, which alludes to the fact that an economically efficient 
bank can withstand financial market turmoil better than its inefficient 
counterpart and can contribute more to the efficient allocation of capital and 
the stability of the financial system (Shamsuddin, Xiang, 2012). Studies on 
the determinants of bank efficiency consider both internal and external 
factors. The internal factors originate from a bank’s balance sheet and 
income statement, and thus are referred to as bank-specific determinants of 
efficiency. The external factors are those that are beyond a bank’s 
management and control, often reflecting the economic and legal 
environments that affect the operation and performance of banks. Bank-
specific characteristics include total assets, equity over total assets, return 
on assets or equity, loans-to-total assets, non-performing loans (NPLs), 
costs over income and costs over total assets. The impacts of these factors 
on bank efficiency vary across studies, depending on the specific 
circumstances of the banking industry analysed (Vu, Nahm, 2013). 
Although banking institutions have become increasingly complex, the key 
drivers of their performance remain earnings, efficiency, risk-taking and 
leverage. While it is clear that a bank must be able to generate earnings, it is 
also important to take account of the composition and volatility of those 
earnings. Efficiency refers to the bank’s ability to generate revenue from a 
given amount of assets and to make profit from a given source of income 
(European Central Bank, 2010).  
According to Shamsuddin & Xiang (2012), the main groups of 
variables that affect the degree of bank‘s profit efficiency are: 
• Bank-specific characteristics: bank size, bank capitalization, 
asset quality, credit risk, liquidity risk and management ability.  
• Ownership features. 
• Transitional indicators. 
• Environmental factors including stock-market development, the 
growth rate of real GDP per capita, annual inflation rate and 
interest-rate margin. 
The efficiency level of a financial institution is an important 
indicator of its financial health and profitability. For example, the profit 
efficiency of a bank can tell us how close its profitability is to the highest 
profitability level achieved in the industry. If a bank has profit inefficiency, 
it is implied that resources are not optimally used or profit-enhancing 
opportunities are not fully utilised by the bank (Shamsuddin, Xiang, 2012). 
The efficiency of banks is also related to their risk-taking and leverage. The 
risk-taking is reflected in the necessary adjustments to earnings for the 
undertaken risks to generate them. Leverage might improve results in the 
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economic upturns but, conversely, it can also make it more likely for a bank 
to fail, due to rare, unexpected losses (European Central Bank, 2010). 
Bikker (2010) the efficiency of banks‘ performance interrelates with 
the competition in the banking market. The market structure, costs and 
profitability are the main factors of banks‘ efficiency. More efficient banks 
translate lower costs into the increased profits or price reductions in order to 
improve their competitiveness. Finally, the higher profits enable banks to 
lower their prices and become more competitive in order to increase their 
market share. Hence competition and efficiency in banking are also highly 
important: high quality at low cost boosts welfare (Bikker, 2010). 
In addition to the efficiency, the wide set of banking indicators, such 
as business model, funding strategy, market structure, stability, profitability, 
regulation, the quality of governance and a measure of financial 
globalization could explain the post incidence of the crisis both across 
countries (at the macro-level) and across banks (at the micro-level), and be 
added to the analytical toolkit available for prudential supervision. Then, the 
use of back-in-time variables is justified by the fact that these contain 
information about:  
• The health of the financial system in the past. 
• How the financial system evolves over time.  
As a consequence, they may be useful in understanding the genesis 
of the banking crises (Caprio Jr., D‘Apice, Ferri, Puopolo, 2014). 
The Euopean Central Bank the main measures of commercial banks 
performance classifies into three groups: 
• Traditional measures of performance. 
• Economic measures of performance. 
• Market-based measures of performance. 
1. Traditional measures of banks‘ performance. The main traditional 
performance measures are similar to those applied in other industries:  
• Return on equity (ROE) = Net income / Average equity. 
• Return on assets (ROA) = Net income / Total assets. 
• Cost-to-income ratio = Operating expenses / Operating revenue. 
• Net interest margin = Net interest income / Total assets. 
ROE is an internal performance measure of shareholder value, and it 
is by far the most popular measure of performance, because: 
• ROE proposes a direct assessment of the financial return of a 
shareholder’s investment. 
• ROE is easily available for analysts, only relying upon public 
information. 
• ROE allows for comparison between different companies or 
different sectors of the economy. 
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The ROE rate is a measures the returns made on the initial capital 
invested. The investors are interested in the return on equity for banks 
because the equity funds represent money given to a business without a 
stated return date or other repayment plan. Higher equity returns for the 
shareholders are always more favorable. The return on equity for banks can 
also be a competitive advantage seen by the investors. The large listed 
banks with well-employed equity capital are often very attractive for the 
capital investments. The higher investments into the banks allow to employ 
more capital and increase its regulatory requirements and financial returns. 
The return on assets (ROA) indicates the percentage of net income 
compared to bank‘s total assets. The cost-to-income ratios reflects the 
bank‘s ability to generate profits from a given revenue stream. Calculating 
this rate the impairment costs are not included into the expenses. The net 
interest margin is a measure for the income generation capacity of the 
intermediation function of commercial banks. In the calculation of net 
interest margin instead of total assets the interest earning assets can be used 
(European Central Bank, 2010). 
2. Economic measures of banks‘ performance. These measures take 
into account the development of shareholders‘ value creation and assess the 
economic results generated by a bank from its economic assets. The rates 
mainly focus on the efficiency as a most important element of bank‘s 
performance. There are two categories of indicators amongst the economic 
measures: 
• Indicators related to the total return of an investment, based on 
the concept of an opportunity cost.  
• Indicators related to the underlying level of risk associated with 
banks’ activity.  
The most popular rate in the first category is the economic value 
added (EVA). This rate is calculated: 
 
 EVA = Rf – (Wcc × Ci) – (Wcd × D) (1.2.1) 
 
Where Rf is the return on invested funds; Wcc is the weighted average 
cost of capital; Ci is the invested capital; Wcd is the weighted average cost of 
debt; D is the net debt. EVA takes into account the opportunity cost for 
shareholders to hold equity in a bank, measuring whether a bank generates 
an economic rate of return higher than the cost of invested capital in order 
to increase the market value of the company. 
 The second category are the indicators related to the underlying level 
of risk associated with banks’ activity. For a bank to be successful in its 
operations, managers must weigh complex trade-offs between growth, 
return and risk, favouring the adoption of risk-adjusted metrics. The 
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RAROC (risk-adjusted return on capital) is the expected result over 
economic capital that allows banks to allocate capital to individual business 
units according to their individual business risk. As a performance 
evaluation tool, it then assigns capital to business units based on their 
anticipated economic value added. This measure shares in common with the 
EVA that it takes into account the bank’s cost of  capital. But RAROC goes 
further because it adjusts the value-added in relation to the capital needed 
(European Central Bank, 2010). 
3. Market-based measures of banks‘ performance. These measures 
characterize the capital market value of a bank compared with the estimated 
accounting or economic value. The most commonly used rates include: 
• Total share return (TSR) is the ratio of dividends and increase of 
the stock value over the market stock price. 
• Price-earnings ratio (P/E) is a ratio of the financial results of the 
bank over its share price. 
• Price-to-book value (P/B) which relates the market value of 
shareholders’ equity to its book value. 
• Credit default swap (CDS) is the cost of insuring an unsecured 
bond of the institution for a given time period (European Central 
Bank, 2010). 
Kumbirai & Webb (2010) also point three groups of banks‘ 
performance measures. 
1. Profitability performance: 
• Return on Assets (ROA).  
• Return on Equity (ROE). 
• Cost to Income Ratio. 
2. Liquidity performance. Liquidity indicates the ability of the bank 
to meet its financial obligations in a timely and effective manner. The 
following ratios are used to measure liquidity: 
• Liquid assets to deposit-borrowing ratio (LADST) = Liquid 
asset / Customer deposit and short term borrowed funds.  
• Net loans to total asset ratio (NLTA) = Net loans / Total assets. 
• Net loans to deposit and borrowing (NLDST) = Net loans / Total 
deposits and short term borrowings. 
LADST indicates the percentage of short term obligations that could 
be met with the bank’s liquid assets in the case of sudden withdrawals. 
NLTA measures the percentage of assets that is tied up in loans. The higher 
the ratio, the less liquid the bank is. NLDST indicates the percentage of the 
total deposits locked into non-liquid assets. A high figure denotes lower 
liquidity. 
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3. Asset Credit Quality (Credit Performance). While it is expected 
that banks would bear some bad loans and losses in their lending activities, 
one of the key objectives of the bank is to minimize such losses. Credit 
performance evaluates the risks associated with the bank’s asset portfolio 
i.e. the quality of loans issued by the bank. The ratios are: 
• Non-performing loans (NPLs) ratio. 
• Loan loss reserve to gross loans (LRGL) = Loan loss reserve / 
Gross loans. 
NPLs ratio indicates the proportion of non-performing loans in 
bank‘s loan portfolio. LRGL indicates the proportion of the total portfolio 
that has been set aside but not charged off. It is a reserve for losses 
expressed as a percentage of total loans (Kumbirai, Webb, 2010). 
 Ongore & Kusa (2013) analyzed the banks‘ performance indicators 
that are given in Table 1.2.1. 
 
Table 1.2.1 
 
Banks‘ performance indicators (Ongore, Kusa, 2013) 
 
Indicator Calculation 
ROA Total income to its total assets. 
ROE Net income after taxes divided by total equity 
capital. 
NIM A percentage of earns on loans in a time period and 
other assets minus the interest paid on borrowed 
funds divided by the average amount earning assets. 
Capital adequacy Total capital to total assets. 
Asset quality Non-performing loans to total loans. 
Management 
efficiency 
Total operating revenue to total profit. 
Liquidity Total loans to total customer deposit. 
 
ROE is a financial ratio that refers to how much profit a bank earned 
compared to the total amount of shareholders‘ equity invested or found on 
the balance sheet. ROA measures the ability of the bank management to 
generate income by utilizing company assets at their disposal. In other 
words, it shows how efficiently the resources of the company are used to 
generate the income. Net interest margin (NIM) is a measure of the 
difference between the interest income generated by banks and the amount 
of interest paid out to their lenders (for example, deposits), relative to the 
amount of their (interest earning) assets. NIM measures the gap between the 
interest income the bank receives on loans and securities and interest cost of 
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its borrowed funds. It reflects the cost of bank intermediation services and 
the efficiency of the bank. The higher the net interest margin, the higher the 
bank‘s profit and the more stable the bank is. 
The capital is one of the bank specific factors that influence the level 
of bank profitability. It is the amount of own fund available to support the 
bank‘s business and act as a buffer in case of adverse situation. Banks‘ 
capital creates liquidity for the bank due to the fact that deposits are most 
fragile and prone to bank runs. Moreover, greater bank capital reduces the 
chance of distress. 
Loans are the major assets of commercial banks that generate the 
income. The quality of loan portfolio also determines the profitability of 
banks. Thus, the non-performing loans ratio is the best indicator for the 
assets quality. The major concern of all commercial banks is to keep the 
amount of non-performing loans to low level. This is so because high NPLs 
affect the profitability of the bank. Thus, the low non-performing loans to 
total loans rate shows the good health of the bank loan portfolio. 
The management efficiency is one of the key internal factors that 
determine the bank profitability. One of this ratios used to measure 
management quality is operating profit to income ratio. The higher the 
operating profits to total income (revenue) the more the efficient 
management is in terms of operational efficiency and income generation. 
The liquidity is another factor that determines the level of bank‘s 
performance. Liquidity refers to the ability of the bank to fulfill its 
obligations, mainly for depositors. The adequate level of liquidity is 
positively related with bank profitability. The most common financial ratios 
that reflect the liquidity position of a bank are customers‘ deposit to total 
assets and total loans to customers‘ deposits (Ongore, Kusa, 2013). 
Duchin & Sosyura (2014) describes some additional banks‘ 
performance ratios that are commonly used in the banks‘ practice. 
Capital ratios: 
• Tier-1 risk-based capital ratio = Tier-1 capital / Risk-weighted 
assets.  
• Total risk-based capital ratio = Total risk-based capital / Risk-
weighted assets.  
• Equity capital ratio = Equity capital / Total assets. 
Bank riskiness ratios: 
• Asset quality = negative of non-current loans and leases scaled 
by total loans and leases. 
• Liquidity = Cash / Deposits. 
• ROA volatility = Standard deviation of quarterly ROA over the 
trailing year. 
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Overall credit activity ratio:  
• Yield on loan portfolios = Interest and fee income from loans 
and leases / Total loans and leases (Duchin, Sosyura, 2014). 
Caruntu & Romanescu (2008) also suggest three additional 
commercial banks‘ performance measures: 
• Leverage multiplier = (Assets / Capital) × 100%. 
• Profit rate = (Net profit / Total revenue) × 100%. 
• The margin of assets utilization = (Total income / Total assets) × 
100%. 
The leverage multiplier is important characteristic for the banks, 
known also under the title of leverage effect. It measures the degree in 
which the attraction and using of new resources conduct to an increase of 
capital rentability. The indicator illustrates how many times a bank 
successed to multiply the invested capital by resources atraction. The 
leverage multiplier surpass normally the value 100 and illustrates the fact 
that involving of new resources is efficient for the bank, respectively when 
the resources cost is lower then the return costs. 
The profit rate is the bank‘s profitability dimension which depends 
first by the ratio between bank income and expenses, and second by the 
structure of incomes and the costs of banking activity. 
The margin of assets utilization is defined as a ratio between the total 
operational income and the total assets, illustrating the total incomes 
obtained from bank‘s assets utilization: incomes from interests, 
commissions, etc. (Caruntu, Romanescu, 2008). 
Supplementing the rates calculated by banks, the external 
independent banks‘ performance evaluation is also very important. The 
ratings of international rating agencies reflect the banks‘ activity results and 
the attractiveness of banks as investments. When properly assigned by 
rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, the ratings 
provide the objective opinions about the bank‘s creditworthiness, 
investment risk, and default probability. Usually the ratings interested 
parties include owners, customers, management, personnel, investors, 
competitors, suppliers, creditors, media, regulatory agencies, researchers, 
and special-interest groups (Chen, Cheng, 2013). Credit rating agencies 
evaluate banks, firms and governments to determine the likelihood that the 
issuer will repay the debt or can recover losses in the event of a default. 
Agencies analyze the information based on their own proprietary standards 
and then provide a single rating. Moody’s and Standard & Poor dominate 
nearly 80% of the market, Fitch accounts for nearly 15% of the market, and 
approximately a dozen more account for the remaining 5%. Credit ratings 
serve investors who want information about debt instruments but may not 
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have the resources or ability to assess public and non-public information 
about the firm, bank or government issuing the debt. With the information 
conveyed by a rating, the investors can drastically reduce their transaction 
costs within the financial markets. The ratings become a public good that 
serves the interests of the entire financial system. As the investors and other 
counterparts rely on ratings their downgrades during an economic downturn 
could contribute to the worsening of a downturn. But if the agencies do not 
make these downgrades when the risks markedly increase, the 
misinformation can also contribute to a developing disaster what happened 
in the recent financial crisis (Scalet, Kelly, 2012). 
 The banks‘ ratings also indirectly depend on the macroeconomic 
conditions in a country because, as it will be proved in further chapters of 
this sudy, the economic environment highly influences the banks‘ financial 
results. The rating agencies attribute the ratings for the countries that reflect 
their economic conditions. These sovereign credit ratings impact the 
economic environment of countries in a number of ways. The primary 
importance of ratings is the fact that they influence the interest rates at 
which countries can obtain credit on the international financial markets. 
Second, sovereign ratings also influence credit ratings of national banks and 
companies and affect their attractiveness to foreign investors by directly 
impacting the ability of firms in that country to access global capital 
markets. Third, institutional investors may be contractually restricted on the 
degree of risk they can presume which in turn implies that they cannot 
invest in debt rated below an agreed level (Teker, Pala, Kent, 2013). The 
sovereign credit rating standards of the main rating agencies have two 
aspects: qualitative and quantitative. Qualitative analysis takes several 
factors into account: a country’s economic structure, political and policy 
stability, and unexpected political incidents and developments. Quantitative 
analysis focuses on the research of a country’s macroeconomic indicators. 
A sovereign credit rating is then expressed as a combination of both 
qualitative and quantitative consideration. Different credit rating agencies 
have a different understanding of sovereign credit risk, so the importance 
assigned to qualitative and quantitative aspects varies (Chen, Cheng, Yang, 
2011). 
 The analysis allows to conclude that the quantitative commercial 
banks‘ performance measures indicate the different parameters of banks‘ 
activity. Ensuring the stability of country‘s financial system the calculation 
and monitoring of these rates are very important for banks because these 
measures allow to estimate the imperfections in bank‘s performance and to 
implement the corrective actions. These indicators and ratings depend on 
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various factors, so in the next chapter the main risks of commercial banks 
will be analyzed that influence the banks‘ performance. 
 
1.3. Commercial banks‘ risks 
 
Risk is a major concern for all financial institutions including banks 
and the different types of risks accompany their business. Although banks 
are in the business of taking risk, banking institutions need to avoid, absorb 
risk or it can be transferred to other participants. In scientific literature and 
banking practice there is no equable classification of banks‘ risks. 
Jasevičienė & Valiulienė (2013) maintain that the main commercial banks‘ 
risks are credit, market, liquidity, operational, concentration, and other 
(Figure 1.3.1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3.1. The main risks of commercial banks (Jasevičienė, Valiulienė, 
2013) 
 
According to National Bank of Serbia (2014), the main risks to 
which the banks are particularly exposed in their operations are:  
• Liquidity risk. 
• Credit risk. 
• Market risks (interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk and risk 
from change in market price of securities, financial derivatives 
and commodities). 
• Exposure risks. 
• Investment risks. 
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• Risks relating to the country of origin of the entity to which a 
bank is exposed. 
• Operational risk.  
• Legal risk. 
• Reputational risk. 
• Strategic risk. 
The European Banking Authority (2013) points the main risks that 
face the European Union banking sector in Figure 1.3.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3.2. Main risks facing the EU banking sector (European Banking 
Authority, 2013) 
 
Faure (2013) describes these main risks that must assess and manage 
all commercial banks: 
• Interest rate risk. 
• Market risk. 
• Liquidity risk. 
• Credit risk. 
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• Currency risk. 
• Counterparty risk. 
• Operational risk. 
According to Garcia, Gimenez & Guijarro (2013) the financial 
institutions face these main types of risk: 
• Market risk: unexpected changes in prices or rates. 
• Credit risk: unexpected changes in value associated with 
changes in credit quality. 
• Liquidity risk: the risk that the costs of adjusting financial 
positions will increase substantially or that a company will lose 
access to financing. 
• Operational risk: associated to human factors: fraud, system 
failures, trading errors. 
• Systemic risk: chain reaction crises affecting the whole market. 
Al-Jarrah (2012) points that the sources of risks facing financial 
institutions can be decomposed into two main categories: systematic and 
non-systematic. The systematic or market risk is the risk that has a broad 
impact on all financial institutions in the market though the magnitude of 
the impact might not be uniform. Furthermore, the sources of systematic 
risk are related to variables that are outside of the bank’s control. On the 
other hand, the non-systematic sources of risk vary and related partly to 
bank-specific variables. Below the analysis of the main banks‘ risks is 
given. 
Credit risk is the risk of negative effects on the financial result and 
capital of the bank caused by borrower’s default on its obligations to the 
bank. The credit risk severally in more detailed way will be analyzed in next 
chapter of this study. 
Liquidity risk is the risk of negative effects on the financial result 
and capital of the bank caused by the bank’s inability to meet all its due 
obligations (National Bank of Serbia, 2014). Al-Jarrah (2012) defines the 
liquidity risk as the potential loss to an institution from either its inability to 
meet its obligations or to fund increases in assets as they fall due without 
incurring unacceptable cost or losses. Liquidity risk for a bank is the risk of 
not being able to meet obligations in terms of funds demanded by clients. 
This applies to both sides of the balance sheet of banks, i. e. to withdrawals 
of deposits and to loans drawn down by borrowing clients in terms of loan 
commitments made by the banks. Banks are in the financial intermediation 
business and essentially transmute mostly short-term liquid deposits into 
loans and investments, which are for the most part non-liquid and have the 
longer terms. Banks cannot repay all deposits immediately. They rely on the 
position that only a certain proportion of depositors will demand their funds 
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at the same time, and determines its liquid asset holdings (Faure, 2013). 
Liquidity risk is not only a source of banks’ funding risk (the ability to raise 
cash to fund the assets), but also has a strong link to market liquidity (the 
ability to convert assets into cash at a given price). The originate-to-
distribute model has made banks increasingly dependent on market liquidity 
to secure funding by issuing securities on wholesale markets and by trading 
credits. As a result, banks have become more vulnerable to macroeconomic 
and financial shocks that may engender liquidity risk (End, 2010). 
Operational risk is the risk of negative effects on the financial 
result and capital of the bank caused by omissions in the work of 
employees, inadequate internal procedures and processes, inadequate 
management of information and other systems, and unforeseeable external 
events (National Bank of Serbia, 2014). Risk measurement techniques of 
banks now are extended to operational risk, which is the risk of losses 
resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and systems 
or from external events. It is the risk of loss arising from the potential that 
inadequate information system, technology failure, breaches in internal 
controls, fraud, unforeseen catastrophes, or any other sources of operational 
problems (Al-Jarrah, 2012). Operational risk has caused large losses to 
financial institutions. As a result, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision mandated a new capital charge against operational risk. This 
forced the banks to pay attention and to measure operational risk. The most 
advanced methods for operational risk measurement are based on the 
frequency of losses over a horizon as well as the severity of losses when 
they happen. These two statistical distributions are combined into a 
distribution of losses, which is summarized by the worst loss at a high 
confidence level.  However, the measurement of operational risk is still 
controversial. Data on large operational risk losses are scarcer than for other 
types of risk. In addition, losses may not be applicable to banks with 
different control environments. Even so, institutions that are now measuring 
operational risk find that this often leads to improvements in internal 
processes (Jorion, 2010). 
Market risk (also called position risk, trading risk and price risk) is 
the risk of a decline in the market value of financial securities (shares, debt 
and derivatives) that is caused by unexpected changes in market prices and 
interest rates, and changes in credit spreads (Faure, 2013). Market risk 
exposure may be explicit in portfolios of securities and instruments that are 
actively traded. Conversely, it may be implicit such as interest rate risk due 
to mismatch of loans and deposits. Therefore, market risk is the risk that the 
value of on and off-balance sheet positions of a financial institution will be 
adversely affected by movements in market rates or prices such as interest 
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rates, foreign exchange rates, equity prices, credit spreads and commodity 
prices resulting in a loss to earnings and capital (Al-Jarrah, 2012). Market 
risk can be divided into the interest rate and foreign exchange risk. 
Interest rate risk is the risk of negative effects on the financial result 
and capital of the bank caused by changes in interest rates (National Bank 
of Serbia, 2014). This is the risk of expected earnings being influenced 
negatively as a result of changes in the pattern and level of interest rates 
(Faure, 2013). Interest rate risk, the most important type of market risk, 
arises when there is a mismatch between positions, which are subject to 
interest rate adjustment within a specified period. The bank’s lending, 
funding and investment activities give rise to interest rate risk. The 
immediate impact of variation in interest rate is on bank’s net interest 
income, while a long term impact is on bank’s net worth since the economic 
value of bank’s assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet exposures are 
affected (Al-Jarrah, 2012). The interest rates also are influenced by the 
concentration and competition in the banking market. The risk-shifting 
effect accounts for fewer firm defaults when loan rates decrease in a more 
competitive banking market. However, there is also a margin effect that 
reduces the interest payments from performing loans and thus bank 
revenues. These two effects work in opposite directions, so that the net 
effect on bank risk-taking and financial stability is unclear. Often the risk-
shifting effect is shown to be dominated by the margin effect in competitive 
banking markets, such that increased competition increases bank failure 
risk. Also in a more concentrated banking market the risk-shifting effect can 
dominate and thus bank failure risk can decline with increased competition. 
Overall, there is a U-shaped relationship between bank competition in the 
market, which is measured by the number of banks, and the risk of bank 
failure (Jimenez, Lopez, Saurina, 2013). 
Foreign exchange risk is the risk of negative effects on the financial 
result and capital of the bank caused by changes in exchange rates (National 
Bank of Serbia, 2014). The foreign exchange risk is the current or 
prospective risk to earnings and capital arising from adverse movements in 
currency exchange rates. It refers to the impact of adverse movement in 
currency exchange rates on the value of open foreign currency position. The 
banks are exposed to exchange rate risk, which arises from the maturity 
mismatching of foreign currency positions. In the foreign exchange 
business, banks also face the risk of default of the counter parties or 
settlement risk (Al-Jarrah, 2012). Faure (2013) this risk refers as the 
currency risk. Certain financial intermediaries‘ asset portfolios are made up 
of domestic and foreign securities. In addition to their foreign portfolios, 
banks also play a major role in the derivative foreign exchange markets. 
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Internationally, banks also have liabilities in foreign currencies. Most large 
banks are exposed to currency risk, which may be defined as the risk of 
changes in currency values unfavourably affecting the values of assets and 
liabilities that are denominated in currencies other than the domestic 
currency. Because banks, are highly leveraged, their exposure to currency 
risk can be devastating on their profitability and to their capital position 
(Faure, 2013). 
A special type of market risk is the risk of change in the market price 
of securities, financial derivatives or commodities traded or tradable in the 
market.  
Exposure risks include risks of bank’s exposure to a single entity or 
a group of related entities, and risks of banks’ exposure to a single entity 
related with the bank. 
Investment risks include risks of bank’s investments in entities that 
are not entities in the financial sector and in fixed assets. 
Country risk is the risk of negative effects on the financial result 
and capital of the bank due to bank’s inability to collect claims from such 
entity for reasons arising from political, economic or social conditions in 
such entity’s country of origin. Country risk includes political and economic 
risk, and transfer risk. 
Legal risk is the risk of loss caused by penalties or sanctions 
originating from court disputes due to breach of contractual and legal 
obligations, and penalties and sanctions pronounced by a regulatory body.  
Reputational risk is the risk of loss caused by a negative impact on 
the market positioning of the bank. 
Strategic risk is the risk of loss caused by a lack of a long-term 
development component in the bank’s managing team (National Bank of 
Serbia, 2014). 
Counterparty risk. Each party to a deal has a party on the other side 
of the deal which may renege on the deal or be a fraudulent party and may 
not perform in terms of the conditions of the deal. If a party fails to settle a 
deal the counterparty will do another deal which may not be as favourable 
and may result a loss as the unsettled deal. This risk is termed as the 
counterparty or settlement risk (Faure, 2013). 
 Systemic risk is the likelihood of experiencing a systemic failure, a 
broad-based breakdown of the financial system that is triggered by a strong 
systemic event (e.g., a financial institution failure), which severely and 
negatively impacts the financial markets and the economy in general (Patro, 
Qi, Sun, 2013). Compared to other sectors the systematic component of 
default plays a particularly important role in the banking industry. Due to 
the systemic nature of banking within the financial system there are banks 
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whose default can potentially generate a cascade of failures. In contrast, 
there are other banks whose default is highly unlikely to generate a 
cascading failure. Traditionally, the incidence of systemic risk by banks was 
mostly associated to size but the recent financial crisis has shown that there 
are other factors having an impact on systemic risk. The individual bank 
default can also have adverse effects on non-financial companies. For 
instance, due to its impact on the supply of credit to borrowers, or via 
perceived increases in the future cost of financing via financial markets if 
there are closer connections between the banking sector and the overall 
financial markets (Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez, 2013). Systemic risk in 
banking systems is rooted in interbank relationships. The existing bank risk 
management techniques or measurements were mainly developed for 
individual banks, thus they are not very effective in modeling and analyzing 
systemic risk. The major challenge for modeling systemic risk is capturing 
the two risk sources: 
• The insolvent bank may default on its interbank payment 
obligations to other banks and cause more banks to fail, thereby 
triggering a domino effect which is often called contagious bank 
failures. 
• The adverse economic shock may cause significant losses in 
banks’ correlated financial asset portfolios and result in 
simultaneous failures of multiple banks.  
These two systemic risk sources are not independent of each other 
and often exist at the same time (Hu, Zhao, Hua, Wong, 2012). The 
systemic risk can be measured by the probability, severity, and exposure of 
a systemic failure. It is important to distinguish systemic risk from a 
systemic event and from systemic failure. Systemic risk is not systemic 
failure, even when such a risk is high. Whether a systemic failure happens 
or not depends on whether there is a sufficiently strong triggering event and 
whether that triggering event occurs in a high enough risk environment as to 
likely cause systemic failure (Patro, Qi, Sun, 2013). 
The recent financial crisis triggered a paradigm shift in banking 
regulation from an essentially microprudential approach aiming at 
individual institutions to a macroprudential approach aiming at the stability 
of a whole financial system. From this perspective banks are considered not 
as isolated business entities, but as interacting institutions whose failure 
may produce externalities and put the system’s stability at risk. A 
macroprudential approach to banking regulation would internalize negative 
external effects by imposing systemic capital surcharges so that they reflect 
banks’ individual contributions to the risk of the whole financial system 
(Puzanova, Dullmann, 2013). Rodriguez-Moreno & Pena (2013) also 
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maintain that until recently, risk management in the financial industry has 
usually focused on individual institution’s market, credit and operational 
risks and ignored systemic risk. In this vein, the Basel I (1988) and Basel II 
(2004) Capital Accords advised risk management policy on the basis of the 
banks’ portfolios, ignoring interconnection among banks. However, as the 
2007 – 2009 crisis has shown, this bank-specific perspective is not 
sufficient to appropriately ensure the soundness of the financial system. 
This is because the risk it poses the system is greater than the sum of the 
risk faced by individual institutions. Nevertheless, this issue was addressed 
in the new Basel III (2011) Accord in which capital buffers were improved 
(quality and quantity) and a macro-prudential overlay proposed to deal with 
systemic risk (Rodriguez-Moreno, Pena, 2013). 
 After the analysis of banks‘ risks it can be concluded that this sector 
meets very high number of different risks types, so the banks‘ managers 
must understand their exposure and be able to manage these risks. To assure 
the continuity of banks‘ performance it is necessary to develop the risk 
management system in every bank considering the regulatory requirements. 
As the banks play very important role in the country‘s financial system and 
whole economy, the risk management actions must be directed towards the 
whole changing environment, because the financial problems of banks 
mostly depend on the improperly evaluated risk determinants. This is 
evident according to the recent financial crisis and the macroeconomic 
deterioration in many countries. While this study is concentated to the credit 
risk, in the next chapter the main peculiarities of this risk will be analyzed. 
Further, the main effects of macroeconomic changes on credit risk in banks 
will be revealed. 
 
1.4. Credit risk management in banks 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) defines the 
credit risk as the potential that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to 
meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms. It is usually associated 
with loans and securities that generate interest income, thus being the 
primary source of bank revenue (Gavalas, Syriopoulos, 2014). According 
Jasevičienė & Valiulienė (2013) credit risk is the probability that one side of 
transaction will not be capable to pay back according to the way stated in 
the contract. Also credit risk can be defined as a category of damage, which 
might occur due to the debtor’s incapability to apply the undertakings stated 
in the contract or due to the reverse of the debtor’s quality of 
creditworthiness. Credit risk arises from the potential that an obligor is 
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either unwilling to perform on an obligation or its ability to perform such 
obligation is impaired (Al-Jarrah, 2012). 
In a commercial bank, credit risk in lending activities is the 
possibility that the actual returns on a loan may vary from what the lenders 
expected, the difference of which represents financial loss. In other words 
credit risk is the risk of repayment or the possibility that an obligor will fail 
to perform as agreed and adversely affects capital and earnings. Credit risk 
is critical since the default of a small number of important borrowers can 
generate large losses, potentially leading to the insolvency of bank. A bank 
may strive towards high volume of credit by building up huge level of 
advances portfolio, but this growth is also accompanied by higher risk of 
incurring high credit losses. While the credit targets keep on pushing banks 
towards aggressive approach, the risk management aspect compels them to 
be rather conservative. To ensure proper risk management without 
compromising on volume of credit operations, the bank managers have to 
also ensure that the credit risk management framework is appropriately 
designed and implemented (Arora, 2012). Higher credit risk may lead to 
lower profitability of a bank due to a greater likelihood of uncollectible 
amounts owed by bank clients. In regards to corporate governance, banks 
should have a system of rules, procedures, and regulations to ensure that 
agency costs, or costs of minimizing the agency problem and, consequently, 
moral hazard, are as low as possible, as a way to maintain and increase the 
shareholders‘ value (Berrios, 2013). 
The credit risk of the loan and the debtor is measured by the main 
indicators: the probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and 
exposure at default (EAD). 
Bank of Lithuania has defined that:  
• The probability of default is a probability that the debtor will not 
apply the undertakings in the period of one year. 
• The loss given default is the proportion (expressed in percent) of 
the loss due to the debtor’s failure to apply the undertaking and 
value of the position, which appears when undertakings are not 
applied. 
• The exposure at default is the amount of a balance sheet items of 
bank or non-balance claims included in the banking book at the 
day of failing to apply the undertakings (Jasevičienė, Valiulienė, 
2013). 
Studies examining the early warning predictive signals of business 
default have received widespread and growing attention over last years, 
since such predictive signals have come to be regarded as extremely 
important for both the financial and non-financial sectors of any economy. 
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Clearly, it is of considerable importance for firms within the non-financial 
sectors to be aware of the probability of default amongst their competitors. 
However, within the financial sector, referring particularly to the banking 
industry, an awareness of the probability of default helps to reduce 
occurrences of non-performing loans and ensures the appropriate capital 
allocation. It also seems obvious that investors can gain from studies on 
predictive signals of business default, since an awareness of such signals 
can clearly assist them to avoid the pursuit of poor investment targets or 
unwise investment in questionable assets. Signals of corporate default are 
also undoubtedly of value to the relevant authorities, since they can assist 
the various bodies to monitor the relevant industries so as to avoid any 
potential systematic risk (Lu, Shen, Wei, 2013). Therefore, forecasting the 
bankruptcy of companies is an issue which nowadays is becoming 
increasingly important and worthwhile to analyze. In most cases, 
bankruptcy is a continuous process, where it is possible to distinguish 
several stages – from the emergence of the first signs of financial crisis, 
through blindness and ignorance towards the financial and nonfinancial 
symptoms of crisis in a firm, to inappropriate activities that lead to the final 
phase of the crisis, which is bankruptcy. The process of going bankrupt may 
even take up to 5 – 6 years. This is not a sudden phenomenon, impossible to 
predict. Therefore, the earlier warning signals are detected, the more time 
managers will have for preparing and reacting in subsequent phases of the 
crisis (Korol, 2013). 
 Managing the credit risk in banks the regulatory capital according to 
the BCBS requirements can be calculated by: 
• The standardized approach. 
• The internal ratings based approach. 
In the standardized approach, to be used by less sophisticated banks, 
Basel II bases risk weightings for credit risk exposure on rating agencies’ 
assessments. Basel II was implemented into EU law in 2005 as the capital 
requirements directive. The approach has not been changed in the Basel III 
proposals, nor in the EU’s draft implementing Basel III. On the contrary, 
the reliance on the standardized approach may become even more prevalent, 
as the internal ratings-based approach has come under much criticism in the 
post-crisis context. Less known is that the UCITS III directive, governing 
the asset allocation of investment funds, also requires an investment grade 
rating for investments by money market funds. The sector has already been 
raising this issue with the authorities for some time, but they have yet to act 
(Tichy, 2011). 
Under the Basel II guidelines (also incorporated in Basel III), banks 
are allowed to use their own estimated risk parameters for the purpose of 
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calculating regulatory capital. This is known as the Internal-Ratings-Based 
(IRB) approach to capital requirements for credit risk. Only banks meeting 
certain minimum conditions, disclosure requirements, and approval from 
their national supervisor are allowed to use this approach in estimating 
capital for various risk exposures. The IRB approach relies on a bank’s own 
assessment of its counterparties and exposures in order to calculate capital 
requirements for credit risk (Gavalas, Syriopoulos, 2014). These guidelines 
of the BCBS instigated commercial banks to develop internal credit 
evaluation models to assess the hazards of borrowers entering into default 
that are subsequently used as key inputs in the pricing of credit (and its 
derivatives) and the determination of minimum capital requirements. These 
models are of importance for regulators in assessing pressures in the 
corporate sector and for supervisors in identifying early warning signals 
arising from bank loan portfolios which can prove risky for banks and 
ultimately for the entire financial system (Bhimani, Gulamhussen, Lopes, 
2013). By the IRB banks are responsible for determining PD and 
demonstrating the appropriateness of techniques used for measuring PD to 
banking supervisors. In practice, the PD models are necessary not only for 
regulatory capital calculation as PD models or credit scoring models can be 
used effectively to control risk selection, manage credit losses, evaluate new 
loan programs, reduce loan approval processing time, ensure that the 
existing credit criteria are sound and consistently applied, increase 
profitability and minimize acquisition costs (Genriha, Voronova, 2012). 
The researchers in scientific literature distinguish three main 
categories of PD calculation models:  
• Expert systems.  
• Credit scoring models. 
• Rating systems (Mačerinskienė, Ivaškevičiūtė, 2008). 
The expert systems of credit risk assessment are in the system 
development process extracted rules that are represented as a decision table. 
Further this graphical representation can be readily interpreted by credit 
experts in the loan applicant‘s credit risk assessment process (Baesens, 
Setiono, Mues, Viaene, Vanthienen, 2001). An expert  system is a simply 
system that uses a collection of membership functions and rules. The rules  
in an expert system are usually of a form similar to the  following: if A is 
low and B is high then X is medium, where A and B  are input variables, X 
is an output variable.  Here low, high, and medium are the variables defined 
on A, B, and X respectively.  
The expert system modeling can be pursued using the following 
steps: 
• Selection of relevant input and output variables. 
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• Selection a specific type of inference system. 
• Design and description of if – then rules. 
The obtained rules by the bank‘s experts must be selected according 
to their importance. The designed expert system is based on  the rules and 
the defined membership functions by the experts. The expert system is used 
as the final predicting model for credit assessment of the bank‘s  customers. 
One of the advantages of this model is the combination of the knowledge of 
the bank’s experts and the rules extracted in the system‘s development 
process (Nosratabadi, Nadali, Pourdarab, 2012). The example of expert 
system is given in Table 1.4.1. 
 
Table 1.4.1 
 
The rules of credit risk assessment expert system (Nosratabadi, Nadali, 
Pourdarab, 2012) 
 
 
Current ratio Debt ratio 
Net benefit 
ratio 
Claims 
collection 
period 
Credit degree 
of customer 
1. Medium High Low Medium Low 
2. High Low Medium Medium Medium 
3. Medium Low High - High 
4. Medium High - Low Medium 
5. High Low Low High Medium 
6. Low Medium Medium High Low 
7. - - High Low High 
8. High Low Medium Medium Medium 
9. High Medium High Low High 
10. Medium High Medium Low Medium 
11. - High Low - Low 
12. Low Medium Medium Medium Medium 
 
Judgmental or expert-based models are established through set of 
formal rule-of-thumb quantitative criteria. It is an easiest way to incorporate 
the best practices and the knowledge of credit managers into formal 
automated decision rules (Nikolic, Zarkic-Joksimovic, Stojanovski, 
Joksimovic, 2013). But the environment is complex and it is impossible for 
decision makers, even highly specialized banks, to achieve full information 
about the objective risk properties of borrowers. Strict optimization 
therefore is not possible due to a lack of access to and computability of 
information. Thus, decision-makers develop decisional rules that abstract 
from the complex environment and rely on a reduced subset of information. 
After an evolutionary process, only those rules survive that enable the 
prevalent (presumably unalterable) probability distribution to be accurately 
approximated. The information that is required for these risk-evaluation 
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procedures however is not easy to obtain, and problems of asymmetric 
information are common. It is possible that the risk exposure of a potential 
borrower cannot be fully identified. Consequently, it is not possible to 
match each borrower with the perfectly correct, risk-adjusted loan rate 
(Ramskogler, 2011). 
The scoring models apply statistical data processing methods and 
historical data to obtain borrower’s credit score, which can be used to 
allocate the borrowers to groups. There are many definitions for credit 
scoring, but most of them have mentioned credit scoring as a classification 
method, which categories customers into two main groups: 
• Creditworthy customers. 
• High default risk customers. 
The benefits of customer credit scoring can be explained by 
decreasing the cost of credit analysis, easily making decisions for loan 
applicants and reducing customer credit risk. With a large number of 
customer credit cards and customer loan applications, financial institutes 
need to develop various kinds of credit scoring models to make better credit 
decisions. Therefore, new models should be developed to make more 
accurate predictions (Siami, Gholamian, Basiri, 2013). Credit scoring 
models play an important role in contemporary banking risk management 
practice. They contribute to the key requirement in loan approval process, 
which is to accurately and efficiently quantify the level of credit risk 
associated with a customer. The credit scoring models objective is to predict 
future behavior in terms of credit risk by relying on past experience of 
customers with similar characteristics. The level of credit risk of a borrower 
is associated with probability that it will default on approved loan over 
given time horizon, usually 1 year. The main task of credit scoring model is 
to provide discrimination between good and bad corporate entities in terms 
of their creditworthiness. Discrimination ability is the key indicator of 
model successfulness. The higher the discrimination power the more precise 
the credit scoring model will be (Nikolic, Zarkic-Joksimovic, Stojanovski, 
Joksimovic, 2013).  
The models of this type are based on the determination of one 
quantitative measure for a borrower, which is obtained when customer’s 
data is entered into statistical models. The scientists distinguish these forms 
of methods: linear probability model, probit model, artificial neural 
networks, decision tree, logit model, discriminant analysis (Mačerinskienė, 
Ivaškevičiūtė, 2008). According to Zhang, Gao & Shi (2014) mostly these 
methods have been proposed for credit scoring: logistic regression, probit 
regression, nearest neighbour analysis, Bayesian network, artificial neural 
networks, decision trees, genetic algorithm, multiple criteria decision 
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making, support vector machine, and so on. However, Blanco, Pino-Mejias, 
Lara & Rayo (2013) affirm that the strict assumptions (linearity, normality 
and independence among predictor variables) of the traditional statistical 
models, together with the pre-existing functional form relating response 
variables to predictor variables, limit their application in the real world. For 
these reasons, in recent years, non-parametric statistical models, such as the 
k-nearest neighbour algorithm, support vector machines, decision tree and 
artificial neural network models have been successfully applied to credit 
scoring problems. Of these, artificial neural networks (ANNs) constitute 
one of the most powerful tools for pattern classification due to their 
nonlinear and non-parametric adaptive-learning properties. Many studies 
have been conducted that have compared ANNs with other traditional 
classification techniques in the field of credit scoring models, since the 
default prediction accuracies of ANNs are better than those using classic 
linear discriminant analysis and logistic regression (Blanco, Pino-Mejias, 
Lara, Rayo, 2013). 
The default probability is usually obtained as a linear function from a 
set of economic and financial variables that provide information about 
different aspects of corporate clients: size, liquidity, solvency, profitability, 
debt, etc. A scoring or ranking model combines these variables in order to 
obtain an accurate assessment of default probability, thus serving to 
automate the evaluation process of default risk measurement within a 
financial institution. In order to obtain the aforementioned function, a set of 
explanatory variables x and a binary variable y corresponding with the 
company situation are related: y takes the value of 1 if the company has 
defaulted, and 0 otherwise. The problem can be summarized as finding a 
function that relates the dependent variable (default) with the set of 
explanatory variables (Garcia, Gimenez, Guijarro, 2013). Models 
constructed on the basis of financial reporting information assume that 
accounting statements give an objective view of the financial standing of 
firms. However, there is evidence that firms generally, and especially those 
entering into default, have incentives to dress their accounts. Non-financial 
information can play an important role not only in moderating the influence 
of financial reporting information, but also in understanding other factors 
driving default, especially for non-listed firms for which financial reporting 
information, especially in the start-up phase, may altogether not be 
available. Criticisms of the sole use of financial information in predicting 
default have led to the use of non-financial information such as age and size 
which are associated with stable cash flow streams. Both age and size have 
been found to significantly influence economic distress (Bhimani, 
Gulamhussen, Lopes, 2013). 
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For the accurate loan applicant‘s classification the data quality is 
very important. Data quality can be measured by many dimensions, such as 
accuracy, completeness, timeliness, relevance, objectivity, believability and 
other. Some of these dimensions (e.g., accuracy and objectivity) lend 
themselves to objective measurement that is intrinsic to the data itself and is 
independent from the context in which the data are used. There are, 
however, the dimensions that cannot be measured objectively. For example, 
relevance and believability that tend to vary with the usage context. Data 
relevance mostly depends on the task, because data that are highly relevant 
for one task may be irrelevant for another. To understand the contextual 
effects of data quality, it is important to take factors that pertain to the use 
of data into account. Also the most frequently mentioned data quality 
dimensions in the representation and access categories are representational 
consistency, easily-understandable, accessibility and security (Moges, 
Dejaeger, Lemahieu, Baesens, 2013). In general, for decision-makers, a 
high degree of informational quality entails the more efficient loan portfolio 
management which involves the lower costs (Dragota, Tilica, 2014). 
Credit scoring models have been extensively used to evaluate the 
credit risk of consumers or enterprises, and they can classify the applicants 
as either accepted or rejected according to their specific characteristics 
(Zhang, Gao, Shi, 2014). Contemporary risk management practice 
emphasizes and promotes the use of credit scoring models for various asset 
classes of bank’s credit portfolio. Retail banks use application and 
behavioral credit scoring models for automation of loan approval process 
for individuals. By employing process automation, the bank’s staff costs are 
reduced, loan approval process is simplified, speeded up and more control 
on approval decision making process is attained (Nikolic, Zarkic-
Joksimovic, Stojanovski, Joksimovic, 2013). But it is also concluded that 
main imperfections in individual loan evaluation using scoring models are 
that in creation of models characteristics of bank’s borrowers who were 
granted a loan are used, while it is not known whether the persons (or 
entities) whose applications for loans were rejected would have been able to 
meet their obligations or not. Additionally, the size of groups of borrowers 
that met their obligations and failed to meet their obligations are not equal 
(Mačerinskienė, Ivaškevičiūtė, 2008). 
The more complex compared to credit scoring models are the credit 
rating systems. Implementing the BCBS requirements banks must classify 
the loan applicants into not less than 8 risk groups (ratings). The rating 
objective is to set accurate ratings that inform about the probability of 
default over a given time horizon. With a ratings-based credit risk 
assessment, the rating determines the interest rate of loan and the regulatory 
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capital hold by bank for the particular loan. The banks assign high credit 
ratings, leading to lower interest rates for the borrowing firm that has the 
lower default probability. Also banks assign low credit ratings, leading to 
higher interest rates for the borrowing firm with a higher default probability 
(Manso, 2013). Credit ratings are the assessments of the creditworthiness of 
debtors, and involve a hierarchical ranking process by which credit is 
classified into different risk categories. The banks develop their own rating 
scale that is very similar as of the credit rating agencies, such as Standard & 
Poor‘s, Moody’s and Fitch (Table 1.4.2).  
 
Table 1.4.2 
 
Rating scales used by Moody‘s and Standard & Poor‘s (Iyengar, 2012) 
 
Interpretation 
No. 
Moody‘s 
ratings 
Standard 
& Poor‘s 
ratings 
Grading Credit risk 
Capacity to meet 
financial 
commitment 
1. Aaa AAA Highest quality Minimal Extremely strong 
2. Aa1 AA+ 
3. Aa2 AA 
4. Aa3 AA- 
High quality Very low Very strong 
5. A1 A+ 
6. A2 A 
7. A3 A- 
Upper-medium Low Still strong 
8. Baa1 BBB+ 
9. Baa2 BBB 
10. Baa3 BBB- 
Medium Moderate Weakened 
11. Ba1 BB+ 
12. Ba2 BB 
13. Ba3 BB- 
Lower-medium Substantial Inadequate 
14. B1 B+ 
15. B2 B 
16. B3 B- 
Low High Impaired 
17. Caa1 CCC+ 
18. Caa2 CCC 
19. Caa3 CCC- 
Poor Very high Not likely 
20. Ca1 CC+ 
21. Ca2 CC 
22. Ca3 CC- 
Very low Very near default 
Vulnerable to non-
payment 
23. C1 C+ 
24. C2 C 
25. C3 C- 
Lowest In default 
Highly vulnerable 
to non-payment 
 
The credit rating is a benchmark measure of default probability, 
namely, of a debtor failing to meet its obligations under the debt contract, 
and of the expected associated losses. Low ratings indicate high risk of 
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default. Banks use credit ratings to indicate the likelihood of receiving their 
money back in accordance with the debt contract terms (Chen, Cheng, 
2013). 
In addition to the enterprises‘ PD assessment methods, the market 
models also are being applied. In this case the default is related to the 
capital structure of firms: firms default on their obligations if the market 
value of their assets falls below a threshold determined by the respective 
default model. Restricted liability creates incentives for partners to default 
and to shift ownership to lenders and consequently ensure a minimum limit 
in the settlement of their equity. This framework is the basis of the 
benchmark credit risk models (e.g. the JP Morgan’s CreditMetrics and 
Moody’s KMV). The inputs required for these models, in particular are 
market-based data that are available for listed firms but not for non-listed 
firms, what limits their applicability (Bhimani, Gulamhussen, Lopes, 2013). 
The most central risk parameter of the loans is not only the 
previously analyzed probability of default (PD), but also the loss given 
default (LGD) is very important. A decade ago, the focus of academic 
research and banking practice was mainly on the prediction of PDs, but 
more recently, substantial effort has been put into modeling LGDs (Gurtler, 
Hibbeln, 2013). Loss Given Default is the loss incurred by a financial 
institution when an obligor defaults on a loan, given as the fraction of 
exposure at default (EAD) unpaid after some period of time. It is usual for 
LGD to have a value between 0 and 1, where 0 means that the balance is 
fully recovered and 1 means the total loss of EAD. LGD is an important 
value that, for several reasons, banks need to estimate accurately: 
• Firstly, it can be used along with the probability of default (PD) 
and EAD to estimate the expected financial loss. 
• Secondly, a forecast of LGD for an individual can help to 
determine the collection policy to be used for that individual 
following default. For example, if a high LGD is expected, then 
more effort may be employed to help reduce this loss. 
• Thirdly, an estimate of LGD, and therefore of the portfolio 
financial risk, is an integral part of the operational calculation of 
capital requirements to cover credit loss during extreme 
economic conditions (Bellotti, Crook, 2012). 
The requirements of the Basel II/III framework allow for banks to 
provide their own estimates of the LGD when using the advanced internal 
ratings based (A-IRB) approach for corporates or the IRB approach for 
retail exposures. In addition to the regulatory requirement, accurate 
predictions of LGDs are important for risk-based decision making, e.g. the 
risk-adjusted pricing of loans, economic capital calculations, and the pricing 
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of asset-backed securities or credit derivatives. Consequently, banks using 
LGD models with high predictive power can generate competitive 
advantages, whereas weak predictions can lead to adverse selection 
(Gurtler, Hibbeln, 2013). 
 Taking the analyzed 3 credit risk measures (PD, LGD and EAD) 
together the expected credit losses are calculated as the product of the 
average probability of default (PD) for the loan portfolio, the exposure at 
default (EAD) and the loss given default (LGD). The losses stemming from 
the described credit risk calculations can to some extent be covered by 
available net income. Therefore, bank income is taken into account as the 
first line of defense against the losses. In particular, it is assumed that banks 
will use all available income to sustain their capital adequacy ratio at the 
same level when hit by a financial shock. If income is insufficient to fully 
absorb the losses emerging in the macroeconomic scenario under 
consideration, the losses are deducted from bank capital (Fungačova, 
Jakubik, 2013). 
There are the particular peculiarities in the projects‘ credit risk 
assessment. The project finance has two sources of funds: debt and equity. 
Banks are the largest providers of debt capital in project finance and the 
financial structure of the project (leverage ratio) is very important in 
convincing bankers to provide capital. It implies that banks must pay 
particular attention to the evaluation of the credit risk of the project. The 
failure of the project, and the subsequent borrowers’ insolvency, may 
damage lenders heavily. 
The assessment of economic and financial feasibility of the project 
made by the banks should primarily evaluate the expected economic return 
of the project on medium and long term, rather than focusing on collaterals 
provided by sponsors or third parties. To assess the creditworthiness of a 
project is necessary to carry out a feasibility study. Preliminary test of 
project practicability is the first step for banks. The project should be 
technically feasible and economically viable. A static analysis of the project 
focuses on assets characteristics, tangibility and marketability of corporate 
assets, as well as firm’s solvency ratios. In the standard corporate lending 
the lender has security over tangible assets. A dynamic analysis is necessary 
in funding project finance because lender’s primary security is the future 
revenue stream of the project. It is a different type of analysis that focuses 
on the expected economic and financial returns associated with the project. 
In particular, a lender should deeply evaluate the degree of innovation of the 
project, the professional skills of people who will execute and manage the 
project, the capabilities, competences, and knowledge of firms involved in 
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the project, the reaction of the target market to the introduction of new 
services and products (Scannella, 2013). 
The real effects of bank lending depend on the agency costs of 
investment faced by a firm, which are negligible at times when profits and 
the share of internal finance are large, when uncertainty about the future and 
therefore information asymmetries is perceived to be low, when alternative 
sources of financing (other banks, non-bank intermediaries, bond markets or 
heavier recourse to commercial credit) are easier to find, by contrast, the 
premium on bank finance can increase rapidly when cash flows dryup, 
uncertainty increases, and non-bank financial flows fall, as is typically the 
case during economic downturn (Gaiotti, 2013). In lending practice the 
higher credit risk is associated with collateral required by banks. The 
rationale underlying this argument is that banks can sort the borrowers from 
information they have on their quality. Consequently, they charge riskier 
borrowers with higher rates, and simultaneously require more collateral 
from these borrowers. Because the collateral reduces its loss, the bank 
would be more inclined to demand collateral to clients with a higher credit 
risk. The collateral allows a reduction of the loan loss for the bank in the 
event of default of the loan (Blazy, Weill, 2013). 
In lending practice also there is a tendency that it is more difficult to 
obtain credits for small enterprises. But these enterprises have some 
particular strengths. Small companies are known to be able to react quickly 
and to find creative solutions when faced with the increasing turbulence in 
the global markets and with the wide range of ensuing problems regarding 
competitiveness, social, cultural issues, and technological innovation. Small 
businesses are able to effectively provide products and services for market 
segments, which it may be too difficult, or not sufficiently profitable, for 
large firms to reach. The real strength of small enterprises is their 
essentially personal character in all aspects of company structure: 
ownership, management and operating systems. Owners and managers are 
often one and the same people and tend to be personality driven and 
opportunistic or instinctive in approach. The small enterprises‘ growth is a 
result of clear, positively motivated business intentions and actions on the 
part of the owner-manager, driven by the belief that the owner-manager can 
produce the desired outcomes (Ciampi, Gordini, 2013). 
 The another factor increasing the credit risk of the borrowers is their 
over-indebtedness. On the financing or liability side during the financial 
crisis many banks backed by cash collections from mortgage loans, suffered 
losses due to excessive risk taking by lending money to people with 
insufficient ability to repay. The increase in bank’s liabilities or leverage, if 
large and lasting enough, will trigger a financial crisis. This is complicated 
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by having long-term assets in balance sheets, such as mortgage loans, being 
financed by short-term liabilities. Consequently, banks are obliged to pay 
cash before asset driven cash collections occur, increasing their illiquidity 
(Berrios, 2013). 
Most households are able to manage their financial obligations and 
to avoid credit risks. But for the significant part of households the huge 
loans are actually a problem. Those who have little wealth or no safety net 
are vulnerable if anything unexpected occurs in the economical 
environment or their own economies. In general, people are considered 
over-indebted if they have difficulty meeting their financial commitments 
related to loans or the payment of bills. Over-indebtedness refers to a 
situation where a person or household does not have enough money to pay 
debt instalments and interests after other necessary expenditures have been 
paid. The definition of over-indebtedness presupposes that debt problems 
have continued for a fairly long time. According to a common European 
definition of over-indebtedness by the European Commission, consumers 
are considered to be over-indebted if they have difficulty meeting their 
commitments related to servicing secured or unsecured debts or payments 
of rent, utility or other household bills (Raijas, Lehtinen, Leskinen, 2010). 
The rise of the instability of a banking system becomes apparent when the 
level of indebtedness of an economic unit grows constantly. The influence 
of the external negative shocks starts to play a more crucial role. The 
internal dynamics of the economy is important, but the growth of instability 
appears exactly with the changes of external negative shock. Various 
countries have different levels of aggregated indebtedness, and there is no 
correct answer when the level of aggregated indebtedness becomes crucial 
for a banking system. The internal dynamics of the economy and the system 
of state interventions provide for its existence within definite limits. In other 
words, the financial markets are constantly unstable and external shocks, as 
the reason for the system becoming unstable, should always be taken into 
consideration (Fanstein, Novikov, 2011). 
The causes of debtors‘ over-indebtedness are mainly related to the 
misundersatnding of basic economic patterns and over-confidence 
managing the finances. It can be argued that what went wrong is that people 
made the wrong decisions for a number of years, based on the assumption 
that asset prices would remain high and would continue to rise. The 
aggregate saving rate fell to zero and many people borrowed even to finance 
the consumption. The leverage ratios of households, firms, and institutions 
went up. When the whole economy in many countries went into a 
downward trend and the large fall in asset values occurred, people realized 
they were overleveraged and they had saved too little. They started saving 
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to pay down debt and build up their assets (Allen, Carletti, 2010). The 
mortgage lenders often abstain from foreclosing and enforcing repayment 
because of low recovery rates and lengthy and costly legal procedures. 
Therefore individuals with negative equity have a strong incentive to 
default. Consistent with this view, the borrowers who have experienced a 
small financial shock, are more likely to default on mortgage debt than on 
other forms of debt (e.g., credit cards). If many borrowers with large 
housing price declines choose to default, also borrowers with positive net 
value may decide to delay payments, anticipating a possible failure of their 
lender. If the lender fails, their future relational value would be destroyed, 
and they would prefer to hold the cash until the winding-up of the bank. The 
downward trend in house prices during the subprime crisis was reinforced 
by the decision of many borrowers who exercised their implicit put options 
and walked away from their houses and their mortgage obligations 
(Trautmann, Vlahu, 2013). The risks of an economic environment are 
materialized if, for instance, the economy takes a downturn, unemployment 
increases or interest rates go up. Many consumers’ economic situation is 
marked by short-term employment relationships providing an uncertain 
income. Despite positive development in the national economy, the number 
of low income persons can be nod decreasing. Among the different 
consumer groups, it is students, pensioners, unemployed people, and single 
parents that most often have low incomes. An irregular, uncertain, or low 
income makes it difficult to plan personal economy and long-term use of 
money. When a person’s income is low or irregular, he is tempted to 
compensate for his scanty earnings by taking consumer credit, usually of the 
most expensive kind (Raijas, Lehtinen, Leskinen, 2010). 
 Forming the loan portfolio banks meet the problems of concentration 
and diversification. There are some research works on the relationship 
between diversification and performance of banks, however there is no 
consensus so far, because findings of different countries vary, with 
evidences supporting both opinions. On one hand, traditional banking 
theory suggests that banks should diversify their loans to decrease credit 
risk, which is also in accordance with portfolio theory. The view is due to 
asymmetric information, the diversification reduces financial intermediation 
costs. In practice, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision reported that 
many banking crises in the last three decades were caused by concentration, 
indicating that risk is highly associated with diversification. On the other 
hand, corporate finance theory states that firms would enjoy additional 
benefits resulting from reduced cost if they concentrate their activities on 
specific sectors which they have expertise in or are familiar with. In 
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addition, the diversification strategy is less attractive because it also induces 
competition (Chen, Wei, Zhang, 2013). 
Managing the credit risk the information sharing between credit 
institutions can reduce the possible loss caused by the debtors‘ insolvency. 
Theoretical and empirical research has examined various effects of credit 
information sharing on lenders, borrowers, and economic activity. Most of 
these studies document significantly positive effects of information sharing, 
such as an increase in the supply of credit by banks, a decrease in the costs 
of credit and realized default rates, and an increase in GDP growth. This 
finding can largely be attributed to the disciplining effect of credit 
information sharing around its introduction. It becomes more costly for 
firms to default or to be past due with payments when credit information is 
shared not only among current but also potential future lenders (Dierkes, 
Erner, Langer, Norden, 2013). 
 The analysis of main credit risk peculiarities has shown that the 
management of this risk is the concern for every bank, because the banks 
are enabled to develop their own credit risk assessment systems that must 
meet the requirements of supervising institutions. The various statistical and 
artificial intelligence methods are being applied for the credit risk 
assessment and the different sets of variables are being analyzed. The 
estimation of default probability of a loan applicant is usually obtained 
through taking into account the financial indicators, credit history of the 
borrower and the nature of investment. But the recent financial crisis has 
shown that there is another very important aspect which needs to be taken 
into consideration – the status of the general economy. Business cycle can 
have great impact on the credit portfolio of banks. This can intuitively be 
traced back to the relationship of business cycle and the individual firms 
within an industry. Also the Basel III guidelines propose the necessity to 
estimate the macroeconomic factors in the credit risk assessment process. 
So in the next chapter the impact of macroeconomic environment on the 
credit risk in banks estimated by other scientific researches will be 
analyzed. 
 
1.5. Macroeconomic impact on credit risk in banks 
 
The economic cycle is quite a natural phenomenon in the market 
economics which consists of the stages of growth, peak, recession and a 
bottom as the lowest point of the economic decline. In the top phase of the 
cycle the economics of countries is over-heated and accompanied with high 
gross domestic product (GDP), the low unemployment rate and the high 
inflation starts to cause problems. Conversely, the boom is followed by the 
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recession phase which is closely associated with a decrease of the 
employment and also with a decline of the pressure on inflation (Baran, 
2011). According to Kaihatsu & Kurozumi (2014), the main sources of 
economic fluctuations are: output growth, consumption growth, investment 
growth, labor, wage growth, consumption price inflation, changes in the 
relative price of investment, the economic policy, the loans rate, loans 
growth, and net worth growth.  
During last two decades, the world has experienced a large number 
of financial crises in emerging market economies. These financial crises 
were not confined individual economy, but affected directly or indirectly to 
almost all the countries of the world. As a result, a number of international 
organizations, governments, and private sector institutions have begun to 
develop the early warning systems as a monitoring instruments to detect the 
possible financial crisis in advance and to alert policy makers to take the 
preventive actions (Yoon, Park, 2014). Each financial crisis has its own 
individual features, but most of them have a number of common 
characteristics. According to Socol (2013), the crises have the following 
evolution: 
• The events start with an exogenous shock outside the 
macroeconomic system (a war, adoption, to a large extent, of a 
new invention, a political event, etc.). 
• The extension of the bank loan results in the increase of the 
money supply and it supplies the economic growth. This may 
result in the creation of new banks, in the development of new 
loan instruments and in the unlimited extension of the personal 
loans until the moment when the phenomenon practically 
becomes impossible to be controlled. 
• The demand increases, the prices also get increased, new profit 
opportunities, new companies and investors appear. The 
revenues increases stimulate the additional investments what 
further increase the revenues. 
• The economic bubbles develop. The excessive trade extends 
from one country to another, through arbitration for goods and 
internationally traded assets, the capital flows or, simply, the 
psychological effects of transmission. The interest rates, the 
velocity of money and the prices, all of them continue to get 
increased. Some initiates profit and sell everything. 
• Financial disaster. Everybody start to be aware of development 
of a rush for cash in order to get rid of assets and to obtain cash. 
This resulting in some speculative lenders‘ incapacity to return 
their loans. As the disaster persists, the speculators realize that 
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the market cannot grow more. It is the moment for them to draw 
back, and the rush to transform the real or financial assets into 
cash for a long term turns into panic. 
• Crisis. The trigger may be the failure of a bank or of a big 
company, the revealing of a cheat or of a defalcation, or a price 
decrease of the initial speculation object. The prices get 
decreased. The bankruptcies get increased. Closeout is 
sometimes required, but this cannot degenerate into panic. The 
banks cease to grant loans for collateral assets, of which prices 
get decreased (Socol, 2013). 
Because the economies of different countries are related, the 
financial crisis can also spread to other countries. The contagion is the 
cross-country transmission of shocks or general cross-country spillover 
effects. The literature includes two groups of theories explaining crisis 
transmission mechanisms. One group argues that the economic 
fundamentals of different countries are interconnected by their cross-border 
flows of goods, services, and capital. When a crisis originates in one 
country, this interdependence of economies through real and financial 
linkages becomes a carrier of crisis. In addition, global phenomena or 
common shocks such as a major economic shift in industrial countries, 
significant changes in oil prices or exchange rates may adversely affect the 
economic fundamentals of several economies simultaneously, and 
potentially may cause a crisis. Another group of theories argues that 
financial crisis spreads from one country to another due to market 
imperfections or the behaviour of international investors. Information 
asymmetries make investors more uncertain about the actual economic 
fundamentals of a country. A crisis in one country may give a wake-up call 
to international investors to reassess the risks in other countries, and 
uninformed or less informed investors may find it difficult to extract the 
informed signal from the falling price and follow the strategies of better 
informed investors, generating excess co-movements across the markets 
(Dungey, Gajurel, 2014). The recurrence of financial crises in the recent 
past questioned the benefits of the increasing international financial 
integration and challenged countries to find ways how to protect the 
domestic economy from the downside risks of financial openness (Steiner, 
2014). 
To avoid or mitigate the crisis in the country the particular factors 
have significant impact on it. According to Prochniak (2011), the most 
important economic growth determinants of the countries are investment 
rate (including foreign direct investments), human capital measured by the 
education level of the labour force, financial sector development, good 
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fiscal stance (low budget deficit and low public debt), economic structure 
(high services share in GDP), low interest rates and low inflation, 
population structure (high share of working age population), development 
of information technology and communications, high private sector share in 
GDP and favourable institutional environment: economic freedom, progress 
in market and structural reforms (Prochniak, 2011). 
In the literature there is an important distinction between the kinds of 
factors that can affect banking credit risk:  
• Factors influencing the unsystematic credit risk. 
• Factors influencing the systematic credit risk.  
The factors influencing the unsystematic credit risk are the specific 
factors of borrowers: 
• The individual borrower‘s specific characteristics like the 
individual personality, financial solvency and capital, credit 
insurance.  
• The companies‘ specific characteristics like management, 
financial position, sources of funds and financial reporting, their 
ability to pay the loan and specific factors of the industry sector 
(Castro, 2013). 
Casey & O‘Toole (2014) include a number of unsystematic control 
variables in their empirical model to control the firm creditworthiness and 
risk. Specifically, they split firm risk and quality into two separate 
categories:  
• Trading quality, demand and production risk. 
• Financial risk.  
To control for the former, they include controls of firm‘s 
profitability, historical and predicted sales growth, business outlook, labour 
and non-labour costs. To control for financial risk, the researchers include 
indicators for changes in firms‘ capital positions, debt to asset ratios, 
interest expenses and credit histories (Casey, O‘Toole, 2014). 
The factors influencing the systematic credit risk are: 
• Macroeconomic factors like the employment rate, growth in 
gross domestic product, stock index, inflation rate, and exchange 
rate movements, etc. 
• Changes in economic policies like changes in monetary and tax 
policies, economic legislation changes, as well as import 
restrictions and export stimulation.  
• Political changes or changes in the goals of leading political 
parties.  
All these variables can have an important influence on the likelihood 
of borrowers paying their debts, but as changes in economic policies and 
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political changes are difficult to examine, the literature has mainly focussed 
on the macroeconomic factors (Castro, 2013). According to Teker, Pala & 
Kent (2013) the main systematic credit risk variables are nine economic 
(GDP per capita, inflation rate, trade balance, international reserves, fiscal 
balance, export growth rate, debt to GDP, financial depth and efficiency, 
and exchange rate) and three political variables: political stability, 
government effectiveness and corruption levels. Macroeconomic shocks can 
feed into banks’ balance sheets through the credit risk transmission channel 
following deterioration in the credit quality of loan portfolios that can cause 
significant losses for banks and may even mark the onset of a banking 
crisis. A large number of researches found that bank loan portfolio quality 
can be explained by both macroeconomic conditions and other idiosyncratic 
features. Recent studies show that factors like borrower type, loan category, 
quality of institutions, and form of banking organization are major 
determinants of credit risk (Love, Ariss, 2014). 
There is a close link between business cycles, bank credit, and 
banking crises. The financial crises were often accompanied by deep and 
lasting recessions. According to the financial instability hypothesis a period 
of prolonged prosperity may induce speculative euphoria and excess 
borrowing which push the economy on the brink. This view became popular 
during the recent world financial crisis and challenged the consensus 
macroeconomic models based on rational behavior of agents (Bucher, 
Dietrich, Hauck, 2013). The expansion phase of the economy is usually 
characterized by a relatively low rate of non-performing loans, as both 
consumers and firms face a sufficient stream of income and revenues to 
service their debts. However, as the booming period continues, credit is 
extended to lower-quality debtors and subsequently, when the recession 
phase sets in, the non-performing loans tend to increase. The unemployment 
rate may provide additional information regarding the impact of economic 
conditions. An increase in the unemployment rate should influence 
negatively the cash flow streams of households and increase the debt 
burden. With regards to firms, increases in unemployment may signal a 
decrease in production as a consequence of a drop in effective demand. This 
may lead to a decrease in revenues and a fragile debt condition (Castro, 
2013). The empirical literature provides evidence on the linkages between 
business cycles and performance in banking. In a booming economy, 
revenues of households and businesses improve and increase the ability to 
service debt payments. In their quest to increase market share during a 
boom, banks extend their lending activities often reaching out for lower 
credit quality borrowers. Especially the low interest rates are a driving force 
of the housing bubbles (Steiner, 2014). However, the extension of credit to 
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subprime borrowers inevitably increases non-performing loans (NPLs) 
when a recession subsides and asset prices fall. Still, it is well known that 
poor asset quality is one of the major causes of bank failures. Thus, 
macroeconomic shocks are inevitably transmitted to banks’ balance sheets 
through a worsening of their credit portfolio. To examine the 
macroeconomic determinants of credit risk, studies generally use different 
proxiesof loan quality, including loan loss provisions, NPLs, and loan write-
offs (Love, Ariss, 2014). The financial crisis in 2008 made people pay more 
attention to the issues of mortgages. After all, they paid a great price for the 
default problems. Intuitively, lending institutions increased risk premiums 
as the default risk increased. This result shows that the real estate investors 
may default if lending institutions (banks) require excessive risk premiums. 
Interest rates and house prices are the primary factors affecting the 
mortgage default or payment options (Chih-Hsing, Ming-Chi, Wen-Yuan, 
2014). 
Business cycles can have great impact on the credit portfolio of 
banks because the firms‘ profitability and solvency changes with the 
business cycle. Apart from the management problems and other firm 
specific issues that would cause a loss in its profitability, changes in market 
and economic conditions (such as changes in interest rates, stock market, 
exchanges rate, unemployment rates, and industry specific shocks) may 
affect the overall profitability of the firm. In general, in an expansion, 
demand is high and business is strong: firms have higher probability to 
profit and therefore fewer defaults will happen. Whereas during a recession, 
keeping a business profitable is more challenging and it is more likely for a 
firm to default. Therefore the firm’s performance, which is associated with 
its risk profile, is directly tied to the business cycle and the whole state of 
macroeconomy (Qu, 2008). The banks and other market participants in 
credit boom period were simply unaware of the level of risks they were 
taking. In particular the bank managers may simply have grossly 
underestimated the shortcomings of their own risk models and their 
processes of internal control (Milne, 2014). 
Hence, it appears that banks’ asset quality reinforces the business 
cycle in a procyclical manner and the high NPLs that many countries 
currently face adversely affect the pace of economic recovery. When the 
asset bubble began to burst, financial institutions woridwide had to concede 
that the value of loan portfolios was being strongly eroded. This again led to 
a fatal negative spiral, with a loss of confidence in the individual financial 
institutions and the entire market. Liquidity in the markets dried up 
completely, and on a global scale the first real woridwide crisis in the 
financial system became a reality. Restoring of financial confidence in some 
48 
countries led to a permanent transfer of losses to the public sector, as the 
private sector‘s risk takers were bought out. In more polemical terms: 
profits from the excesses of the preceding period were privatised, while the 
losses were socialised. Having said that, there was little inclination among 
political decision-makers to try out the alternative – allow the financial 
system to fail. The real economy is far too dependent on a well-functioning 
financial system for that to be allowed to happen (Rohde, 2011).  
The initial level of liquidity and banking development are positively 
linked to long-term economic growth, productivity growth and capital 
accumulation (Asal, 2012). Banks are vulnerable to external shocks because 
they finance illiquid assets with liquid liabilities and such fundamental 
shocks are the main driver of financial crises. In the business cycle view of 
bank instability the economic agents observe a leading economic indicators 
that correlate with future asset returns. With the unfolding of economic 
recessions, the value of bank assets is reduced and the value of the collateral 
that is pledged by borrowers may also be impaired, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of a banking crisis (Love, Ariss, 2014). 
The financial sector development promotes economic growth by 
enhancing physical capital accumulation. Following this evidence, the 
studies of Ngare, Nyamongo & Misati (2014) affirmed that financial sector 
development is key to economic growth subject to dismantling financial 
repression. The literature has recognized the important role played by credit 
markets in shaping real outcomes. A credit expansion by reducing interest 
rates would increase investment relative to savings. The rising consumer 
prices as a result of increased consumption, indicates that consumer goods 
are more profitable than producer goods, thus forcing producers to reassess 
investment plans. That situation would eventually cause recession. An 
alternative theory which stresses the importance of financial institutions in 
understanding business cycles suggests that the financial innovations and 
periods of economic tranquility will encourage greater risk taking. This will 
result in excessive leverage and a lower quality of investment during the 
rising cycle. The overheating economy will bring about a tightening in 
monetary policy which will eventually cause recession (Karfakis, 2013). In 
the economy the disposable income, corporate profits, and total spending 
are highly related. The disposable income and revolving credit cause the 
aggregate spending. Spending in turn causes corporate profits. There is, 
however, some feedback effect, as spending causes disposable income. 
Revolving credit as well as corporate profits also causes disposable income. 
The over-expansion of credit when profits and house prices are declining 
and the informational asymmetries on the quality of credit slows the 
economy and leads to the recession (Dore, Singh, 2012). 
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The researchers found a substantial increase in credit risk during the 
recent financial crisis period and documented the impact of GDP growth, 
share price indices, unemployment rate, interest rates, credit growth and the 
real exchange rate. The results support the hypothesis that the growth of 
finance harms banking performance and deteriorates NPLs dynamics due to 
the overheating of the economies. When the economy of a country 
deteriorates, the downgrades in the credit quality of an entire loan portfolio 
is typical signalling deterioration in the credit quality of firms affected by 
adverse economic conditions. These credit quality dynamics highlight the 
importance of credit migration modelling as an integral part of modern 
credit risk solutions (Gavalas, Syriopoulos, 2014). The researches also 
revealed that a positive shock to capital inflows and to GDP growth results 
in favorable changes in all bank-level variables, whereas higher lending 
rates may lead to adverse selection problems and hence to a drop in loan 
portfolio quality (Love, Ariss, 2014). 
The nature of the recent financial crisis in Europe has brought to the 
fore concerns regarding firms‘ capacity to access traditional bank lending. 
While the constraints may be higher in crisis countries, such bank rejections 
may reflect the accurate re-pricing of firm-specific risk by financial 
institutions as opposed to banking reductions in credit supply at the country 
level. The large firms in higher income economies show a greater 
prevalence of traditional financing compared to those in low income 
economies. Firm age is also significant, because younger firms typically 
rely more on other financing alternatives than on bank finance for both 
short-term (working capital) and long-term (investments) financing. In part, 
these findings are likely to reflect that smaller firms may represent greater 
risk, with growth more uncertain and loans more difficult to monitor. The 
findings indicate that older, larger and more profitable firms tend to make 
fewer late payments. By contrast, highly indebted debt firms are found to be 
more likely to make late payments (Casey, O‘Toole, 2014). In the Baltic 
States small and medium enterprises form the largest part of companies, 
providing the majority of jobs. Small firms find it difficult to obtain 
commercial bank financing, especially long-term loans, for a number of 
reasons, including lack of collateral, difficulties in proving creditworthiness, 
small cash flows, inadequate credit history, high risk premiums, 
underdeveloped bank-borrower relationships and high transaction costs. 
Access to finance plays a significant role in the development of the 
company, while the company‘s development level is dependent on the 
availability of financial services (Rupeika-Apoga, 2014). 
Many studies document the influence of the macroeconomic risk on 
banks‘ financial condition. In addition, the macroeconomic downturn 
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influences the loan portfolio diversification level. The homogeneity of bank 
portfolios would increase in response to an increase in macroeconomic risk 
and uncertainty. The macroeconomic shocks affect bank signals about 
expected returns and the greater economic uncertainty hinders banks’ ability 
to foresee investment opportunities. The deteriorating information quality 
should lead to a narrowing of the cross-sectional composition of bank 
portfolios, as banks reducing the risk tend to allocate assets in their portfolio 
more homogeneously when macroeconomic uncertainty increases (Calmes, 
Theoret, 2014). Notwithstanding the above arguments, Chan, Karim, Burton 
& Aktan (2013) also highlight the possibility that diversification in the 
activities of financial institutions can result in value reduction via poor 
investment decisions. In this context, moral hazard can lead managers of 
banks to take on risks that are entirely borne by shareholders, resulting in 
higher cost inefficiencies as well as a larger proportion of non-performing 
loans. When the loan portfolio quality decreases banks can look for more 
non-interest income activities, but this diversification can also adversely 
affect banks’ efficiency levels by disturbing revenue stability. Moreover, 
the involvement of banking institutions in non-interest income activities 
might increase fixed costs, resulting in higher operational leverage (Chan, 
Karim, Burton, Aktan, 2013). 
The indicators of bank stress are closely correlated with the 
indicators of stress in government securities markets, illustrating the 
perceived financial interdependency between governments and their 
countries’ banks (Allen, Moessner, 2013). Banking system stability and 
public finances sustainability are mutually reinforcing each other in the 
long-term. Promoting a conservative macroprudential policy, which favors a 
relatively constant credit supply dynamic and close to growth potential, 
contributes to maintaining the cyclical component of budget revenues at 
around zero. At the same time, implementing a disciplined budget policy 
creates the prerequisites of a favorable development in the trading book 
value of credit institutions, where government bonds play a leading role 
(Moinescu, 2013). The rising external indebtedness may create the 
macroeconomic backdrop for a financial crisis (Steiner, 2014). The banking, 
macroeconomic and sovereign debt crises are interlinked in several ways. 
First, the sovereign debt holdings of euro-area banks are so large that if 
some of the debt-stressed sovereigns (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain) cannot pay their debts, the banking system as a whole is insolvent. 
Second, and at the same time, attempts at fiscal austerity to relieve the 
problems due to sovereign stress are slowing growth. Yet without growth, 
especially in the stressed sovereigns, the sovereign debt crisis will persist. 
To complete the circle, continued troubles for the banks could bankrupt 
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certain sovereigns, already struggling under the weight of supporting the 
banks within their jurisdictions, and failure of these banks could lead to a 
broken credit channel, which in turn could become a further constraint on 
growth (Shambaugh, 2012). 
Generally, financial crises are rather a mechanism that amplifies 
rather than triggers the recession. They are actually a change in direction for 
the production growth, leading to a series of insolvencies in the debts to the 
banks, to a restraint of other crediting activities, and reaching new 
production decreases, with new reimbursement problems. Moreover, 
banking crises are accompanied, more often than not, by other types of 
crises, such as exchange rate crises, internal and external debt crises, 
inflation crises. Almost invariably, banking crises lead to abrupt decreases 
of the revenues coming from taxation, while other factors leading to deeper 
deficits may include the application of automatic mechanisms of fiscal 
stabilization, contra-cyclical fiscal policies and higher interest rates, through 
the increase of the risk-related additional benefits and the downgrading to 
lower rating classes (Adam, Iacob, 2012). The traditional approach in 
addressing the interaction between the budget deficit and credit to private 
sector has at its centre-point the crowding-out effect during recessions. The 
more government borrows from the local market, the lower credit supply to 
non-financial corporations and households is. Fewer private sector 
financing puts additional pressure on GDP contraction, which degenerates 
later on in lower reimbursing capacity of debtors. Hence, second round 
effects of crowding-out the private sector lead to both lower fiscal revenues 
and higher non-performing loans in the banking sector (Moinescu, 2013). 
The financial safeguarding of the banking sector, the revenue 
decrease and the fiscal stimulation packages that accompany a great deal of 
the banking crises involve the fact that there are growing budget deficits, 
adding up on top of the existing governmental debt stock. Consequently, it 
is no wonder that the true heritage of banking crises is a higher level of the 
public debt. And the main reason of the governmental debt explosion is the 
inevitable fall of the revenues from taxes triggered by the deep long-term 
contractions of the economic production (Adam, Iacob, 2012). 
For the crucial importance of banks in the countries‘ financial 
systems and whole economies, the activity of banks is highly regulated. The 
deregulation of the banking industry by easing entry and lowering economic 
rents to bank charters has the potential to elicit bank financial policies that 
will increase the incidence of bank failures. At all times and particularly, to 
avoid banking crises, regulators devise mechanisms to monitor banks‘ risk 
taking behavior. It is commonly argued that disruption in the financial 
system can lead to a reduction in investment and other economic activity. 
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Further, bank depositors face profound loss because of bank failures and 
governments tend to incur large costs in remedying a banking crisis. To 
avoid this type of systemic form of bank insolvency, all jurisdictions have 
emphasized greater reliance on market discipline in the regulatory 
framework along with implicit government support and explicit deposit 
insurance for banks‘ creditors, central bank‘s lending of last resort, and 
bank insolvency resolution procedures (Haq, Faff, Seth, Mohanty, 2014). 
First Capital Adequacy Accord (Basel I) was directed towards restriction of 
credit risks. Basel II was issued, adding operational risk, as well as a 
supervisory review process and disclosure requirements. Basel II also 
updated and expanded upon the credit risk weighting scheme introduced in 
Basel I, not only to capture the risk in instruments and activities that had 
developed since 1988, but also to allow banks to use their internal risk 
rating systems and approaches to measure credit and operational risk for 
capital purposes. The new Capital Adequacy Accord (Basel III) adopted in 
late 2010 is aimed at consolidation of banking system and toughening of 
requirements towards capital structure at commercial banks (Kudinska, 
Konovalova, 2012). 
In response to the 2007 – 2009 global financial crisis BCBS issued 
the series of documents to address specifically counterparty risk in 
derivative transactions, strengthening of liquidity standards, and market risk 
framework. Consolidating all these, the BCBS released the Basel III 
framework entitled “Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for more 
Resilient Banks and Banking systems” in December 2010 (revised in June 
2011). 
According to the BCBS, the Basel III proposals have two main 
objectives: 
• To strengthen global capital and liquidity regulations with the 
goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector. 
• To improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising 
from financial and economic stress. 
Basel III contains various measures aimed at improving the quantity 
and quality of capital, with the ultimate aim of improving the loss-
absorption capacity in both going concerns and liquidation scenarios. 
Remaining the minimum capital adequacy ratio at 9%, the Tier I capital 
ratio increased to 7% with the equity component stipulated at 5,5% (Table 
1.5.1). The new concepts introduced by Basel III are of capital conversion 
buffer and countercyclical capital buffer. The capital conversion buffer 
ensures that banks are able to absorb losses without breaching the minimum 
capital requirement, and are able to carry on business even in a downturn 
without deleveraging. This is not part of the regulatory minimum. So while 
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the 9% minimum capital requirement remains under Basel III, there is an 
added 2,5% as capital cushion buffer (Jayadev, 2013). 
 
Table 1.5.1 
 
Minimum regulatory capital prescriptions as % of risk weighted assets 
(Jayadev, 2013) 
 
  
Basel II 
(current) 
Basel III (as 
on March 31, 
2018) 
A = B + D Minimum total capital 9 9 
B Minimum Tier-1 capital 6 7 
C Minimum common equity Tier-1 capital 3,64 5,5 
D Maximum Tier-2 capital (within total capital) 3 2 
E Capital conservation buffer (CCB) - 2,5 
F = C + E Minimum common equity Tier-1 capital + CCB 3,6 8 
G = A + E Minimum total capital + CCB - 11,5 
H Leverage ratio (to total assets) - 4,55 
 
In the aftermath of the crisis the BCBS emphasized the importance 
of additional reserves as a means of crisis prevention and proposed new 
measures to evaluate their adequacy. The accumulation of reserves, 
however, contains costs that have been neglected so far: while reserves 
might effectively protect the banks and domestic economy from external 
shocks, their global and continuous accumulation might create systemic 
risks (Steiner, 2014). At the same time, the higher capital levels prescribed 
by Basel III will penalize commercial banks. The need for traditional banks 
to increase their own funds will have two consequences. First, since capital 
is costly and there is a race for deposits, banks will have to increase the 
price of their loans, making credit more expensive with negative 
consequences on growth and no additional positive effects on stability. 
Second, there will be a tendency to reduce lending in order to shrink the 
denominator of capital ratios (Caprio Jr., D‘Apice, Ferri, Puopolo, 2014). 
Bank regulators can achieve their desired safety goals by the risk-
weights used in calculation of bank capital. However, risk-based capital 
standards can contribute towards a credit crunch where banks are 
encouraged to invest in government securities or mortgaged backed 
securities which require low levels of capital rather than making business 
loans which have higher risk weighting and thus higher capital 
requirements. A number of additional country-level factors could also be 
important to bank risk taking such as bank concentration ratio, explicit 
deposit insurance, economic freedom index, stock market turnover, real 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate and gross national income (GNI) 
per capita. Bank concentration ratio can show a positive or a negative 
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relationship with bank risk depending on the intensity of bank competition 
(Haq, Faff, Seth, Mohanty, 2014). 
To solve the banking crises the governments of countries can take 
the particular actions. In a first instance, in reaction to a banking crisis, 
governments set up safety plans leading to an increase in public deficits 
(Candelon, Palm, 2010). Duchin & Sosyura (2014) studied two types of 
regulatory interventions: disciplinary actions and mandatory capital support. 
The authors found that both types of interventions are generally associated 
with lower risk taking and liquidity creation at disciplined banks. Their 
evidence also yields two important conclusions: the consequences of 
government interventions vary depending on the business cycle and have an 
effect mainly in non-crisis years, and disciplinary actions against banks 
generate spillover effects on other banks, providing the latter with a 
competitive advantage (Duchin, Sosyura, 2014). 
Financial institutions can also be supported by off-balance sheet 
operations such as government guarantees to commercial banks. The fiscal 
cost of the latter measure is difficult to evaluate as there is no direct 
liquidity support, but the risk associated with the potential exercise of the 
guarantee leads investors to ask a higher risk premium from the country or 
institution providing the insurance. Finally, the real consequences 
associated with the banking crisis affect government tax revenues, which 
will shrink, and government spending, which will rise, through social 
security and through measures designed to stimulate global demand. This 
automatic stabilizer mechanism deepens the budget deficit and increases the 
debt, calling for even more procyclical discretionary fiscal policies. This 
mechanism is particularly important for members of the European Monetary 
Union that committed themselves to limiting their fiscal deficits and debt. 
As a consequence, this restrictive fiscal policy could increase the 
probability of default for households, increasing the amount on non-
performing loans, again putting tensions on the banks’ balance sheet 
(Candelon, Palm, 2010). 
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, many governments 
in the euro area and elsewhere committed large resources to guarantee and 
rescue financial institutions. This led to increasing public debt and thereby 
higher risk of sovereign default. The governments’ exposures to financial 
sector weakness became more prominent as the crisis progressed. Investors 
perceived this as a credit risk transfer from the banking sector to 
governments, and thereby sovereign debt spreads widened while risk 
spreads of financial institutions narrowed. For example, sovereign spreads 
for Ireland started to increase after the government extended a guarantee to 
the banking system (Alsakka, Gwilym, 2013). 
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The analysis of scientific publications has shown that debtors‘ credit 
risk in banks has the significant dependence on the macroeconomic factors 
of a country. The development of internal credit risk assessment models 
must include not only specific characteristics of loan applicants, but the 
macroeconomic indicators must be also taken into consideration. There is 
no one set of macroeconomic variables defined in the scientific researches 
that are important for the credit risk of debtors, however the GDP and its 
growth, consumption, investment, wages, inflation, unemployment rate are 
often mentioned. The research proved that the performance of banks is 
highly influenced by the economic environment and, conversely, the 
economic development of a country is dependent on the condition of 
commercial banks and whole financial system. In the economic recession 
the restricted credit supply usually slows the recovery of economy, so the 
ability to keep the banking system stable is crucial for every country. As the 
business cycles are typical for the economies of countries, the 
understanding of their consistent patterns is very important not only for 
banks and their supervisors, but for the every enterprise and household this 
knowledge allows to manage the finances more efficiently. The growth of 
non-performing loans is often related to the misunderstanding of economic 
processes and the irresponsible borrowing. This problem for households is 
especially difficult to solve in the economic downturns. 
The recommendations of BCBS in Basel III guidelines suggest the 
analysis of macroeconomic conditions in credit risk assessment process, so 
the further empirical research aims to reveal the main effects of business 
cycle on credit risk in banks and their financial indicators. The statistical 
data of Lithuania and other EU countries will be analyzed to assess how the 
indicators of banks were influenced by recent economic downturn. The 
empirical results may ease the understanding for bankers and other 
researchers the relations of main economic factors and credit risk. This 
understanding may improve the credit risk management in banks and reduce 
the loss caused by macroeconomic fluctuations. The statistical analysis will 
allow to evaluate quantitativey the recent problems in banks and to acquire 
the ability to manage the credit risk in more complex way for the future 
from the lessons of recent economic downturn.  
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2. THE EMPIRICAL STATISTICAL RESEARCH 
STRUCTURE AND METHODS 
 
 The empirical research aims to assess the changes of credit risk 
related banks‘ performance indicators, the macroeconomic changes in 
Lithuania and other European Union (EU) countries, and to find the 
interrelations between these factors. The research consists of 8 parts that are 
based on the statistical analysis of Lithuanian and EU indicators. The 
research structure and expected results are shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. The empirical research structure and expected results 
 
Analysis object Expected results 
1. Lithuanian commercial banking 
system 
Main aggregated financial indicators 
of Lithuanian banks 
2. NPLs problem in Lithuanian 
commercial banks 
The changes of NPLs related financial 
results of Lithuanian banks 
3. Lithuanian macroeconomic 
indicators and business cycle 
The changes of macroeconomic 
environment of Lithuanian banks 
4. Bankruptcy predictions in micro-
level considering the sectorial risk 
The statistical enterprises bankruptcy 
prediction model 
5. Lithuanian business and 
households indebtedness 
The critical debt burden ratios causing 
NPLs problem in economic recession 
6. Non-performing loans problem in 
European Union 
The similarities and differences of 
NPLs in EU countries 
7. Macroeconomic indicators in EU 
countries 
The impact of macroeconomic 
changes on NPLs in EU 
8. Non-performing loans predictions in 
EU countries 
The statistical model enabling to 
foresee the NPLs growth in EU 
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 Further the research structure, statistical data and analysis methods 
are explained. 
1. Lithuanian commercial banking system. This chapter aims to 
present the Lithuanian commercial banking system, to estimate the changes 
of main balance-sheet entries: the assets, loan portfolio and deposits. 
2. The problem of non-performing loans and the changes of 
financial condition in Lithuanian banks. The statistics of non-performing 
loans (NPLs), the credit risk related financial indicators of interest income, 
net interest income, net profit, impairment of loans, return on assets, return 
on equity will be analyzed. The analysis results will show the deterioration 
of main financial rates of Lithuanian banks when the proportion of non-
performing loans increased. The stock market data analysis also will 
measure the decrease of listed bank’s shares prices after the deterioration of 
banks’ loan portfolio quality and financial results. 
3. The changes of commercial banks macroeconomic 
environment in Lithuania. The business cycle in Lithuanian economy will 
be substantiated by the macroeconomic indicators of GDP, exports, imports 
and gross capital formation (investments). As the solvency and credit risk of 
business enterprises depend on their financial condition, the main financial 
indicators of revenue, net income and net profitability will be analyzed. The 
number of profitable and loss-making companies, the bankruptcy statistics 
will reveal the changes of Lithuanian credit risk in different stages of 
business cycle. The analysis of creditors’ claims statistics will measure the 
risk for banks to loose the lent money in case of a company’s bankruptcy. 
The households’ credit risk related economic indicators of compensation of 
employees, consumption expenditures of households, the average wages, 
unemployment and inflation rates will indicate how the problems of NPLs 
in Lithuanian banks increased after the deterioration of these rates. The 
changes of realty price index will be interrelated with the economic 
recession and impairment of loans. The research suggests that in the credit 
risk management of banks the public finance indicators of general 
government revenue and expenses, budget deficit, public debt are also good 
predictors of NPLs growth. The correlation analysis of mentioned variables 
will prove their interdependence and strong impact on NPLs in banks. 
4. Enterprises credit risk assessment model considering the 
industry sectors sensitivity to the macroeconomic changes. Analyzing 
the set of bankrupted and profitable Lithuanian enterprises the statistical 
bankruptcy prediction model will be developed. The multivariate adaptive 
regression splines and logistic regression methods will be employed for the 
analysis of enterprises’ financial ratios. Extending the credit risk 
determinants from the enterprise’s micro-level, the industry sectors  
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statistical data will be analyzed to measure the sensitivity of these sectors to 
the fluctuations of business cycle. In general these interrelations will be 
estimated by the canonical analysis and polynomial regression methods. 
The variables of the number of bankrupted companies, revenue, income 
before taxes, profitability of main activity, the proportion of loss-making 
enterprises in every sector will allow to attribute the sectorial bankruptcy 
risk ranks that can help banks to assess the credit risk of such loan 
applicants expecting the macroeconomic changes in the country. The 
comparative analysis of Lithuanian districts will be implemented aiming to 
highlight the relative differences of industry sectors’ credit risk. The 
average net profitability, return on assets, current ratio, quick ratio and debt 
ratio values in the last year before the companies bankruptcy will be 
analyzed what can help banks to foresee the risk of a particular company to 
bankrupt if these financial ratios differ in the industry sectors. The cluster 
analysis will classify the sectors into 3 groups and the critical average 
financial ratios warning about the enterprises’ bankruptcy will be 
calculated. 
5. Business and households indebtedness indicators as factors of 
NPLs problem in banks. In this chapter the Lithuanian enterprises and 
households indebtedness as the important factor of the ability to repay debts 
will be analyzed. The statistics of loan portfolio dynamics in Lithuanian 
banks will be presented and the relative indebtedness indicators of 
companies and households will be calculated. The overall loan portfolio, 
business, households loans, GDP, Lithuanian enterprises’ revenue and 
compensation of employees indicators will be used to calculate the relative 
indebtedness ratios. The estimation of ratios changes will allow to highlight 
the critical over-indebtedness levels in the peak point of Lithuanian business 
cycle that later turned into the oppressive debt burden for business and 
households causing the extensive growth of NPLs in Lithuanian banks. The 
reasons of this situation also will be suggested accenting the problem of 
irresponsible borrowing that was evident in Lithuania until the economic 
recession. 
6. Non-performing loans problem in European Union. The non-
performing loans statistics of European Union in this chapter will be 
presented, what allows to understand the situation in the EU countries. The 
Lithuanian NPLs will be analyzed in the context of EU average values. The 
interrelations of GDP to one inhabitant and NPLs in banks will be estimated 
to measure the strength of EU countries economy and the NPLs problems in 
banks. The dynamics of the aggregated European Union banks’ assets, loan 
portfolio, deposits, interest income, net interest income and net profit will 
be presented. The capital adequacy ratios of EU and Lithuanian banks will 
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be analyzed comparing them to estimate the strength of commercial banking 
systems in the EU and to evaluate the ability of banks to absorb the 
unexpected losses. 
7. The dependence of non-performing loans problem on 
macroeconomic conditions in European Union. In this chapter the EU 
countries will be classified into four groups of low, lower medium, higher 
medium and high NPLs in banks. The average macroeconomic indicators to 
1 inhabitant (GDP, exports, investments, compensation of employees, 
consumption expenditures of households and general government) will be 
compared between these groups aiming to prove that the economic strength 
of a country is the very important determinant of NPLs in commercial 
banks. The EU countries will be selected that suffered from the highest 
NPLs and the dynamics of macroeconomic indicators in these years will be 
estimated. This will allow to conclude how the deterioration of 
macroeconomic conditions in a country increases the non-performing loans 
amount in its banks. 
8. The NPLs in European Union countries prediction model. The 
statistical model for the prediction of NPLs changes will be developed in 
this chapter. The set of macroeconomic indicators will be formed and their 
basic indices reflecting the changes of macroeconomic rates will be used as 
the independent variables. Because the changes of NPLs in EU countries 
can be different, the countries in the first stage of analysis will be separated 
into three groups. The logistic regression, factor analysis and probit 
regression methods will be employed for this purpose. The countries 
classification accuracy will be measured. The discriminant analysis models 
will be developed to classify the EU countries according to the expected 
low or high growth of the non-performing loans. The model’s prediction 
ability will be tested analyzing the out-of-sample data. 
 The statistical data of Statistics Lithuania, Bank of Lithuania, 
EUROSTAT, European Central Bank and World Bank will be used in the 
empirical research. 
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3. THE EMPIRICAL STATISTICAL RESEARCH 
 
3.1. Lithuanian commercial banking system 
 
 The number of domestic banking groups and stand alone banks, 
foreign (EU and non-EU) controlled subsidiaries and foreign (EU and non-
EU) controlled branches in Lithuania is shown in Figure 3.1.1. 
 
12
15 15
18 19
16 16
0
5
10
15
20
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 
Figure 3.1.1. The number of banks in Lithuania (European Central Bank, 
2014) 
 
 In 2014 the number of banks in Lithuania and their types are given in 
Table 3.1.1. 
 
Table 3.1.1 
 
The number of banks in Lithuania in 2014 (Bank of Lithuania, 2014) 
 
Bank type Number 
Deposit money banks 7 
Foreign bank representative offices 2 
Foreign bank branches 8 
Total 17 
 
 Financially the size of a country‘s banking system can be measured 
by the consolidated assets of commercial banks. Bank assets are the 
physical and financial property of a bank, what a bank owns, in particular it 
is the physical and financial property an financial. The most notable asset 
categories are loans which generate the interest revenue, investment 
securities and money. In 2013 the assets of Lithuanian banks was 22,4 
billion EUR. The highest assets of 26 billion EUR was in 2008 while in 
period of 2009 – 2012 it decreased to 21,5 billion EUR (Figure 3.1.2). 
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Figure 3.1.2. The Lithuanian banks assets and the capital to assets ratio 
(Bank of Lithuania, 2014; World Bank, 2014) 
 
 One of the banking system strength measures is the capital to assets 
ratio which is calculated as the ratio of bank capital and reserves to total 
assets. Capital and reserves include funds contributed by owners, retained 
earnings, general and special reserves, provisions, and valuation 
adjustments. Capital includes tier 1 capital (paid-up shares and common 
stock), which is a common feature in all countries‘ banking systems, and 
total regulatory capital, which includes several specified types of 
subordinated debt instruments that need not be repaid if the funds are 
required to maintain minimum capital levels (these comprise tier 2 and tier 
3 capital). Total assets include all nonfinancial and financial assets. The 
least capital to assets ratio (7,3%) in Lithuanian banks was in 2009 while in 
further years it constantly increased to 12,5% in 2013 (Figure 3.1.2). 
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Figure 3.1.3. The loan portfolio and deposits in Lithuanian commercial 
banks (Bank of Lithuania, 2014) 
 
 The loan portfolio of Lithuanian banks in 2013 was 17,6 billion 
EUR, the deposits – 18,2 billion EUR (Figure 3.1.3). 
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3.2. The problem of non-performing loans and the changes of financial 
condition in Lithuanian banks 
 
The Lithuanian commercial banks, according to the statistics 
published by World Bank, since 2009 met the problem of very high 
proportion of non-performing loans in their loan portfolios. Bank non-
performing loans to total gross loans are the value of non-performing loans 
divided by the total value of the loan portfolio (including non-performing 
loans before the deduction of specific loan-loss provisions). Particularly the 
most negative situation was in 2009 when the proportion of non-performing 
loans increased by 17,9% and reached 24%. This high rate with slight 
fluctuations remained until 2010, while since 2011 the constant decrease of 
NPLs in Lithuanian commercial banks was observed (Figure 3.2.1). 
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Figure 3.2.1. The non-performing loans to total gross loans in Lithuanian 
commercial banks (World Bank, 2014) 
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Figure 3.2.2. Total profit or loss of Lithuanian banks from continuing and 
discontinued operations after tax (Bank of Lithuania, 2014) 
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 The total profit of Lithuanian banks from continuing and 
discontinued operations after tax as the main final financial result was 
affected very negatively by this deterioration of loan portfolio quality. The 
sudden loss of Lithuanian banks in 2009 was 1 062,8 million EUR (Figure 
3.2.2). In 2010 this loss decreased by 92,5% to 80 million EUR and in 
further years the profitable activity of banks was recovered. 
 The other main financial indicators in profit (loss) statement affected 
by the high NPLs are the banks‘ interest income and the impairment of 
loans and other receivables. The highest interest income of Lithuanian 
banks was 1 459,1 million EUR in 2008 and in further years it decreased in 
average by 17,2% yearly. In 2013 the interest income was only 568,8 
million EUR (Figure 3.2.3). 
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Figure 3.2.3. The interest income of Lithuanian banks (Bank of Lithuania, 
2014) 
 
 When the debtors fulfil all their financial obligations for banks they 
have the valuable loans as the profit making assets in the balance sheets. In 
case of the debtor’s default the loans are classified into two types: the 
overdue but not impaired loans and the impaired loans. The overdue loans 
have the delayed loan repayments or interest payments but the value of loan 
has not decreased. A loan is impaired when it is not likely the lender will 
collect the full value of the loan because the creditworthiness of a borrower 
has fallen. When enough time has passed since the payment had to be made 
for the lender and it is suspected that the payments intermit, the default 
occurs. It means the borrower has failed to meet the terms a lender provided 
to restore a loan payments. In this case, the loan would be considered 
impaired if the lender feels there is not evidence the debt will be collected 
based on the borrower's financial status, credit status and other factors. The 
lender will pursue either restructuring or foreclosure as a result of the 
impaired status of the debt. The banks calculate this amount by subtracting 
the amount expected to be recovered on the loan from the initial book 
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amount of the loan. If a lender issues a mortgage for mA EUR but expects to 
recover only mB EUR, when mA > mB, the impairment amount would be mA 
– mB EUR. The banking accounting rules require lenders to report impaired 
loans. This gives customers, investors and credit raters a full picture of the 
lender's financial condition. A bank with too many impaired loans and not 
enough loans in good standing could be at risk of insolvency and 
bankruptcy. The statistical data of Lithuanian banks shows that in 2009 the 
impairment of loans and other receivables including leasing increased by 
794,8% from 127,8 to 1 143,5 million EUR (Figure 3.2.4). In 2010 it 
decreased to 201,2 million EUR and in 2011 this rate became negative. 
While in two further years the impairment was 14,9 and 10,1 million EUR. 
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Figure 3.2.4. The impairment of loans and other receivables (including 
leasing) of Lithuanian banks (Bank of Lithuania, 2014) 
 
The relative financial indicators ROE and ROA also reflect the 
deterioration of banks‘ financial condition in 2009 (Figure 3.2.5).  
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Figure 3.2.5. The ROE and ROA rates of Lithuanian banks (European 
Central Bank, 2014) 
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The highest return on equity (ROE) of Lithuanian domestic banking 
groups and stand alone banks, foreign controlled subsidiaries and foreign 
controlled branches was in 2007 – 19,9%. When the proportion of NPLs 
increased in 2009 this rate decreased to -56,1% and in 2010 it still remained 
negative. These negative rates indicate that banks were not able to earn 
financial returns on their employed capital. Low returns often turn into 
lower net profit, which leads to a bank’s inability to pays expenses and 
other financial obligations. Without a substantial return on this capital, a 
bank may suffer low income and be unable to pay for its administrative 
expenses or other standard costs. Banks‘ negative return on equity also does 
not allow to pay the financial returns to investors for the use of their capital. 
The only way to stop this loss is to find profitable investing options to 
increase the return on equity. But banks operate in highly regulated markets, 
so they must consider the requirements of central bank managing risks and 
finances. While the return on equity for banks should be strong enough to 
keep the proper financial condition, to get the high returns it can be 
problematic, because the main drivers of banks’ profitability remain 
earnings, efficiency, risk-taking and leverage that should be managed. ROE 
is a short-term indicator and must be interpreted as a snapshot of the current 
health of banks. It does not take into account either institution’s long-term 
strategy or the long-term damages caused by the crisis. 
It the ROE is a measure of equity holders returns and the potential 
growth on their investments, the return on assets (ROA) is an indication of 
the operational efficiency of the bank. One of the biggest economic 
considerations in the banking system is the maintenance of a profitable 
commercial banks. The main sources of bank profits originate from 
transaction fees on financial services and the interest spread on resources 
that are held in trust for clients who, in turn, pay interest on the asset. The 
ROA of Lithuanian domestic banking groups and stand alone banks, foreign 
controlled subsidiaries and foreign controlled branches from 1,4% in 2007 
decreased to -3,9% in 2009 and in 2010 it remained negative (Figure 3.2.5). 
This unfavourable situation caused a serious concern in banks‘ risks 
management because the profitability is bank’s first line of defence against 
unexpected losses, as it strengthens its capital position and improves future 
profitability through the investment of retained earnings. An institution that 
persistently makes a loss will ultimately deplete its capital base, which  in 
turn puts equity and debt holders at risk.  
The structure of total banking assets according to ROE rates is given 
in Table 3.2.1. In 2007 the highest proportion of banks assets (60,1%) had 
the ROE indicator higher than 20%. The rest assets had ROE positive up to 
15%. In 2008 the 97,3% of assets ensured the ROE rate in range 5 – 20%, 
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while 2,7% was loss making. This was the beginning of banks loss problem 
and in 2009 the ROE < 0 had the proportion of 99%, in 2010 – 73,5%. In 
further years mostly the profitable activity of Lithuanian banks was 
observed which in 2011 and 2013 ensured the ROE > 20% in 68,7% – 
69,3% of total banks‘ assets. 
 
Table 3.2.1 
 
The percentage of total banking assets of institutions according to ROE 
rates 
 
ROE (%) Year 
< 0 0 – 5 5 – 10 10 – 15 15 – 20 > 20 
2007 0,0 2,0 7,6 30,3 0,0 60,1 
2008 2,7 0,0 33,7 34,1 29,5 0,0 
2009 99,0 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
2010 73,5 26,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
2011 1,6 12,1 16,9 0,0 0,0 69,3 
2012 0,6 44,0 22,8 32,7 0,0 0,0 
2013 0,0 3,8 8,4 0,0 19,1 68,7 
 
The banks‘ ability to use the assets effectively an to earn income 
from credits can be measured by the relative indicators of the interest 
income and the net interest income to total assets (Figure 3.2.6).  
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Figure 3.2.6. The interest income and net interest income percentage of 
total assets in Lithuanian banks (European Central Bank, 2014) 
 
The highest interest income to total assets ratio of Lithuanian banks 
was in 2008 – 5,83% and since 2009 it decreased to 2,62% (Figure 3.2.6). 
The net interest income to total assets ratio has not the constant decrease 
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tendency in this period. From 2,3% in 2008 it decreased to 1,58% and 
1,51% in 2009 – 2010 while in further years it has not reached the previous 
values higher than 2%. 
 The another measurement of banks performance can be the stock 
market data. If the stock market is effective, usually when the financial 
condition of companies deteriorates, the investors react to these negative 
changes in the demand of shares. So the fall in financial rates is related to its 
share prices. In Lithuania only one bank („Šiaulių bankas“) is listed in the 
Main List of NASDAQ OMX Baltic stock market. In 2008 the highest share 
price of this bank was 1,01 EUR white the least price in 2009 was 0,18 
EUR. The amount of this sudden decrease in one year was 82,2% (Figure 
3.2.7). 
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Figure 3.2.7. The share prices of one Lithuanian listed bank (NASDAQ 
OMX Baltic, 2014) 
 
 The analysis of Lithuanian commercial banks financial data has 
shown that the deterioration of their financial condition is coincident with 
the sudden growth of non-performing loans in 2009. Due to this reason the 
activity of banks became loss making, their interest income started to 
decrease and many of loans have impaired. This typical situation was 
observed in all banks according to the return on equity rate distribution. So, 
it can be concluded that this negative situation was driven by the systemic 
factors that are related to the all banks performance results. The next 
chapter aims to analyze the macroeconomic changes in Lithuania that 
affected the sudden growth of non-performing loans in commercial banks 
loan portfolios and disimproved their financial results. The understanding of 
main affects of macroeconomic changes on credit risk can help to manage 
this risk in banks more effectively. 
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3.3. The changes of commercial banks macroeconomic environment in 
Lithuania 
 
The analysis of other credit risk and macroeconomy researhers‘ 
results published in scientific publications has shown that the economic 
recession usually negatively influences the ability of debtors in banks to 
repay their credits. The loan portfolio quality depends on the banks‘ 
macroeconomic environment, so the analysis of their relations are important 
for every bank. The recent macroeconomic indicators reflect the significant 
business cycle fluctuations in Lithuanian economy therefore the effect of 
these fluctuations on the non-performing loans in banks in this chapter will 
be analyzed. 
The general Lithuanian macroeconomic indicators of gross domestic 
product (GDP), exports (EXP), imports (IMP) and gross capital formation 
(investments, INV) are shown in Figure 3.3.1. 
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Figure 3.3.1. The GDP, investments, exports and imports of Lithuania 
(EUROSTAT, 2014) 
 
The graphs of apparently show the fluctuations of business cycle and 
the 2009 year‘s downturn in Lithuanian economy. The Lithuanian 
macroeconomic indicators in year 2008 were the highest as it was the peak 
point of business cycle. In the most downturn of year 2009 the GDP 
decreased by 17,8% from 32 414 million EUR to 26 654 million EUR. GDP 
is a measure of the economic activity, defined as the value of all goods and 
services produced less the value of any goods or services used in their 
creation. The business activity slowdown also reflects the decrease of 
investments by 44,3% from 8,2 to 4,6 billion EUR. The international trade 
indicators were significantly negatively affected by economic downturn. In 
2009 the fall of exports was 25,2% when it decreased from 19,3 to 14,5 
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billion EUR. The changes of imports are more significant: it decreased by 
35,6% from 23,2 to 15 billion EUR. After this considerable economic 
downturn, in 2010 the stabilization of macroeconomic indicators was 
observed and the economic growth has started. In period of 2010 – 2013 the 
average annual GDP growth rate is 6,8%, exports – 20,4%, imports – 
19,2%. The restrained growth is visible in investments that in 2013 since 
2009 increased only by 38,6% and in 2013 it was only 77,2% of the year’s 
2008 value. 
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Figure 3.3.2. The GDP growth, investments to GDP and NPLs in 
Lithuanian banks (EUROSTAT, 2014; World Bank, 2014) 
 
 According to the statistics of EUROSTAT in 2009 the Lithuanian 
real GDP growth rate was -14,8%. In this case the GDP at current prices is 
valued in the prices of the previous year and thus the computed volume 
changes are imposed on the level of a reference year, so the production and 
services price movements do not inflate the growth rate (Figure 3.3.2). The 
highest relative investments to GDP rate (28,1%) was in 2007 which 
constantly decreased until 2010 to 16,3%. The Figure 3.3.2 also indicates 
the relation between the GDP growth, investments to GDP and non-
performing loans in Lithuanian banks. The least point of this graph denotes 
the 1% of NPLs in banks when the real GDP grew 9,8% and the 
investments were 28,15 of GDP in 2007. The middle-sized point is the 6,1% 
of NPLs in banks (year 2008) when the real GDP grew only 2,9% and the 
investments decreased to 25,3% of GDP. The largest point in the right chart 
of Figure 3.3.2 denotes the highest proportion of NPLs in 2009 together 
with the worsened real GDP growth and the investments to GDP rates. 
 The another group of banks‘ environment indicators related to the 
credit risk of debtors are the aggregated business indicators of Lithuanian 
enterprises. The business cycle fluctuations are visible in the aggregated 
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revenue and net income of Lithuanian companies (Figure 3.3.3). The 
business revenue constantly grew until 2008 with the average annual 
increase rate of 19,3%. In 2008 the revenue of Lithuanian companies 
reached 63 650 million EUR and it was the peak point of economics 
growth. Next year the business revenue decreased by 29,4% to 44 966 
million EUR. This was the only year of enterprises revenue slump, thus 
after the year 2009 the revenue constantly grew again and in 2012 it was 64 
845 million EUR or 144,2% of the 2009 year‘s revenue. 
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Figure 3.3.3. The aggregated revenue and net income in Lithuanian 
companies (Statistics Lithuania, 2014) 
 
The highest net income as the final financial result of Lithuanian 
companies was in 2007 when it reached 5 156 million EUR (Figure 3.3.3). 
Despite the increasing revenue in 2008, the net income in this year 
decreased by 71,2% to 1 483 million EUR. 
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Figure 3.3.4. The aggregated net profitability of Lithuanian companies and 
bankruptcies (Statistics Lithuania, 2014) 
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 So, it can be concluded that in the peak point of business cycle the 
net income starts to decrease one year before the fall of revenue. The 
growth of enterprises‘ expenses in 2008 affected the decrease of net income 
by 71,2% to 1 483 million EUR but this indicator still remained positive. 
The worst situation was in 2009 when the aggregated net income of 
Lithuanian companies was negative (-1 926 million EUR), also the net 
profitability ratio of this year was negative (Figure 3.3.4). This was the only 
year of aggregated loss-making activity of Lithuanian companies and in 
further years the net profit margin was positive in range of 1,9% – 3,5%. 
 The loss making activity of Lithuanian companies in 2009 caused the 
growth of their bankruptcies. In 2009 the number of enterprises where the 
bankruptcy process was started increased by 92,7% to 1 844 companies 
(Figure 3.3.4). The higher number of bankrupted companies means the 
increasing unability to fulfil the financial obligations for banks and other 
creditors. That undoubtedly causes the increase of credit risk and growth of 
non-performing loans. 
 The statistical relation between Lithuanian enterprises revenue, net 
income, net profitability, number of bankruptcies and non-performing loans 
in the peak point of business cycle and economic recession (years 2007 – 
2009) in diagram form is visualized in Figure 3.3.5. In the right graph the 
points are situated almost in line what confirms that NPLs in banks have the 
tendency to grow when the net profitability of enterprises is decreasing and 
the number of bankrupted companies grows. However the points in the left 
side of grapf are not exactly in line where the relations between Lithuanian 
enterprises revenue, net income and NPLs is shown. 
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Figure 3.3.5. The relation of aggregated Lithuanian companies indicators 
and NPLs in banks (Statistics Lithuania, 2014; World Bank, 2014) 
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 As was proved previously the net income of Lithuanian enterprises 
started to decrease in the last year of the revenue growth in 2008. So the 
least number of NPLs was in 2007 when the net income of companies was 
the highest, but the revenue had not reached the maximal value. The highest 
proportion of NPLs in banks was observed when the revenue of companies 
decreased and their activity was loss making in 2009. 
 The year 2009 is extraordinary in Lithuanian business statistics 
because the number of loss-making companies (27 074) was 1,4 times 
higher than profitable (19 282). The similar number of these companies was 
in 2008 and 2010, while in other years the profitable companies in 
Lithuanian business structure dominate (Figure 3.3.6). Compared to the year 
2009, in further period of economic growth, the number of profitable 
companies increased by 72% in 2012 to 33 170 enterprises. Also the 
number of loss-making companies decreased by 17,5% to 22 345 
enterprises. In the group of profitable enterprises the highest profit of 6 547 
million EUR was in 2007, which in 2009 decreased by 70% to only 1 964 
million EUR (Figure 3.3.6). The highest loss of loss-making companies was 
also in 2009 when it reached 3 704 million EUR. These indicators in years 
2010 – 2012 have shown the significant improvement that reflect the better 
business situation in companies and recovery in whole Lithuanian economy. 
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Figure 3.3.6. The indicators of profitable and loss-making Lithuanian 
companies (Statistics Lithuania, 2014) 
 
 The statistics of fulfiled claims of creditors affirms the high credit 
risk of enterpises financial condition deterioration. In the period of 1993 – 
2012 only 29,2% of claims with mortgage in bankrupted companies were 
fulfiled (Table 3.3.1). The banks credits without mortgage have the 
proportion of only 2,7% because banks together with other creditors belong 
to the III row creditors according to Lithuanian Enterprises Bankruptcy 
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Law. The I row creditors are the employees and the agriculture subjects that 
supplied the production for the bankrupted enterprises. The fulfiled claims 
in this group are 56,4%. The II row creditors are the government (tax 
payments), the State social insurance fund and the creditors of bankrupted 
companies that have the guarantees from government to repay the loans. In 
this group statistically 8,6% of claims are fulfiled in case of enterprises‘ 
bankruptcy. 
 
Table 3.3.1 
 
The claims of creditors in Lithuanian bankrupted enterprises in 1993 – 
2012 (Enterprises Bankruptcy Management Department, 2013) 
 
Valid claims Fulfiled claims Claims of 
creditors Million EUR % 
Million 
EUR % 
Fulfiled 
claims 
(%) 
Mortgage credits 856,7 22,5 250,5 49,8 29,2 
I row creditors 210,8 5,5 118,9 23,6 56,4 
II row creditors 1 017,4 26,8 87,9 17,4 8,6 
III row creditors 1 719,3 45,2 46,1 9,2 2,7 
Total 3 804,2 100 503,4 100 13,2 
 
The banks‘ economic environment indicators related to the 
households credit risk are also very important. The compensation of 
employees (COE), consumption expenditures of households (CEH) and the 
unemployment rate (UNE) were analyzed. Like the other analyzed 
Lithuanian indicators, the significant decrease of COE and CEH was 
observed in 2009 (Figure 3.3.7). 
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Figure 3.3.7. The compensation of employees and consumption 
expenditures of households in Lithuania (EUROSTAT, 2014) 
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The compensation of employees is the important factor influencing 
the ability of households to repay the consumer and realty loans for banks. 
In period of 2002 – 2008 this rate in average increased by 16,3% every year 
and in 2008 reached 14 357 million EUR. But next year the COE suddenly 
decreased by 16,6% to 11 969 million EUR. This slump of employees‘ 
compensation in 2009 reduced the final consumption expenditure of 
households and non-profit institutions serving households (CEH) by 14,1%. 
This fall is undoubtedly related not only to the credit risk increase of 
households but also on the riskiness of business enterprises. The decrease in 
consumption expenditure negatively affected the ability of Lithuanian 
enterprises to repay the business loans, because the decreased demand of 
goods and services in home market reduced the revenue and profit of 
companies. 
 The average wages before and after taxes of one employee in 
Lithuania is shown in Figure 3.3.8. 
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Figure 3.3.8. The average wages before and after taxes in Lithuania 
(Statistics Lithuania, 2014) 
 
 The growing wages until 2008 stimulated to increase consumption 
together with borrowing when the part of the households‘ expenses in this 
period were financed by banks‘ credits. So in the economic peak point of 
2008 the average wage after taxes of Lithuanian employees was 478,13 
EUR and the highest consumption expenditures of households reached 21,2 
billions EUR (Figure 3.3.7). Also the loan portfolio in Lithuanian banks was 
the highest in this year and reached 22 372 million EUR (Figure 3.1.3). In 
2009 the decrease of wage after taxes was only 3%, so it can be supposed 
that the significant decrease of aggregated compensation of employees was 
affected by the growth of unemployment. 
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Figure 3.3.9. The unemployment and inflation rates in Lithuania (Statistics 
Lithuania, 2014) 
 
The unemployment in 2009 increased by 8% to 13,8%, but the peak 
was reached in 2010 when this rate was 17,8% (Figure 3.3.9). The higher 
unemployment rate as the factor of households‘ income slump increases risk 
of loss for banks in retail credits. The analysis results allow to maintain that 
there is a lag in 1 year between social and business statistics related with the 
economic downturn. The GDP, exports and investments were the least in 
2009 but the highest unemployment rate and the least compensation of 
employees, consumption expenditures of households and the average wages 
were in 2010. So, after the economics growth period the significant 
deterioration of households‘ financial condition in 2009 – 2010 is evident. 
This business cycle fall effect had negative impact to the households credit 
risk in Lithuania that suddenly met the lack of financial resources after short 
period of economic growth and reasonless expectations. 
The consumption intensity and economic atcivity in a country also 
reflects the inflation rate which calculation is based on the consumer price 
index measuring the changes in the prices of goods and services. In 
Lithuania the highest inflation rate was in 2007 – 2008, when the economy 
was in the peak point of business cycle (Figure 3.3.9). The prices increase 
when demand for goods and services grows. The companies create inflation 
when they raise their prices to cover higher supply prices and maintain 
profit margins. When inflation is high, overall prices are rising within the 
economy. In such environment, businesses generally have little trouble 
raising prices to their customers. When the consumers see the high inflation 
they usually expect prices to rise. That makes it easier for business to justify 
price hikes. However, when inflation is fairly low, it makes it extremely 
difficult for most companies to raise prices for goods and services. So, the 
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inflation rate is the important indicator reflecting the state of an economy. 
That is visible in Lithuanian economy statistics when in the downturn of 
2009 the inflation rate decreased from 8,5% to 1,3%. The inflation‘s 
relationship with supply and demand of goods or services means that it 
affects the financial decisions of consumers and lending amounts. Because 
the inflation is a sign of a growing economy and the deflation is a sign of 
recession, this indicator can allow to foresee the credit risk changes of loan 
portfolios in banks. 
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Figure 3.3.10. The relation of compensation of employees, consumption 
expenditures of households, unemployment, inflation rate and NPLs in 
banks (Statistics Lithuania, 2014; World Bank, 2014) 
 
 The dependence between compensation of employees, consumption 
expenditures of households and non-performing loans in changing stages of 
Lithuanian business cycle (years 2007 – 2010) is shown in Figure 3.3.10. 
The decrease of COE and CEH in economic downturn significantly 
increased the number of NPLs in banks. The related to this situation growth 
of unemployment and the typical decrease of inflation after economic boom 
period cause the increase of NPLs. 
The credit risk of households loans is closely related to realty price 
index. Buying a residential property the inhabitants make the high amount 
transactions that offten are financed by credits. Further the residential 
property as their most valuable assets credits expenses are the most 
significant component of households’ total expenses. The risk of a 
household‘s default increases when the realty prices start to decrease. So the 
realty price index measures how the prices of residential properties are 
changing over time. The realty price index describes the price developments 
of all residential properties purchased by households (flats, detached 
houses, terraced houses, etc.), both newly built and existing, independently 
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of their final use and independently of their previous owners. This index is 
the important indicator not only for households, but also for banks 
evaluating the expected loss if the debtor will not repay the credit. The 
realty price index serves as a timely, accurate indicator of house price trends 
at various geographic levels. It also provides housing economists with an 
improved analytical tool that is useful for estimating changes in the rates of 
mortgage defaults, prepayments and housing affordability in specific 
geographic areas. 
 According to the statistics of Lithuanian banks the value of loans in 
2009 decreased by 1 143,5 million EUR and next year (in 2010) it 
decreased by 201,2 million EUR. These negative changes in loan portfolio 
quality are interrelated with the realty price index calculated by the 
Statistics Department of Lithuania. The basic period in Figure 3.3.11 is year 
2010 when the realty price index was equal to 100%. The very significant 
decrease of -45,3% in realty prices was observed in economic recession of 
2009 and that increased the loss given default (LGD) values in banks. If the 
debtors had not repaid the credits, banks had to realize the realty assets in 
the market with significantly lower prices.  
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Figure 3.3.11. The realty price index and the impairment of loans in 
Lithuanian banks (Statistics Lithuania, 2014; Bank of Lithuania, 2014) 
 
The 2009 year’s growth of non-performing loans in commercial 
banks is also related to the worsened economic indicators of Lithuanian 
public sector. In 2004 – 2008 the Lithuanian general government revenue 
increased in average 17,3% yearly and in 2008 reached 11 219 million 
EUR. In this period the general government expenditures were also similar, 
so Lithuania had the balanced budget. But in 2009 the revenue decreased by 
15,8% to 9 449 million EUR. This fall in revenue caused the necessary 
stopping of expenditures growth. The general government expenditures in 
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2009 – 2013 were stable at 11 708 – 11 974 million EUR and this positive 
tendency allowed to reduce the national budget deficit (Figure 3.3.12). 
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Figure 3.3.12. Lithuanian general government revenue and expenses 
(Statistics Lithuania, 2014) 
 
The highest national budget deficit of 2 514 million EUR was in 
2009, but due to the regenerative revenue in 2013 the deficit decreased to 
745 million EUR (Figure 3.3.13). In economic growth period of 2004 – 
2007 the general government budget deficit to GDP was in range of [-1,5%; 
-0,4%]. The pre-crisis 2008 year‘s indicators can be considered as warning 
about 2009 year‘s oncoming downturn, because the general government 
budged deficit suddenly increased by 269,2% and it became -3,3% of GDP. 
In 2009 when the problem of high non-performing loans in commercial 
banks emerged, the Lithuanian general government budget deficit was 
higher by 769,9% compared to year 2007 and it became -9,4% of GDP. 
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Figure 3.3.13. Lithuanian general government deficit (EUROSTAT, 2014) 
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Since 2009 the worsened Lithuanian economic environment is also 
visible in the statistics of general government debt. In 2004 – 2008 the 
average annual debt growth was 9,3%, but in 2009 – 2013 the debt 
increased in average 22,1% yearly (Figure 3.3.14). So, the large part of 
government expenses are financed by loans not earning the sufficient 
revenue inside the country. The stopped growth of general government 
expenditures reduced the income of business enterprises and households 
partly disimproving their financial condition and reducing solvency in the 
credits repayments for banks. 
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Figure 3.3.14. Lithuanian general government gross debt (EUROSTAT, 
2014) 
 
 The analysis of banks‘ economic environment changes has proved 
that the growth of non-performing loans in Lithuanian commercial banks is 
closely related to the deterioration of economics in 2009. The correlation 
analysis was implemented to measure quantitatively these relations (Table 
3.3.2). The analyzed variables can be classified into 4 groups: 
• Banks finance: non-performing loans (NPLs), return on equity 
(ROE) and return on assets (ROA). 
• Business economics: gross domestic product (GDP), 
investments (INV), exports (EXP), imports (IMP) and number 
of bankrupted companies (BNK). 
• Social indicators: compensation of employees (COE), 
consumption expenditures of households (CEH) and 
unemployment rate (UNE). 
• Public finance: general government deficit to GDP ratio (GDF) 
and general government debt to GDP ratio (GGD). 
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Table 3.3.2 
 
The correlation matrix of banks finance, business economics, social and public 
finance indicators 
 
 NPLs ROE ROA GDP INV EXP IMP BNK COE CEH UNE GDF GGD 
NPLs 1,00 -0,65 -0,61 -0,39 -0,97 0,01 -0,25 0,91 -0,58 -0,38 0,94 -0,89 0,69 
ROE -0,65 1,00 0,99 0,59 0,61 0,45 0,64 -0,71 0,38 0,41 -0,37 0,83 -0,08 
ROA -0,61 0,99 1,00 0,65 0,55 0,54 0,71 -0,65 0,40 0,47 -0,31 0,82 0,01 
GDP -0,39 0,59 0,65 1,00 0,37 0,87 0,96 -0,16 0,81 0,96 -0,19 0,66 0,23 
INV -0,97 0,61 0,55 0,37 1,00 -0,08 0,20 -0,89 0,66 0,40 -0,95 0,79 -0,77 
EXP 0,01 0,45 0,54 0,87 -0,08 1,00 0,96 0,19 0,45 0,77 0,26 0,41 0,67 
IMP -0,25 0,64 0,71 0,96 0,20 0,96 1,00 -0,07 0,61 0,86 0,01 0,61 0,45 
BNK 0,91 -0,71 -0,65 -0,16 -0,89 0,19 -0,07 1,00 -0,32 -0,09 0,83 -0,75 0,70 
COE -0,58 0,38 0,40 0,81 0,66 0,45 0,61 -0,32 1,00 0,91 -0,56 0,59 -0,30 
CEH -0,38 0,41 0,47 0,96 0,40 0,77 0,86 -0,09 0,91 1,00 -0,27 0,57 0,11 
UNE 0,94 -0,37 -0,31 -0,19 -0,95 0,26 0,01 0,83 -0,56 -0,27 1,00 -0,69 0,86 
GDF -0,89 0,83 0,82 0,66 0,79 0,41 0,61 -0,75 0,59 0,57 -0,69 1,00 -0,28 
GGD 0,69 -0,08 0,01 0,23 -0,77 0,67 0,45 0,70 -0,30 0,11 0,86 -0,28 1,00 
 
 The proportion of NPLs in banks is highly related to the amount of 
investments, bankruptcies and unemployment rate (|r| ∈ [0,91; 0,97]). The 
public finance indicators of general government deficit to GDP ratio and 
general government debt to GDP ratio also can be the NPLs predictors, 
because their |r| ∈ [0,69; 089]. The profitability of banks (ROE and ROA) is 
significantly dependent on almost all indicators except GGD. Analyzing the 
general economic indicators the GDP rate has the strong linear relations 
with exports, imports, compensation of employees and consumption 
expenditures of households where the correlation coefficients are in range 
of [0,81; 0,96]. The other values of significant correlations affirm the 
importance of systemic factors in banks‘ environment analysis and the 
ability of risk managers to extract the necessary information can improve 
the banks‘ financial results. 
 The analyzed in this chapter macroeconomic and other indicators 
have certainly affirmed the fluctuations of business cycle in Lithuanian 
economy and it is evident that these fluctuations highly affected the credit 
risk of debtors in commercial banks and their financial results. The changes 
of non-performing loans and banks‘ consolidated financial data in different 
phases of business cycle allow to maintain about the evident dependence 
between them. The impact of macroeconomic factors on the debtors‘ ability 
to repay debts in Lithuania is very strong. The loan portfolio quality of 
banks is highly dependent on the changes of economic environment. The 
understanding of this dependence and the analysis of macroeconomic 
indicators can help to manage credit risk more effectively in comercial 
banks. 
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3.4. Enterprises credit risk assessment model considering the industry 
sectors sensitivity to the macroeconomic changes 
 
In credit risk management in banks the main problem is to assess the 
creditworthiness of loan applicants. The wide range of statistical techniques 
can be applied in the classification models development. In this research the 
classification of Lithuanian enterprises into default and non-default groups 
was implemented by multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS) and 
logistic regression (LR) methods. 
The data sample for the model‘s development consists of 195 
Lithuanian companies (145 not bankrupted and 50 bankrupted). The 11 
financial ratios of 3 years were included into analysis (Table 3.4.1) that 
were calculated according to balance-sheets and income statements. 
 
Table 3.4.1 
 
The Lithuanian enterprises financial ratios 
 
No. Ratio and calculation 
1.  Gross profit margin (GPM): 
Gross profit / Net sales 
2.  Main activity profit margin (APM): 
(Sales – (Cost of goods sold + Operating expenses)) / Sales 
3.  Net profit margin (NPM): 
Net income / Sales 
4.  Return on assets (ROA): 
Net income / Total assets 
5.  Return on equity (ROE): 
Net income / Shareholders’ equity 
6.  Current ratio (CR): 
Current assets / Current liabilities 
7.  Working capital to total assets (WCA): 
(Current assets – Current liabilities) / Total assets 
8.  Debt ratio (DR): 
Total liabilities / Total assets 
9.  Long-term debt ratio (LDR): 
Long-term debt / (Long-term debt + Shareholders’ equity) 
10.  Asset turnover (AT): 
Sales / Total assets 
11.  Retained earnings to total assets (REA): 
Retained earnings / Total assets 
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The analyzed financial ratios involve 3 years so the indexes at the 
abbreviations of financial ratios xt denote the year of the data: {t = 1, the 
last year; t = 2, one year before; t = 3, two years before (e.g. 2013, 2012 
and 2011). The developed models classify enterprises into 2 groups: low (0) 
and high (1) risk of bankruptcy in the next 1 financial year: 
 
 Yt+1 = f(xi), i = t, t – 1, t – 2 (3.4.1) 
 
The multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS) is a 
nonparametric procedure that makes no assumption about the underlying 
functional relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
MARS constructs this relation from a set of coefficients and basis functions 
from the data. The independent variables, basis functions and the model 
parameters are combined to determine the credit risk class of a company.  
The mathematical model of MARS is: 
 
 ( )∑
=
+=
M
m
mm XhY
1
0 ββ  (3.4.2) 
 
Where M is the number of non-constant terms in the model; hm(X) – 
the basis functions; βm – the weights; β0 – the intercept. 
The weights of MARS equations are calculated in Table 3.4.2. 
 
Table 3.4.2 
 
The weights (βm) of MARS equations 
 
Basis 
function 
Low bankruptcy risk  
(0) 
High bankruptcy risk  
(1) 
BF1 0,2370247070 -0,237024707094566 
BF2 0,0268583197534090 -0,0268583197534090 
BF3 -0,214058110308261 0,214058110308261 
BF4 -2,31211924651472 2,31211924651472 
BF5 1,27914838327317 -1,27914838327317 
BF6 -0,101888271406899 0,101888271406899 
BF7 -0,599616496296886 0,599616496296887 
BF8 1,00291145843225 -1,00291145843225 
BF9 0,0664933123712619 -0,0664933123712619 
BF10 0,435027694980797 -0,435027694980797 
BF11 -0,2872030472 0,287203047288994 
BF12 -0,0291739471055231 0,0291739471055231 
Intercept (β0) -0,2266233855 1,22662338555876 
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The basis functions of low (0) and high (1) bankruptcy risk models 
are given in Table 3.4.3. 
 
Table 3.4.3 
 
The basis functions of MARS models 
 
BFi Basis functions 
BF1 max (0; REA1 + 1,34350088326142) 
BF2 max (0; -1,34350088326142 – REA1) 
BF3 max (0; 0,181725208479310 – ROE2) 
BF4 max (0; ROE1 – 0,157559662373134) 
BF5 max (0; ROE1 + 0,331967032482701) 
BF6 max (0; LDR2 – 0,154025608509773) 
BF7 max (0; 0,154025608509773 – LDR2) 
BF8 max (0; ROE1 – 0,409103563474388) 
BF9 max (0; AT2 – 0,894278549689584) 
BF10 max (0; APM1 + 0,585223984830065) 
BF11 max (0; 0,0822812198773560 – WCA2) 
BF12 max (0; AT1 – 1,89461961678967) 
 
In the MARS model the basis functions max (0; x – t) and max (0; t – 
x) are used as decision points to determine which value will be used in the 
model at a given knot. In the model the basis function BF1 is max (0; REA1 
+ 1,34350088326142). The analysis process is: 
• If REA1 + 1,34350088326142 > 0, then the basis function BF1 = 
REA1 + 1,34350088326142. 
• If REA1 + 1,34350088326142 < 0, then BF1 = 0. 
In the model the basis function BF2 is max (0; -1,34350088326142 – 
REA1). The analysis process is: 
• If -1,34350088326142 – REA1 > 0, then the basis function BF2 = 
-1,34350088326142 – REA1.  
• If -1,34350088326142 – UBA1 < 0, then BF2 = 0.  
The similar analysis must be implemented in all other knots of 
developed MARS model. In the credit risk assessment the company must be 
classified into low or high bankruptcy risk group according to the higher 
value of dependent variable (Y). 
 To improve the credit risk assessment of enterprises the other 
statistical classification model was developed employing the logistic 
regression method which allows to predict the dependent variable P(Y) in 
range [0; 1]. When solving the objects classification into two groups 
problem, the classification threshold must be set in this interval. 
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The mathematical model of logistic regression (LR) is: 
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Where xi – the independent variables (financial ratios of enterprises); 
βi – the regression coefficients; α – the intercept. 
 The regression coefficients are calculated in Table 3.4.4. 
 
Table 3.4.4 
 
The coefficients (βi) of logistic regression model 
 
Ratio (xi) Coefficient (βi)  Ratio (xi) Coefficient (βi) 
GPM1 -5,1912  NPM2 10,8645 
APM1 28,0961  ROA2 21,1961 
NPM1 24,8496  WCA2 1,4305 
ROA1 -3,3699  DR2 -19,1355 
ROE1 1,0890  LDR2 4,1088 
CR1 -0,2079  AT2 2,8039 
WCA1 -2,6060  REA2 -9,2097 
DR1 6,0516  GPM3 6,7497 
REA1 5,8731  APM3 -13,7134 
GPM2 -6,9159  NPM3 44,7345 
APM2 -20,6438  Intercept (α) 4,5082 
 
The classification threshold of the logistic regression model was set 
to 0,5. It means if P(Y) ∈ [0; 0,5) a company is classified into the low 
bankruptcy risk group. If P(Y) ∈ [0,5; 1] a company is classified into the 
high bankruptcy risk group. 
 
Table 3.4.5 
 
The classification matrix 
 
Observed Predicted Work (0) Bankruptcy (1) 
Work (0) TNMARS = 144 TNLR = 144 
FNMARS = 11 
FNLR = 5 
Bankruptcy (1) FPMARS = 1 FPLR = 1 
TPMARS = 39 
TPLR = 45 
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The classification accuracy of MARS and LR models is shown in the 
classification matrix (Table 3.4.5). The true positive (TP), true negative 
(TN), false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) rates were calculated. The 
false rates indicate the classification errors. According to these rates the 
overall accuracy (OA), sensitivity (Se) and specificity (Sp) of developed 
models were calculated to compare the classification results and evaluate 
the suitability of models in credit risk assessment (Table 3.4.6).  
 
Table 3.4.6 
 
The classification accuracy indicators (%) 
 
Rate Calculation MARS LR 
Overall accuracy TP + TN / (TP + TN + FP + FN) 93,85 96,92 
Sensitivity TP / (TP + FN) 78,00 90,00 
Specificity TN / (TN + FP) 99,31 99,31 
 
The higher overall classification accuracy was reached by logistic 
regression model (96,92%). The correct classification of working 
companies (Sp) in both models is the same (99,31%). The logistic 
regression model is able to classify the bankrupted companies more 
precisely, because the sensitivity of this model is 90% compared to the 
MARS model which correctly classified 78% of bankrupted companies. The 
misclassification of bankrupted companies was different so the developed 
MARS and logistic regression models were combined to the aggregated 
classification algorithm to improve the classification results (Table 3.4.7). 
 
Table 3.4.7 
 
The classification rules of aggregated model 
 
Logistic regression Classification rules 
Work ↓ Bankruptcy ↓ 
Work → Work Bankruptcy MARS 
Bankruptcy → Bankruptcy Bankruptcy 
Overall accuracy = 96,92%; Se = 92,00%; Sp = 98,62% 
 
When the logistic regression and MARS models were joined, the 
overall accuracy remained the same as in the LR model (96,92%) but the 
sensitivity increased by 2% and the specificity decreased by 0,69%. Usually 
it is more important for banks to classify correctly the risky clients because 
they can cause a higher loss due to not repaid credits. Otherwise, if a bank 
does not finance the solvent company the implied loss consists of only not 
earned interest income. So banks should combine the MARS and LR 
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models for the better classification performance. In the practice of banks it 
is necessary to classify the loan applicants into 8 or more risk groups 
attributing them credit ratings {AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, C, D}. The 
development of such credit risk assessment models needs more complex 
research analyzing the financial data of enterprises in micro level. This 
study is directed to the macro factors of credit risk, so the economic 
environment of banks and enterprises in more detailed way are being 
analyzed. 
The developed MARS and logistic regression model predicts the 
possibility of enterprise‘s bankruptcy in next financial year with 96,92% 
probability. It analyzes only the financial data of companies and prediction 
is based only on this information. In addition, it is important for banks to 
take into account the systematic risk of particular industry sectors, because 
almost all of them in Lithuania were significantly influenced by the 
economic downturn in 2009 and 2010. 
 
Table 3.4.8 
 
The statistics of bankrupted companies in different industry sectors 
(years 2003 – 2013) 
 
Sector A B C D E F 
Total 339 11 2009 21 60 2074 
Average 30,8 1,6 182,6 1,9 5,5 188,5 
St. dev. 4,8 1,1 52,0 1,6 3,3 137,3 
V (%) 15,7 72,2 28,5 82,7 61,0 72,8 
Sector G H I J K L 
Total 3869 1151 589 209 61 424 
Average 351,7 104,6 53,5 19,0 5,5 38,5 
St. dev. 77,3 79,4 33,6 9,2 2,8 36,6 
V (%) 22,0 75,9 62,8 48,5 51,2 95,0 
Sector M N P Q R S 
Total 597 340 41 50 149 136 
Average 54,3 30,9 3,7 4,5 13,5 12,4 
St. dev. 33,7 24,7 2,3 2,8 6,8 7,4 
V (%) 62,1 79,9 61,3 60,9 50,1 60,2 
 
The abbreviations of sectors in Table 3.4.8 were set according to 
industry classification of Statistics Lithuania. The sectors were analyzed: 
agriculture, forestry and fishery (A), mining (B), manufacturing (C), 
electricity, gas, steam supply and air conditioning (D), water supply and 
waste works (E), construction (F), wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair 
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(G), transportation and storage (H), settlement and feed services (I), 
information and communications (J), financial and insurance services (K), 
immovable property operations (L), profession, science and technical 
activity (M), administration services (N), education (P), health services (Q), 
recreation (R), other services (S). The total number of bankrupted 
companies in 2003 – 2013, average number of 1 year, standard deviation 
and coefficient of variation (V) were calculated in these sectors. The highest 
numbers of bankruptcies are in wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
construction, manufacturing and transportation and storage. These four 
sectors together compound 75% of total bankruptcies in the analyzed 
period. In Table 3.4.9 the sectors are sorted according to the annual average 
number of bankruptcies. The ranks for the sectors were attributed. The 
higher rank [1, 2, ...] means higher number of bankruptcies in the particular 
sector. 
 
Table 3.4.9 
 
The sorted sectors according to the average number of bankruptcies in 
one year 
 
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Sector G F C H M I L N A 
 
         
Rank 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Sector J R S K E Q P D B 
 
  The number of enterprises and the relative rates of bankruptcies to 
total enterprises are shown in Figure 3.4.1. 
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Figure 3.4.1. The number of enterprises and bankruptcy statistics (Statistics 
Lithuania, 2014) 
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 In the economics growth period of 2005 – 2007 the proportion of 
bankruptcies in total number of Lithuanian enterprises was decreasing from 
0,62% to 0,38%. The 2008 year‘s increase of this rate to 0,59% can be 
considered as early crisis warning indicator, because in the economic 
recession of 2009 the rate of bankrupted companies increased to 1,43%. 
Further the recovering economy reduced this relative rate of bankruptcies to 
0,84% in 2012. While the overall number of bankruptcies significantly 
increased in 2009, the calculated standard deviations and coefficients of 
variation in Table 3.4.8 point that the fluctuations of bankrupted companies 
in sectors is different. So, it is worth to ascertain the sectors that are 
sensitive to the fluctuations of business cycle in whole economy. 
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Figure 3.4.2. The average proportion of bankrupted companies by industry 
sector and canonical R values 
 
The line chart in Figure 3.4.2 indicates the canonical correlation 
coefficients between 5 Lithuanian macroeconomic rates of years 2003 – 
2011 and the number of bankrupted companies in every industry sector. 
These macroeconomic indicators were included into canonical analysis: 
GDP to 1 inhabitant, compensation of employees, exports, gross fixed 
capital formation (investments), the final consumption expenditure of 
households and non-profit institutions serving households. The correlation 
is very strong in all sectors except the health services (Q) together with 
financial and insurance sector (K). The number of bankruptcies in these two 
sectors are not very sensitive to the changes in macroeconomic 
environment, because their canonical correlation coefficients are 0,6362 and 
0,7891. The number of bankruptcies in other sectors highly correlate with 
the changes in macroeconomic environment. 
The polynomial regression models were developed to model the 
changes of bankrupted companies number in industry sectors. The charts of 
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two sectors (L and D) with the highest coefficients of variation (according 
to Table 3.4.8) are shown in Figure 3.4.3. The independent variable (x) in 
the polynomial regression models is a year number, the dependent variable 
(y) is the number of bankrupted companies. The polynomial regression 
curves visualize the degree of bankrupted companies number fluctuations in 
the different stages of business cycle. 
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Figure 3.4.3. The polynomial regression models of bankrupted companies 
in sectors with the highest coefficients of variation 
 
The immovable property operations, electricity, gas, steam supply 
and air conditioning sectors are very sensitive to the macroeconomic 
changes because the coefficients of variation are 82,7% – 95%. The 
fluctuations of polynomial regression curves in Figure 3.4.3 reflect this 
volatility.  
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Figure 3.4.4. The polynomial regression models of bankrupted companies 
in sectors with the least coefficients of variation 
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The coefficients of variation in agriculture, forestry and fishery, 
wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair sectors are lesser, therefore the 
polynomial regression curves are not so much fluctuating (Figure 3.4.4). 
These differences of variation rates reflect the different credit risk for banks 
in particular industry sector. The sensitivity of enterprises loss to the 
economic environment is not the same. So it is worth to implement the 
analysis that can help banks to identify the most risky sectors when the 
macroeconomic conditions of a country deteriorate. These results can be 
useful when in the credit risk assessment the estimated default probability 
of company is acceptable for bank. But for the evaluation of long term debt 
perspectives the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on enterprises‘ 
credit risk changes is very important. 
 
 
Figure 3.4.5. The rank attribution process in sectorial analysis 
 
The sensitivity of industry sectors to macroeconomic changes was 
estimated analyzing 5 indicators: 
• Sector‘s number of bankrupted companies in a year (X1). 
• Sector‘s revenue (X2). 
• Sector‘s income before taxes (X3). 
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• Sector‘s profitability of main activity (X4). 
• Proportion of loss-making companies in a sector (X5). 
The years 2005 – 2008 were considered as the pre-crisis period, 
while the downturn’s rates included years 2009 and 2010. The average 
values of pre-crisis period, in downturn and the changes of averages in 
every sector were calculated. According to changes of averages the ranks Ri 
in range of [1; 13] were attributed for the analyzed sectors. The ranks 
attribution process is shown in Figure 3.4.5. The sectors A, K, M, P and S 
were not included into further analysis because of the unavailable statistical 
data.  Ranks attributed to other sectors according to 5 indicators and the 
calculated average ranks are given in Table 3.4.10. 
 
Table 3.4.10 
 
Ranks attributed to industry sectors 
 
Bankruptcy 
risk 
Industry 
sector R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 
Average 
rank 
F 4 1 5 4 1 3 
I 6 4 1 3 5 3,8 
L 1 9 2 1 6 3,8 High 
R 7 2 4 6 2 4,2 
N 2 7 6 5 9 5,8 
J 5 5 10 9 4 6,6 
G 11 6 8 8 3 7,2 
H 3 8 7 10 8 7,2 
Medium 
B 12 3 9 7 7 7,6 
D 8 12 3 2 13 7,6 
C 10 11 11 11 10 10,6 
E 9 10 12 12 11 10,8 Low 
Q 13 13 13 13 12 12,8 
 
The sectorial analysis results allowed to classify the Lithuanian 
industry sectors into three groups according to their bankruptcy risk in 
economic recession: 
• The most risky sectors are: construction (F), settlement and feed 
services (I), immovable property operations (L), and recreation 
(R). 
• The medium bankruptcy risk sectors are: administration and 
services (N), information and communications (J), wholesale 
and retail (G), transportation and storage (H), and mining (B). 
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• The sectors of low bankruptcy risk are: electricity, gas supply, 
air conditioning (D), manufacturing (C), water supply and waste 
works (E), and health services (Q). 
In Figure 3.4.6 the changes of bankrupted companies before 
economic downturn and during the downturn were compared in the highest 
and least risk sectors (3 enterprises from every sector). In the construction 
sector (F) the deterioration of macroeconomic conditions increased the 
average number of bankrupted companies by 305,6%, settlement and feed 
services (I) – 139,3%, immovable property operations (L) – 755,8%. Three 
sectors from the end of Table 3.4.10 were influenced by the economic 
downturn not so significantly. The average number of bankrupted 
companies in manufacturing (C) sector increased by 53,7%, water supply 
and waste works (E) – 87,5%. The least risky is health services sector which 
was not negatively influenced by macroeconomic changes in 2009 and 
2010. This period increased the average number of bankruptcies only by 
6,7%. 
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Figure 3.4.6. The changes of average bankrupted enterprises in high and 
low bankruptcy risk groups 
 
 The analysis of industry sectors riskiness in economic recession was 
extended into the regional view. The distribution of bankrupted enterprises 
in every sector was analyzed in 10 districts of Lithuania. The correlation 
coefficients were calculated to ascertain is the riskiness of sectors equal in 
all districts or are there any significant differences (Table 3.4.11). All 
calculated correlation coefficients are very high in range [0,76; 0,99] what 
means that the estimated consistent patterns of industry sectors risk is 
typical in all districts. The least similarities are in Vilnius and Tauragė, 
Vilnius and Marijampolė, Klaipėda and Tauragė, Klaipėda and Marijampolė 
districts where the correlation coefficients are less than 0,8. 
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Table 3.4.11 
 
The bankrupted companies distributions correlation coefficients of 
industry sectors in 10 districts of Lithuania 
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Alytus 1,00 0,94 0,92 0,96 0,94 0,97 0,93 0,93 0,97 0,90 
Kaunas 0,94 1,00 0,97 0,82 0,95 0,93 0,84 0,97 0,92 0,98 
Klaipėda 0,92 0,97 1,00 0,78 0,87 0,87 0,77 0,91 0,85 0,98 
Marijampolė 0,96 0,82 0,78 1,00 0,88 0,94 0,95 0,84 0,95 0,77 
Panevėžys 0,94 0,95 0,87 0,88 1,00 0,97 0,95 0,98 0,98 0,88 
Šiauliai 0,97 0,93 0,87 0,94 0,97 1,00 0,95 0,95 0,99 0,87 
Tauragė 0,93 0,84 0,77 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,00 0,90 0,98 0,76 
Telšiai 0,93 0,97 0,91 0,84 0,98 0,95 0,90 1,00 0,94 0,92 
Utena 0,97 0,92 0,85 0,95 0,98 0,99 0,98 0,94 1,00 0,85 
Vilnius 0,90 0,98 0,98 0,77 0,88 0,87 0,76 0,92 0,85 1,00 
 
 Despite the fact that the sectorial riskiness differences are not 
signficant in Lithuanian districts, it is possible relatively to compare the 
proportions of bankruptcies to determine in what districts the enterprises of 
a particular sector are more risky. The distribution of 5 sectors that have the 
highest number of bankrupted companies every year according to Table 
3.4.9 are given in Table 3.4.12 
 
Table 3.4.12 
 
The distribution of bankrupted companies in 10 districts of Lithuania 
 
Industry sector District G F C H M 
Alytus 26,1 21,7 18,8 24,6 1,4 
Kaunas 25,5 26,0 17,6 13,4 5,8 
Klaipėda 19,9 29,6 14,2 15,0 5,6 
Marijampolė 25,9 13,0 20,4 31,5 0,0 
Panevėžys 29,0 17,4 23,2 13,8 4,3 
Šiauliai 27,9 16,2 17,6 18,4 2,2 
Tauragė 29,6 11,1 25,9 22,2 0,0 
Telšiai 30,7 24,0 25,3 12,0 1,3 
Utena 27,3 14,5 21,8 20,0 3,6 
Vilnius 19,5 25,6 14,2 12,6 6,9 
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The companies of wholesale and retail sector (G) have the higher 
bankruptcy risk in Panevėžys, Šiauliai, Tauragė, Telšiai and Utena districts. 
The construction (F) companies are more risky in Alytus, Kaunas, Klaipėda, 
Telšiai and Vilnius. The districts that have the higher bankruptcy risk in 
other sectors are highlighted in grey (Table 3.4.12). 
The average net profitability, return on assets, current ratio, quick 
ratio and debt ratio of sectors one year before the enterprises‘ bankruptcy 
are calculated in Table 3.4.13. These ratios in the credit risk management 
can help banks to foresee the bankruptcy of companies in the next financial 
year if their financial indicators reach the estimated values. 
 
Table 3.4.13 
 
The average financial ratios one year before the bankruptcy in industry 
sectors (Statistics Lithuania, 2014) 
 
Sector Net profitab. ROA 
Current 
ratio 
Quick 
ratio 
Debt 
ratio 
A -0,0365 -0,0332 0,74 0,54 0,97 
C -0,157 -0,1976 0,7 0,38 0,98 
E -0,1451 -0,4583 0,53 0,34 1,1 
F -0,0938 -0,0845 1,14 0,4 0,92 
G -0,0549 -0,0962 1 0,45 0,92 
H -0,179 -0,2599 0,65 0,46 1,15 
I -0,4318 -0,4623 0,34 0,17 1,41 
J -0,2033 -0,1388 0,45 0,36 1,05 
L -0,1841 -0,0306 1,68 0,35 0,86 
M -0,3892 -0,2454 0,66 0,51 0,84 
N -0,1349 -0,1067 0,4 0,31 1,05 
P -0,2139 -0,8354 0,23 0,16 1,96 
R -1,205 -0,145 0,42 0,37 0,74 
S -0,0547 -0,224 0,59 0,5 1,3 
All -0,1201 -0,1383 0,93 0,42 0,96 
 
 The average financial ratios vary in different sectors, so the cluster 
analysis by the method of k-means was implemented to classify the sectors 
into three groups according to the profitability, solvency and indebtedness 
ratios of Table 3.4.13. The members of clusters are: 
• Cluster 1: R. 
• Cluster 2: A, C, F, H, J, L, N, S. 
• Cluster 3: E, I, P. 
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Mostly the average bankruptcy warning ratios of enterprises can be 
considered as cluster‘s 2, because this cluster has 71,4% of analyzed 
sectors. So the analysts can use these values as the most common in pre-
bankruptcy state of business enterprises. The sectors in clusters 1 and 3 
have some pecularities in the companies‘ financial condition. In cluster 1 
there are companies of recreation services where in the one year before 
bankruptcy the higher negative net profitability and lower debt ratio are 
typical compared to other clusters. The cluster 3 consists of water supply, 
waste works, settlement, feed services and education sectors where the 
lower return on assets and higher debt ratio are typical compared to other 
clusters. 
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Figure 3.4.7. The average values of financial ratios in clusters of industry 
sectors 
 
 The analysis results of this chapter allowed to develop the statistical 
model applying the multivariate adaptive regression splines and logistic 
regression methods to predict the enterprises bankruptcy in next financial 
year with the probability of 96,92%. If the company in credit risk 
assessment process is acceptable according to its financial data, the sectorial 
riskiness analysis results can help banks to rank the enterprises according to 
this feature. The district of enterprise’s location is also one of factors that 
has the impact on the bankruptcy possibility in case of macroeconomic 
downturn. The comparative analysis allowed to highlight the distribution 
values in industry sectors that point the higher enterprises’ bankruptcy risk 
in the particular district of Lithuania. The average financial ratios of 
profitability, solvency and capital structure help to understand the typical 
financial condition in the last year of the enterprise’s performance. If the 
rates impend to these values, the loan application must be rejected. 
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3.5. Business and households indebtedness indicators as factors of NPLs 
problem in banks 
 
The ability to repay credits also depends on the debtor‘s 
indebtedness level. Not all loan applicants, especially households, 
understand the risk of default and the essence of credits repayment burden 
at the moment of credit agreement signing. That causes the problem of 
irresponsible borrowing which increases the credit risk of loan applicants 
and non-performing loans.  
 Analyzing the statistical data it is evident that in 2009 together with 
the macroeconomic downturn and the NPLs growth in banks it was the 
problem of high indebtedness of banks‘ clients. Since 2001 the business 
loans portfolio increased by 612,7% to 10 370 million EUR in 2008. The 
households loans portfolio in this period increased by 3 875,5% to 8 746 
million EUR (Figure 3.5.1). The average annual business loans growth rate 
in 2001 – 2008 was 32,4%, the households loans – 69,2% yearly. Since 
2008 the loan portfolio in Lithuanian banks is decreasing. 
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Figure 3.5.1. The Lithuanian banks consolidated loan portfolio (Bank of 
Lithuania, 2013) 
 
 The borrowing activity in Lithuanian banks is seen in the statistics of 
new loans of a year (Figure 3.5.2). The peak point of credits in LTL was in 
2007 (5 721,6 million EUR) while the new credits in EUR were highest in 
2008 (8 930,1 million EUR). The overall amount of new credits in 2008 
was 13 331,5 million EUR. So it is evident that the growing Lithuanian 
economy stimulated to borrow and the credits were easily obtainable. In 
2009 the recession in Lithuanian economy started to reduce the annual 
borrowing amounts. 
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Figure 3.5.2. The new loans of Lithuanian banks in LTL and EUR (Bank of 
Lithuania, 2014) 
 
In Table 3.5.1 the indebtedness rates were calculated that reflect the 
changes of debt burden for Lithuanian business enterprises and households. 
The estimated critical indebtedness indicators before the economic 
downturn (year 2008) statistically can help to foresee the similar problems 
for banks in future. 
 
Table 3.5.1 
   
The indebtedness rates of business enterprises and households in 
Lithuania (%) 
 
Rate 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
BL/R 44,9 55,9 60,4 70,7 85,5 64,1 54,3 48,5 
BL/GDP 22,2 27,3 31,2 32,0 35,4 30,7 25,6 24,7 
HL/COE 31,8 44,6 58,8 60,9 69,9 69,1 61,6 57,5 
HL/GDP 12,9 19,0 25,2 27,0 31,4 28,6 24,4 22,5 
LP/GDP 35,2 46,3 56,5 59,0 66,8 59,3 50,1 47,2 
LP/COE 86,5 108,6 131,6 133,2 148,7 143,4 126,2 120,4 
 
The business loans (BL) in 2008 reached the peak point when the 
average financial debt for Lithuanian banks of 1 company was 242,4 
thousands EUR. Also the households loans (HL) in 2008 were the highest 
when 1 Lithuanian inhabitant had in average 2,599 thousands EUR debt for 
banks. The important factor of debtors credit risk increase and insolvency in 
2009 can be considered the high indebtedness of year 2008, that became too 
high debt burden for enterprises and households in deteriorated 
macroeconomic environment. The relative rates of business loans to 
revenue (BL/R), business loans to GDP (BL/GDP), households loans to 
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compensation of employees (HL/COE), households loans to GDP 
(HL/GDP), banks‘ loan portfolio to GDP (LP/GDP) and loan portfolio to 
compensation of employees (LP/COE) were calculated in Table 3.5.1 to 
measure the business and households indebtedness in Lithuania. When the 
revenue of Lithuanian companies in 2009 decreased by 29,4% (Figure 
3.3.3), statistically the Lithuanian companies had to accrue for banks in 
average 85,5% of revenue if a company wanted to repay all financial debts. 
Similarly the economic downturn in 2009 increased the credit risk of 
households credits, because not only the value of assets significantly 
decreased as indicated the realty price index analysis, but also the 
coefficient of households debt to compensation of employees highly 
increased. In 2009 the Lithuanian employees for 1 EUR of their salary had 
0,699 EUR of debts for banks. The total loan portfolio of Lithuanian banks 
to GDP reached 66,8%, the loan portfolio to compensation of employees 
rate – 148,7%. 
 The year 2009 was the macroeconomic downturn in Lithuania, so 
predicting the banking problems the most important indebtedness indicators 
for banks are the year’s 2008 rates. It can be concluded that the 
deterioration of banks’ loan portfolio in next year is very probable when 
these relative indicators reach the estimated values:  
• Business loans to revenue rate – 70,7%.  
• Business loans to GDP – 32%.  
• Households loans to compensation of employees – 60,9%. 
• Households loans to GDP – 27%. 
• Lithuanian banks‘ total loan portfolio to GDP – 59%. 
• Lithuanian banks‘ total loan portfolio to compensation of 
employees – 133,2%. 
These high indebtedness indicators, especially related to the 
Lithuanian households, implicate the problem of irresponsible borrowing in 
the country. There are several factors related to the creditors and debtors 
that facilitate the irresponsible financing behaviour in credit markets. For 
lenders, the aim of high returns from loans as the investment instrument and 
the insufficient financial regulation are among the most important 
motivations. For borrowers, these factors include easy access to credit and 
lack of financial knowledge. The reasons of the adverse households debt 
position often includes the excessive spending by the consumers, using the 
credit for general living expenses and debt repayments, interest and charges 
on the credit taken and the raising of the credit limits by the lender. Usually 
the low-income borrowers are experiencing repayment difficulties due to 
unforeseen circumstances, poverty-level incomes, the lack of welfare 
provision and the misunderstanding that the debt can spiral out of control. 
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The criticism is directed for giving the responsibility entirely to people that 
borrow more than they can afford. Even the ordinary borrowing and 
expenses can get people into unmanageable debt in some circumstances 
outside of their control. 
The irresponsible borrowing by credit institutions customers plays a 
role in creating the current financial crises. Often the publicly debased idea 
of saving importance may be one reason of stimulating the need to borrow 
for the less financially educated persons and causing their over-
indebtedness. For many people this view is still dominant in their 
understanding of financial decision making. Ultimately, the uneducated 
persons resort to the secondary, unregulated markets which charge 
excessive interest rates. Especially the payday loans are often considered as 
an absolute last resort solving the financial problems of households, but 
using them will likely crucify the personal finances and spiral the debt out 
of control. The exorbitant rates charged on desperate borrowers exacerbates 
indebtedness and loans are never paid off, raising social concerns. 
Undoubtedly, defaulting is costly to both the lender and the 
borrower. It is therefore in the interest of both parties to avoid the default 
stage which may ultimately lead to bad individual or corporate reputation, 
litigations and court judgements. The continued advancement of credit to 
people who clearly are not able to pay back is not just irresponsible lending 
but also the operational risk issue within the lending institution. For the 
lenders to be considered as responsible, they must serve their credit markets 
in a sustainable way through the value-enhancing loans. The over-lending, 
especially to already over-indebted loan applicants further commits them 
into a spiralling cycle of indebtedness, further exacerbating the deep 
financial problems. The consumers, financial providers and intermediaries 
need to take the responsibility for their role within the financial system of a 
country. This adds weight to the need for a more financially responsible and 
inclusive financial services sector. In this way, the notion of responsibility 
needs to be shared between the government, financial services and 
individuals but  this responsibility needs to be proportionate and fair. 
The economists highlight the fact that they tend to see individuals as  
rational actors responding to changing economic conditions. Leading from 
this understanding of the rational finance manager, the education is the key 
solution of personal over-indebtedness problem. Indeed the recent policy 
conjecture must focus on the strategic priorities to address the issue of over-
indebtedness problem and the education must appear to be the key 
approach. There is a desire to increase levels of financial capability and 
awareness improving people’s ability to take control of their own finances. 
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3.6. Non-performing loans problem in European Union 
 
The statistical data of World Bank shows that since 2009 the growth 
of average bank non-performing loans (NPLs) to total gross loans in EU 
countries was observed. In 2006 – 2008 this rate was stable in range 2,15 – 
2,75%, but after this period the continued average increase rate of NPLs 
was 0,91% yearly and in 2013 this rate reached 7,3%. The Lithuanian NPLs 
statistics in the context of European Union average in this period is 
outstanding (Figure 3.6.1). But in 2009 the sudden NPLs growth was not a 
systemic banking problem of EU, because the values of NPLs significantly 
differ. The proportions of non-performing loans in 28 EU countries are 
given in Table 3.6.1. 
 
Table 3.6.1 
 
The non-performing loans in banks of EU countries, %  
(World Bank, 2014) 
 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria AT 2,7 2,2 1,9 2,3 2,8 2,7 2,8 2,9 
Belgium BE 1,3 1,2 1,7 3,1 2,8 3,3 3,8 3,8 
Bulgaria BG 2,2 2,1 2,4 6,4 11,9 15 16,6 ... 
Cyprus CY ... ... 3,6 4,5 5,6 9,6 18,6 30,3 
Czech Republic CZ ... 2,4 2,8 4,6 5,4 5,2 5,2 5,2 
Germany DE 3,4 2,6 2,9 3,3 3,2 3 2,9 ... 
Denmark DK ... 0,6 1,2 3,3 4,1 3,7 6 4,8 
Spain ES 0,7 0,9 2,8 4,1 4,7 6 7,5 8,2 
Estonia EE 0,2 0,5 1,9 5,2 5,4 4 2,6 1,5 
Finland FI ... ... 0,4 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,5 ... 
France FR ... ... 2,8 4 3,8 4,3 4,3 4,3 
United Kingdom UK 0,9 0,9 1,6 3,5 4 4 3,7 ... 
Greece EL 61,8 53,7 4,7 7 9,1 14,4 23,3 31,3 
Hungary HU 2,6 2,3 3 6,7 9,8 13,4 15,8 17,6 
Ireland IE 0,5 0,6 1,9 9,8 12,5 16,1 24,6 24,6 
Italy IT 6,6 5,8 6,3 9,4 10 11,7 13,7 15,1 
Lithuania LT 1 1 6,1 24 23,3 18,8 14,8 12,5 
Latvia LV 0,5 0,8 2,1 14,3 15,9 14,1 8,7 6,4 
Malta MT 7,1 5,9 5,5 6,2 7,4 7,3 8,2 9,2 
Netherlands NL ... ... 1,7 3,2 2,8 2,7 3,1 3,2 
Poland PL 7,4 5,2 2,8 4,3 4,9 4,7 5,2 5,2 
Portugal PT ... 2,8 3,6 4,8 5,2 7,5 9,8 11 
Romania RO ... 2,6 2,7 7,9 11,9 14,3 18,2 21,6 
Slovak Republic SK 3,2 2,5 2,5 5,3 5,8 5,6 5,2 5,1 
Slovenia SI 2,5 1,8 4,2 5,8 8,2 11,8 15,2 18 
Sweden SE 0,1 0,1 0,5 0,8 0,8 0,7 0,7 0,6 
Croatia HR 5,2 4,8 4,9 7,7 11,1 12,3 13,8 15,4 
Luxembourg LU 0,1 0,4 0,6 0,7 0,2 0,4 0,1 0,2 
101 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
%
European Union
Lithuania
 
Figure 3.6.1. The NPLs in European Union (World Bank, 2014) 
 
The average GDP to 1 inhabitant and NPLs rates were calculated for 
every EU country in the period of 2006 – 2013. These values in diagram 
form are shown in Figure 3.6.2 which is divided into four parts. Two 
countries were not included into this chart as the outliers: Luxembourg has 
the very high average GDP to 1 inhabitant rate (78 479 EUR) and the 
average of NPLs is low (0,34%), Greece has the very high average NPLs 
(25,66%) and the GDP to 1 inhabitant is 19 099 EUR. In the group of high 
GDP and low NPLs there are 35,7% of EU countries, low GDP and high 
NPLs – 35,7%, low GDP and low NPLs – 21,5%, high GDP and high NPLs 
– 7,1%. 
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Figure 3.6.2. The average GDP to 1 inhabitant and average NPLs in EU 
(EUROSTAT, 2014; World Bank, 2014) 
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 The average values of GDP and NPLs allow to maintain that the 
problem of high NPLs is typical in EU countries with lower GDP indicator 
while the countries with more developed economy have less problem of 
NPLs in commercial banks. Estimating the impact of economic conditions 
on NPLs in a country‘s banks it is more important the dynamics of analyzed 
rates rather than static averages, so in further chapters of this research these 
relations will be analyzed. 
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Figure 3.6.3. The loan portfolio, deposits and total assets in EU banks 
(European Central Bank, 2014) 
 
 In overall EU like in Lithuania since 2008 the decreasing loan 
portfolio and growing deposits tendencies were observed (Figure 3.6.3).  
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Figure 3.6.4. The interest income, net interest income and total (net) profit 
in EU banks (European Central Bank, 2014) 
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The loan portfolio in EU banks since 2008 decreased by 15,6% from 
14 665 to 12 379 billion EUR in 2013. The deposits from credit ans non-
credit institutions with slight fluctuations increased by 8,3% from 16 481 
billion EUR in 2008 to 17 853 billion EUR in 2013. The total assets of the 
EU banks in 2012 and 2013 had tendency to decrease. The highest 
aggregated assets of 35 926 billion EUR was in 2011 while in 2013 it 
decreased to 32 381 billion EUR. 
The loss-making activity in EU banks was in 2008, 2011 and 2012, 
so these indicators are not coincident with Lithuanian where the loss-
making banks were in 2009 and 2010. It can be concluded that the loss-
making activity of Lithuanian banks in 2009 year‘s downturn became by 
one year later than in all European Union. The fluctuating EU banks‘ 
interest income from 679 to 1 122 billion EUR in 2008 – 2013 not 
influenced their net interest income significantly that were in range from 
417 to 459 billion EUR (Figure 3.6.4). 
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Figure 3.6.5. The capital adequacy indicators in EU banks (European 
Central Bank, 2014) 
 
 The capital adequacy indicators of European Union banks since 2008 
are growing (Figure 3.6.5) what points that banks can absorb sufficient 
losses through their shareholders’ equity rather than through customer 
deposits or other funding sources. Only the slight deterioration is visible in 
2011 when the overall solvency ratio and the capital buffer decreased by 
0,1%. The overall solvency ratio ir calculated the regulatory capital of 
banks dividing by the risk-weighted assets. The overall solvency ratio from 
11,69% in 2008 increased to 15,95% in 2013. 
The Basel III from 2010 requires banks to hold 4,5% of common 
equity and 6% of Tier 1 capital of risk-weighted assets. Tier 1 capital is the 
core measure of a bank‘s financial strength from a regulator‘s point of view. 
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It is composed of core capital, which consists primarily of common stock 
and retained earnings, but may also include non-redeemable non-cumulative 
preferred stock. Also the Basel III agreement introduced the additional 
capital buffers: a mandatory capital conservation buffer of 2,5% and a 
discretionary counter-cyclical buffer, which would allow national central 
banks to require up to another 2,5% of capital during periods of high credit 
growth. The capital buffer in the EU banks from 3,69% in 2008 increased to 
7,95% in 2013. 
The Tier 1 capital ratio in the European Union banks since 2008 
increased from 8,3% to 13,11%. It is the ratio of a bank‘s core equity capital 
to its total risk-weighted assets. Risk-weighted assets are the total of all 
assets held by the bank weighted by credit risk according to a formula 
determined by the country‘s central bank. The European Union central 
banks follow the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
guidelines setting the formulas for asset risk weights calculation. Non-risky 
assets like cash and currency usually have zero risk weight, while certain 
loans have a particular risk weight of their value. 
The Lithuanian banks‘ capital adequacy ratios in period of 2008 – 
2013 also were growing with the small slump in 2011 as in all EU. Despite 
the problem of NPLs compared to the EU average in Lithuania was more 
complicated, the capital adequacy rates since 2010 are higher than all EU 
averages (Figure 3.6.6). 
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Figure 3.6.6. The capital adequacy indicators in Lithuanian banks 
(European Central Bank, 2014) 
 
 The analysis results of this chapter allow to conclude that the NPLs 
problem in EU is not coincident compared the indicators of different 
countries in the same years. The macroeconomic and other specific factors 
of every country can have the impact on the NPLs in banks, so the further 
chapters aim to answer the question about these dependencies. 
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3.7. The dependence of non-performing loans problem on 
macroeconomic conditions in European Union 
 
 This analysis aims to classify the EU countries into four groups 
according to the NPLs in banks of years 2008 – 2012. Also the 
interrelations between the macroeconomic indicators and NPLs will be 
analyzed.  
The countries were sorted according to the precentage of NPLs in 
banks and the ranks {1, 2, ..., 28} were attributed for every country in all 
years (Table 3.7.1). Lithuania is in the end of the list in all years except 
2012 when it was in the 21st place. 
 
Table 3.7.1 
 
The ranked EU countries according to the NPLs in banks 
 
NPLs Rank 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Least 1 FI FI LU LU LU 
↓ 2 SE LU FI FI FI 
↓ 3 LU SE SE SE SE 
↓ 4 DK AT AT AT EE 
↓ 5 UK BE BE NL AT 
↓ 6 BE NL NL DE DE 
↓ 7 NL DK DE BE NL 
↓ 8 AT DE FR DK UK 
↓ 9 EE UK UK UK BE 
↓ 10 IE FR DK EE FR 
↓ 11 LV ES ES FR PL 
↓ 12 BG PL PL PL CZ 
↓ 13 SK CY PT CZ SK 
↓ 14 RO CZ CZ SK DK 
↓ 15 CZ PT EE ES ES 
↓ 16 ES EE CY MT MT 
↓ 17 FR SK SK PT LV 
↓ 18 PL SI MT CY PT 
↓ 19 DE MT SI IT IT 
↓ 20 HU BG EL SI HR 
↓ 21 CY HU HU HR LT 
↓ 22 PT EL IT HU SI 
↓ 23 SI HR HR LV HU 
↓ 24 EL RO BG RO BG 
↓ 25 HR IT RO EL RO 
↓ 26 MT IE IE BG CY 
↓ 27 LT LV LV IE EL 
Highest 28 IT LT LT LT IE 
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Further the minimal, maximal values, median, 1st and 3rd quartiles 
of NPLs were found (Table 3.7.2). The EU countries were classified 
according to these criterions of every year: 
• Low NPLs group: min – 1st quartile. 
• Lower medium NPLs group: 1st quartile – median. 
• Higher medium NPLs group: median – 3rd quartile. 
• High NPLs group: 3rd quartile – max. 
 
Table 3.7.2 
 
The statistical indicators of NPLs in EU countries 
 
Statistics 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Min 0,4 0,6 0,2 0,4 0,1 
1st quartile 1,85 3,3 3,65 3,6 3,55 
Median 2,75 4,7 5,4 5,8 6,75 
3rd quartile 3,6 6,775 9,85 12,575 14,9 
Max 6,3 24 23,3 18,8 24,6 
 
 To form the four groups of European Union countries the analysis 
results of 2008 – 2012 years were conjoined and the sums of ranks 
according the data of Table 3.7.1 were calculated. The countries that belong 
to each group and their ranks are given in Table 3.7.3. 
 
Table 3.7.3 
 
The classified EU countries and their NPLs ranks 
 
 
Country LU FI SE AT NL BE UK 
Low NPLs 
Rank 8 8 14 26 30 33 40 
 
Country DK DE EE FR PL CZ ES 
Lower medium NPLs 
Rank 43 46 53 54 63 70 70 
 
Country SK PT MT CY SI LV BG 
Higher medium NPLs 
Rank 74 84 95 95 102 105 106 
 
Country HU HR RO IT IE EL LT 
High NPLs 
Rank 107 112 112 113 117 118 132 
 
 
The ranking results allow to conclude that countries with the least 
percentage of non-performing loans in commercial banks are: Luxembourg, 
Finland, Sweden, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium and United Kingdom. The 
countries with very high percentage of NPLs are: Lithuania, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Romania, Croatia and Hungary. So, Lithuania is one of the 
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countries in the EU that has the most serious problems of NPLs in banking 
sector. Further analysis aims to estimate the main macroeconomic factors 
that causes the negatively enlarged NPLs indicator in EU countries. 
 
Table 3.7.4 
 
Average macroeconomic rates to 1 inhabitant (EUR) 
 
 GDP EXP INV COE CEH CEG 
Low NPLs 41 977,7 37 448,9 7 669,5 20 955,0 19 545,2 9 225,2 
Lower medium NPLs 23 733,8 11 294,7 4 553,1 11 809,7 12 790,8 5 413,3 
Higher medium NPLs 14 169,8 9 000,5 2 600,5 6 358,8 8 723,6 2 728,9 
High NPLs* 11 043,3 5 580,0 2 000,1 4 414,1 7 117,6 2 057,8 
High NPLs 16 769,7 10 290,7 2 702,0 6 922,3 9 829,9 3 177,6 
*Italy and Ireland were excluded as outliers 
 
 The average values of macroeconomic indicators (years 2010 – 
2012) in groups of countries are calculated in Table 3.7.4. 
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Figure 3.7.1. The outstanding macroeconomic indicators of Italy and 
Ireland in group of high NPLs countries 
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There are significant differences of 6 relative average 
macroeconomic indicators in these groups of years 2010 – 2012 that the 
latest statistical data was available. Two countries (Italy and Ireland) were 
excluded from the macroeconomic analysis because their indicators are 
outstanding in the group of high NPLs (Figure 3.7.1), so these countries 
were considered as the outliers. The first three rates are related to business 
activity in the countries – GDP, exports (EXP) and investments (INV). The 
average GDP to 1 inhabitant in group of low NPLs is higher 3,8 times, 
exports – 6,7 times, investments – 3,8 times than in group of high NPLs. 
The second two rates are related to the income of inhabitants – 
compensation of employees (COE) and consumption expenditures of 
households (CEH). The average compensation of employees in group of 
low NPLs is higher 4,7 times, consumption expenditures of households – 
2,7 times. The public finance related indicator of general government 
consumption expenditures (CEG) in these groups differs 4,5 times.  
 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
GDP EXP INV COE CEH CEG
EU
R
 Low NPLs
 Lower medium NPLs
 Higher medium NPLs
High NPLs
 
Figure 3.7.2. The average macroeconomic indicators in groups of EU 
countries 
 
The analyzed average macroeconomic indicators in order of low 
NPLs → lower medium NPLs → higher medium NPLs → high NPLs 
groups constantly decrease (Figure 3.7.2). The lines of this graph do not 
intersect. These results affirm that macroeconomic strength of a country is 
very important factor of NPLs problem in commercial banks. The banking 
systems of EU countries with imperfect macroeconomic conditions suffer 
far more from debtors that are not able to meet their financial obligations. 
In addition to the static NPLs and macroeconimic rates analysis, the 
dynamics of 2006 – 2013 years rates was analyzed. The most significant 
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changes of NPLs interrelated to the changes of 6 macroeconomic indicators 
in the EU countries are shown in Table 3.7.5. 
 
Table 3.7.5 
 
The changes of NPLs and macroeconomic rates of EU countries (%) 
 
Country Year ∆NPLs ∆GDP ∆EXP ∆INV ∆COE ∆CEH ∆CEG 
LT 2009 +17,9 -17,0 -24,6 -44,3 -15,9 -13,4 -5,5 
LV 2009 +12,2 -18,0 -16,4 -41,1 -24,6 -19,4 -20,0 
CY* 2013 +11,7 -6,9 -3,6 -22,4 -11,1 -6,0 -9,7 
CY* 2012 +9,0 -0,9 -0,9 -17,0 -4,1 +0,6 -4,9 
EL 2012 +8,9 -7,3 +0,9 -19,4 -12,2 -8,5 -6,7 
IE* 2012 +8,5 +0,8 +5,9 +1,4 +0,1 +0,1 -1,5 
EL* 2013 +8,0 -5,8 +0,5 -13,2 -10,8 -7,4 -7,3 
IE 2009 +7,9 -11,2 -3,9 -34,2 -10,3 -13,2 -4,7 
BG* 2010 +5,5 +3,8 +25,5 -18,5 +5,6 +3,2 +3,4 
RO 2009 +5,2 -14,6 -14,1 -35,3 -17,6 -18,2 -6,5 
RO* 2010 +4,0 +5,9 +22,6 +6,4 -5,3 +8,9 -6,8 
EL 2011 +5,3 -4,6 +7,5 -19,4 -7,5 -3,0 -10,0 
CY 2011 +4,0 +0,2 +4,0 -10,7 +0,5 +2,2 +0,4 
BG 2009 +4,0 -0,7 -19,0 -15,3 +6,5 -5,5 -2,5 
HU 2009 +3,7 -13,3 -17,6 -17,4 -13,4 -12,8 -10,0 
HU* 2011 +3,6 +3,1 +11,0 -0,8 +2,5 +3,5 -1,3 
SI 2011 +3,6 +1,7 +11,2 -3,9 -0,7 +2,4 +2,1 
EE 2009 +3,3 -13,8 -22,6 -39,8 -13,0 -15,1 -2,8 
Average 1 - +7,0 -5,5 -1,9 -19,2 -7,3 -5,6 -5,2 
Average 2 - +6,9 -9,0 -8,6 -25,5 -9,8 -9,5 -6,0 
 
In analyzed 18 cases with the most significant NPLs growth the 
average changes of macroeconomic indicators were calculated (Average 1). 
Statistically the most significant NPLs increase in EU countries was caused 
by the average decrease of GDP by 5,5%, exports – 1,9%, investments – 
19,2%, compensation of employees – 7,3%, consumption expenditures of 
households – 5,6%, consumption expenditures of general government – 
5,2%. Mostly when the percentage of NPLs grows (in 38,9% of cases 
analyzed) all 6 macroeconomic indicators in a country deteriorate. In 44,4% 
of cases deteriorated 5 macroeconomic indicators. Conversely, in 8,35% of 
analyzed cases only 1 indicator disimproved and in 8,35% cases 2 indicators 
disimproved. This situation mostly was in countries that met the NPLs 
growth repeatedly: Romania and Bulgaria in 2010, Hungary in 2011, 
Ireland in 2012, Cyprus in 2012 and 2013. These cases in Table 3.7.5 are 
marked with asterisks (*). This can be explained by the business cycle 
effect when the economy recovers after 1 or 2 years, but the NPLs continue 
growing as the consequence of the previous sharp downturn of a country‘s 
economy. To identify the main effects of economic downturn on the NPLs 
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growth these cases were eliminated from the calculation of second averages 
for the macroeconomic rates changes (Average 2 in Table 3.7.5). Now it 
can be concluded that the most significant NPLs growth in EU countries is 
related to the average decrease of GDP by 9%, exports – 8,6%, investments 
– 25,5%, compensation of employees – 9,8%, consumption expenditures of 
households – 9,5%, consumption expenditures of general government – 6%. 
The analysis results of this chapter allow to maintain that the 
worsening macroeconomic indicators of EU countries are typical together 
with the increasing non-performing loans percentage in commercial banks. 
So, this affirms that the deteriorative macroeconomic conditions in a 
country significantly causes the increase of NPLs. In general the economic 
downturn’s effect in analyzed countries is also evident, because mostly the 
analyzed macroeconomic rates had negative changes when the NPLs in 
countries’ banks grew. So, the banks of EU countries with the least 
economic rates in the downturn of business cycle have considerably higher 
risk to meet the problem of sudden non-performing loans growth. 
 
 
3.8. The NPLs in European Union countries prediction model 
 
 The statistical model was developed to predict the proportion of non-
performing loans in commercial banks of a country. The NPLs in the EU 
banks in 2008 – 2012 were analyzed. The data for analysis was selected 
according to the changes of non-performing loans in 3 years period. The 
cluster analysis was implemented to form 3 clusters of 28 European Union 
countries in these years (Figure 3.8.1). To predict the growth of non-
performing loans the datum-level is necessary with the low NPLs and their 
significant increase afterwards. So the indicators of years 2008 – 2010 were 
selected for further analysis. 
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Figure 3.8.1. The average NPLs in clusters of EU countries 
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The countries that belong to each cluster are shown in Table 3.8.1. 
The main part of countries (60,7%) are in Cluster 1, where the basic 
individual index of increase in non-performing loans is the least (1,63 and 
1,76). The higher basic index (2,15 and 2,86) have 35,7% of the EU 
countries. In one country (Lithuania) the percentage of non-performing 
loans in banks increased 3,93 times (years 2008 – 2009) afterwards in 2008 
– 2010 this index was lower (3,82). So, Lithuania in this sample represents 
the excessive growth of NPLs in banks. 
 
Table 3.8.1 
 
The clusters of EU countries 
 
Cluster Countries % i2009 i2010 
C1 AT, BE, CY, CZ, DE, DK, ES, EE, FI, FR, 
UK, NL, PL, PT, SK, SE, LU 
60,7 1,63 1,76 
C2 BG, EL, HU, IE, IT, LV, MT, RO, SI, HR 35,7 2,15 2,86 
C3 LT 3,6 3,93 3,82 
 
 The scheme of NPLs prediction in a country and the independent 
variables are shown in Figure 3.8.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.8.2. The data used for NPLs prediction 
 
The NPLs prediction model was developed that is applicable when 
the NPLs in a country of current year t are about 2,1% – 6,1% as the 
averages of all clusters in 2008. The banks in year t knowing the non-
performing loans (NPLt) in the country’s banks and the macroeconomic data 
(MI) of years t – 1, t and t + 1 can predict the NPLs of year t + 2. 
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112 
The set of macroeconomic indicators (28 EU countries) was used 
developing the NPLs prediction model: 
• Basic index of exports of goods and services (EUR/1 inhabitant) 
– EXPi. 
• Basic index of imports of goods and services (EUR/1 inhabitant) 
– IMPi. 
• Basic index of investments (EUR/1 inhabitant) – INVi. 
• Basic index of compensation of employees (EUR/1 inhabitant) – 
COEi. 
• Basic index of final consumption expenditure of households 
(EUR/1 inhabitant) – CEHi. 
• Basic index of final consumption expenditure of general 
government (EUR/1 inhabitant) – CEGi. 
• Real GDP growth rate (%) – GDPGi. 
• Investments to GDP rate (%) – GDPIi. 
The changes of macroeconomic indicators (MI) were estimated by 
calculating  the basic individual indices: 
 
 
1−
=
t
t
tind MI
MIMI  and 
1
1
1
−
+
+ =
t
t
tind MI
MIMI  (3.8.1) 
 
Because in clusters the NPLs differ significantly, the first stage of 
NPLs prediction is to classify a country into the particular cluster. The 
countries classification scheme is depicted in Figure 3.8.3. 
 
 
Figure 3.8.3. The countries classification scheme 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
G1 G0 
Logistic regression Set of independent variables 
Factor analysis 
G2 G3 
Probit model 
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 The logistic regression model was developed to classify the countries 
into groups G0 and G1. 
 
 ( )
∑
∑
+
+
+
=
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ii
x
x
e
eYP βα
βα
1
 (3.8.2) 
 
Where xi – the independent variables (indices of macroeconomic 
rates); βi – the regression coefficients; α – the intercept. 
 The regression coefficients are calculated in Table 3.8.2 (Column 
Variable). 
 
Table 3.8.2 
 
The regression coefficients of logistic regression model 
 
Distribution: BINOMIAL. Link function: LOGIT. 
Variable Estimate Standard Wald p 
Intercept 102,908 79,5748 1,672426 0,195934 
EXPt -192,181 133,6995 2,066151 0,150601 
EXPt+1 200,448 141,1479 2,016757 0,155571 
IMPt 151,820 120,1385 1,596954 0,206335 
IMPt+1 -161,140 134,2814 1,440033 0,230134 
INVt -266,762 167,6640 2,531450 0,111598 
INVt+1 167,122 109,4824 2,330113 0,126893 
COEt 130,931 97,5326 1,802129 0,179455 
CEHt 61,149 64,9260 0,887032 0,346283 
CEHt+1 -19,844 32,6861 0,368595 0,543771 
CEGt -178,469 116,2509 2,356853 0,124734 
GDPGt 5,028 3,2263 2,428501 0,119147 
GDPGt+1 -4,918 3,1984 2,364322 0,124138 
GDPIt 0,228 0,8492 0,072247 0,788093 
 
The countries classification threshold was set to 0,5.  If P(Y) ∈ [0; 0,5) 
a country is classified into group G1 and into Cluster 1. If  P(Y) ∈ [0,5; 1] a 
country is classified into group G0 and further analysis is needed to separate 
the countries into Cluster 2 and Cluster 3. The classification results are in 
Table 3.8.3 (“Response” – actual value, “Predicted” – predicted value).  
The groups of countries were denoted: 
• Cluster 1 – “0” (group G1). 
• Cluster 2 and cluster 3 – “1” (group G0). 
The classification accuracy of logistic regression model – 96,4%. In all 
sample only Spain was classified incorrectly.  
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Table 3.8.2 
 
The countries classification results of logistic regression model 
 
Country Response Pred. LINEAR Standard Lower CL Upper CL 
BE 0,000000 0,002378 -6,0390 4,92721 0,000000 0,973868 
BG 1,000000 0,999715 8,1637 7,28874 0,002189 1,000000 
CZ 0,000000 0,044708 -3,0619 4,35649 0,000009 0,995834 
DK 0,000000 0,000006 -11,9704 8,06188 0,000000 0,978763 
DE 0,000000 0,334536 -0,6877 1,62069 0,020548 0,923349 
EE 0,000000 0,194507 -1,4210 2,48758 0,001839 0,969368 
IE 1,000000 0,964251 3,2948 4,92667 0,001724 0,999998 
EL 1,000000 0,535427 0,1419 1,88501 0,027852 0,978886 
ES* 0,000000 0,572714 0,2929 1,80943 0,037202 0,978945 
FR 0,000000 0,000001 -14,0590 8,59992 0,000000 0,942487 
HR 1,000000 0,999972 10,4790 7,98583 0,005636 1,000000 
IT 1,000000 0,091283 -2,2981 1,78909 0,003005 0,770030 
CY 0,000000 0,182156 -1,5018 2,47488 0,001739 0,966068 
LV 1,000000 1,000000 25,4801 18,77387 0,000012 1,000000 
LT 1,000000 0,999895 9,1634 10,04435 0,000027 1,000000 
LU 0,000000 0,192285 -1,4352 2,22244 0,003045 0,948859 
HU 1,000000 0,905263 2,2571 3,18106 0,018385 0,999795 
MT 1,000000 0,688274 0,7921 2,04537 0,038539 0,991845 
NL 0,000000 0,000387 -7,8562 5,66406 0,000000 0,962498 
AT 0,000000 0,180594 -1,5123 1,78713 0,006594 0,879784 
PL 0,000000 0,000000 -26,9100 18,05393 0,000000 0,999791 
PT 0,000000 0,036343 -3,2777 3,34565 0,000054 0,963723 
RO 1,000000 0,772621 1,2232 2,35734 0,032385 0,997110 
SI 1,000000 0,287677 -0,9067 1,90566 0,009549 0,944188 
SK 0,000000 0,540781 0,1635 1,81088 0,032743 0,976171 
FI 0,000000 0,348687 -0,6248 2,01825 0,010146 0,965473 
SE 0,000000 0,000000 -22,8286 13,83002 0,000000 0,986316 
UK 0,000000 0,125537 -1,9410 2,98840 0,000410 0,980471 
*Misclassification of Spain. 
 
To reduce the amount of statistical data, for the initial 
macroeconomic variables indices of countries classified into group G0 the 
factor analysis was accomplished and 4 factors (F1 – F4) were extracted. 
The factor score coefficients were calculated for the each initial variable 
(Table 3.8.3) that allow to calculate new independent variables (factor 
scores) for further probit analysis. The common factor is expressed by the 
linear combination of initial variables: 
 
 Fj = βj1x1 + βj2x2 + … + βjnxn (3.8.3) 
 
Where βji – the factor score coefficients; xi – the initial variables. 
 The factor scores of factors F1 – F4 were involved as independent 
variables and the probit model was developed. The factor scores are in 
Table 3.8.4. 
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 The probit model is: 
 
Z = 8,46679 + 4,92774 ⋅ F1 + 0,76422 ⋅ F2 + 
+3,93935 ⋅ F3 + 2,29868 ⋅ F4 
(3.8.4) 
 
The classification of countries according to Z value: 
• If Z ≥ 0, a country is attributed to group G2 (Cluster 2). 
• If Z < 0, a country is attributed to group G3 (Cluster 3). 
 
Table 3.8.3 
 
Factor score coefficients 
 
Rotation: Unrotated. Extraction: Principal components. 
Variable Factor 1 (F1) Factor 2 (F2) Factor 3 (F3) Factor 4 (F4) 
EXPt -0,109707 -0,025589 -0,143992 0,072134 
EXPt+1 -0,078122 -0,055440 -0,129208 0,428482 
IMPt -0,097599 0,065035 -0,143689 0,107427 
IMPt+1 0,038803 0,146043 -0,198468 0,262533 
INVt -0,093528 0,088011 0,191197 0,127314 
INVt+1 -0,027929 0,168368 0,199040 0,011646 
COEt -0,120458 -0,033160 0,040011 0,084335 
COEt+1 -0,054314 0,160612 0,057181 -0,179771 
CEHt -0,113259 -0,002136 -0,127232 -0,131172 
CEHt+1 -0,020158 0,149572 -0,140657 -0,395950 
CEGt -0,101566 -0,069727 -0,137733 0,025365 
CEGt+1 -0,055929 0,109377 -0,231714 -0,280652 
GDPGt-1 -0,087002 -0,103726 -0,077587 -0,211359 
GDPGt -0,087378 0,116862 -0,069029 0,243664 
GDPGt+1 0,050630 0,166905 -0,002514 0,140799 
GDPIt-1 -0,086382 -0,110352 0,109225 -0,148907 
GDPIt -0,104243 -0,016713 0,226107 -0,008970 
GDPIt+1 -0,078630 0,070262 0,314008 -0,004195 
 
Table 3.8.4 
 
Factor scores of clusters C2 and C3 countries 
 
Country Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Bulgaria -1,34121 1,23901 1,27865 -0,07776 
Ireland 1,49167 -0,96204 0,03090 0,87661 
Greece 0,56816 0,53977 -0,46776 -1,35773 
Croatia -0,14287 0,54148 0,61470 -0,06985 
Italy 1,24119 0,34554 0,61726 -0,55984 
Latvia -0,47945 -2,26367 0,80177 -0,79498 
Lithuania -1,09366 -0,79447 -1,86313 -0,34451 
Hungary 0,81649 0,05177 0,53436 1,36695 
Malta 0,48954 0,95135 -1,71453 0,34451 
Romania -1,30360 -0,05951 -0,04484 1,74631 
Slovenia -0,24625 0,41077 0,21262 -1,12971 
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According to Z values (column Linear in Table 3.8.5) all countries 
were classified correctly into clusters C2 and C3 (Response = Predicted). So 
the classification accuracy of the developed probit model is 100%. 
 
Table 3.8.5 
 
The classification of countries into clusters C2 and C3  
 
Distribution: BINOMIAL. Link function: PROBIT. 
Country Response Pred. LINEAR Standard Lower CL Upper CL 
Bulgaria 1,000000 1,000000 7,66282 3409,159 0,00 1,000000 
Ireland 1,000000 1,000000 17,21891 3311,324 0,00 1,000000 
Greece 1,000000 1,000000 6,71537 1669,134 0,00 1,000000 
Croatia 1,000000 1,000000 10,43757 1610,640 0,00 1,000000 
Italy 1,000000 1,000000 15,99182 2005,176 0,00 1,000000 
Latvia 1,000000 1,000000 5,70525 1385,739 0,00 1,000000 
Lithuania 0,000000 0,000000 -5,66107 1227,135 0,00 1,000000 
Hungary 1,000000 1,000000 17,77706 2433,529 0,00 1,000000 
Malta 1,000000 1,000000 5,64395 1170,774 0,00 1,000000 
Romania 1,000000 1,000000 5,83506 1990,351 0,00 1,000000 
Slovenia 1,000000 1,000000 5,80796 1843,671 0,00 1,000000 
 
After the classification of countries the second stage of analysis is 
the prediction of non-performing loans. Because the increase of NPLs in 
clusters is different, so the different prediction models were developed for 
the each cluster.  
 
 
 The NPLs prediction model for countries of cluster 1 
 
The discriminant analysis model was developed to classify the 
countries of cluster 1 into two groups:  
• The countries where low NPLs growth in year t + 2 is expected. 
• The countries where high NPLs growth in year t + 2 is expected. 
The independent variables in these models are the previously 
analyzed indices of macroeconomic indicators. The NPLs growth in 2008 – 
2010 of these countries was estimated and the class of a country was 
determined (Table 3.8.6). The median of NPLs growth (∆NPLs) was set as 
the classification threshold for countries of cluster 1. The median is equal to 
1,6%. The class of a country is: 
• If ∆NPLs < 1,6%, the class is low NPLs growth (L1). 
• If ∆NPLs ≥ 1,6%, the class is high NPLs growth (H1). 
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Table 3.8.6 
 
The classification of cluster’s 1 countries according to NPLs growth 
 
Country ∆NPLs (%) Class 
Belgium 1,1 L 
Czech Republic 2,6 H 
Denmark 2,9 H 
Germany 0,3 L 
Estonia 3,5 H 
Spain 1,9 H 
France 1 L 
Cyprus 2 H 
Luxembourg -0,4 L 
Netherlands 1,1 L 
Austria 0,9 L 
Poland 2,1 H 
Portugal 1,6 H 
Slovakia 3,3 H 
Finland 0,2 L 
Sweden 0,3 L 
United Kingdom 2,4 H 
 
 The different discriminant analysis models (M1 – M8) were 
developed to select the independent variables (Table 3.8.7). 
 
Table 3.8.7 
 
The variables of discriminant analysis models 
 
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 
EXPt + + + +    + 
EXPt+1 + + + + + + +  
IMPt + + + + +   + 
IMPt+1      + +  
INVt + + + + +  +  
INVt+1         
COEt        + 
COEt+1 + + + + + + +  
CEHt    + +    
CEHt+1 + + + + + + +  
CEGt        + 
CEGt+1     + + + + 
GDPGt-1        + 
GDPGt     + +   
GDPGt+1      + +  
GDPIt-1    + +   + 
GDPIt   + + + + +  
GDPIt+1  + + + +   + 
Accuracy, % 82,35 88,23 8,23 94,12 100 88,23 82,35 82,35 
118 
 
 The highest overall classification accuracy (100%) was reached with 
the model M5, so this set of independent variables will be used for the 
classification of cluster’s 1 countries. 
 
 The discriminant analysis functions are: 
 
L1 = -3038,26 + 2613,65 ⋅ EXPt+1 – 2523,78 ⋅ IMPt + 
+ 10133,28 ⋅ INVt +2931,79 ⋅ COEt+1 – 9133,34 ⋅ CEHt +  
+ 5424,8 ⋅ CEHt+1 – 4909,37⋅ CEGt+1 – 57,57 ⋅ GDPGt – 
– 90,6 ⋅ GDPIt-1 + 143,06 ⋅ GDPIt + 17,23 ⋅ GDPIt+1 
(3.8.5) 
 
H1 = -2915,16 + 2607,77 ⋅ EXPt+1 – 2644,25 ⋅ IMPt + 
+ 10236,45 ⋅ INVt +2753,53 ⋅ COEt+1 – 9184,97 ⋅ CEHt +  
+ 5392,36 ⋅ CEHt+1 – 4776,09⋅ CEGt+1 – 56,16 ⋅ GDPGt – 
– 92,81 ⋅ GDPIt-1 + 140,51 ⋅ GDPIt + 22,9 ⋅ GDPIt+1 
(3.8.6) 
 
 The EU countries of cluster 1 classification results (predicted class 
and the posterior probabilities) are given in Table 3.8.8. 
 
Table 3.8.8 
 
The discriminant analysis results 
 
Classification Posterior probabilities 
Country 
Observed Predicted Class L Class H 
Belgium L L 0,991269 0,008731 
Czech Republic H H 0,001420 0,998580 
Denmark H H 0,183238 0,816762 
Germany L L 0,997412 0,002588 
Estonia H H 0,001507 0,998493 
Spain H H 0,000018 0,999982 
France L L 0,646884 0,353116 
Cyprus H H 0,000197 0,999803 
Luxembourg L L 0,991279 0,008721 
Netherlands L L 0,977088 0,022912 
Austria L L 0,999984 0,000016 
Poland H H 0,013280 0,986720 
Portugal H H 0,450068 0,549932 
Slovakia H H 0,028913 0,971087 
Finland L L 0,998934 0,001066 
Sweden L L 0,950204 0,049796 
United Kingdom H H 0,003121 0,996879 
 
 The countries classification matrix is in Table 3.8.9. 
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Table 3.8.9 
 
The classification matrix of cluster‘s 1 countries 
 
Rows: Observed classifications. Columns: Predicted classifications 
 Percent L H 
L 100,00 8 0 
H 100,00 0 9 
 
 
 The NPLs prediction model for countries of cluster 2 
 
The discriminant analysis model was developed to classify the 
countries of cluster 2 into two groups:  
• The countries where low NPLs growth in year t + 2 is expected. 
• The countries where high NPLs growth in year t + 2 is expected. 
The independent variables in these models are the factor scores of 
macroeconomic indicators (Table 3.8.4). The NPLs growth in 2008 – 2010 
of these countries was estimated and the class of a country was determined 
(Table 3.8.10). The median (Me = 6,5%) of NPLs growth (∆NPLs) was set 
as the classification threshold for countries of cluster 2. The class of a 
country is: 
• If ∆NPLs < 6,5%, the class is low NPLs growth (L2). 
• If ∆NPLs ≥ 6,5%, the class is high NPLs growth (H2). 
 
Table 3.8.10 
 
The classification of cluster’s 2 countries according to NPLs growth 
 
Country ∆NPLs (%) Class 
Bulgaria 9,5 H 
Ireland 10,6 H 
Greece 4,4 L 
Croatia 6,2 L 
Italy 3,7 L 
Latvia 13,8 H 
Hungary 6,8 H 
Malta 1,9 L 
Romania 9,2 H 
Slovenia 4 L 
 
The highest overall classification accuracy (100%) was reached with 
the below given discriminant analysis model. Two discriminant functions 
were developed for the classification of cluster’s 2 countries. 
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The discriminant analysis functions are: 
 
L2 = -1,94328 + 0,97491 ⋅ F1 + 1,637 ⋅ F2 – 
– 0,98399 ⋅ F3 – 1,9289 ⋅ F4  
(3.8.7) 
 
H2 = -2,19305 – 0,59906 ⋅ F1 – 1,43399 ⋅ F2 + 
+ 1,82365 ⋅ F3 + 2,21585 ⋅ F4  
(3.8.8) 
 
The EU countries of cluster 2 classification results (predicted class 
and the posterior probabilities) are given in Table 3.8.11. 
 
Table 3.8.11 
 
The discriminant analysis results 
 
Classification Posterior probabilities 
Country 
Observed Predicted Class L Class H 
Bulgaria H H 0,210161 0,789839 
Ireland H H 0,016677 0,983323 
Greece L L 0,999941 0,000059 
Croatia L L 0,562529 0,437471 
Italy L L 0,979202 0,020798 
Latvia H H 0,001638 0,998362 
Hungary H H 0,004185 0,995815 
Malta L L 0,999343 0,000657 
Romania H H 0,000112 0,999888 
Slovenia L L 0,994563 0,005437 
 
 The cluster’s 2 countries classification matrix is in Table 3.8.12. 
 
Table 3.8.12 
 
The classification matrix of cluster‘s 2 countries 
 
Rows: Observed classifications. Columns: Predicted classifications 
 Percent H L 
H 100,00 5 0 
L 100,00 0 5 
 
 
 The NPLs prediction for countries of cluster 3 
 
Because the cluster 3 consists of only one country (Lithuania), it is 
impossible to develop the discriminant analysis model. So it is considered 
that the NPLs growth in this cluster is 17,2% as the Lithuanian NPLs 
change in 2008 – 2010. 
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 The NPLs prediction results 
 
Having the NPLs values of year t (NPLt) and the predicted cluster 
and class of a country it is possible to predict the expected percentage of 
non-performing loans of  the year t + 2 in the country’s banks. 
 In cluster 1 and cluster 2 the decision about the country’s class is 
made by this rule: 
• If Li > Hi, a country is classified into class L. 
• If Hi > Li, a country is classified into class H. 
The expected changes of NPLs in year t + 2 of the EU countries are 
given in Table 3.8.13. 
 
Table 3.8.13 
 
The expected changes of NPLs 
 
Cluster Class ∆NPLs Average ∆NPLs 
L Up to 1,6% 0,5625 1 
H More than 1,6% 2,4778 
L Up to 6,5% 4,04 2 
H More than 6,5% 9,98 
3 – About 17,2% 17,2 
 
 
 Test of the developed model 
 
The developed NPLs prediction model was tested considering the 
year 2009 as the basic and predicting the NPLs in the EU countries for year 
2011. This period was selected because according to Figure 3.8.1 in 2009 
the least percentages of NPLs were observed and applying the developed 
model it is possible to predict the NPLs growth after two years. For the 
clearness the test was divided into different stages. 
 
 
 Stage 1:  Classification of EU countries by the logistic 
regression model 
 
 The EU countries classification results are given in Table 3.8.14. 
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Table 3.8.14 
 
Logistic regression analysis results 
 
Country P(Y) Group Cluster 
Belgium 1,59736E-05 G1 1 
Bulgaria 1 G0 Not determined 
Czech Republic 0,005103889 G1 1 
Denmark 3,59048E-12 G1 1 
Germany 2,52036E-13 G1 1 
Estonia 8,54674E-18 G1 1 
Ireland 0,998278336 G0 Not determined 
Greece 0,999999955 G0 Not determined 
Spain 0,611735251 G0 Not determined 
France 1,77278E-05 G1 1 
Croatia 0,965070902 G0 Not determined 
Italy 5,57043E-10 G1 1 
Cyprus 2,80243E-08 G1 1 
Latvia 5,55461E-10 G1 1 
Lithuania 7,76221E-17 G1 1 
Luxembourg 4,15237E-11 G1 1 
Hungary 0,997608133 G0 Not determined 
Malta 1,61679E-15 G1 1 
Netherlands 0,456829952 G1 1 
Austria 1,08285E-05 G1 1 
Poland 1 G0 Not determined 
Portugal 4,16344E-05 G1 1 
Romania 0,049035115 G1 1 
Slovenia 2,48729E-07 G1 1 
Slovakia 5,93928E-15 G1 1 
Finland 3,33624E-21 G1 1 
Sweden 1,05144E-09 G1 1 
United Kingdom 0,000530889 G1 1 
 
 
 Stage 2:  Factor analysis of G0 group’s countries 
 
Using the factor score coefficients of Table 3.8.3 the factor scores of 
G0 group‘s countries were calculated (Table 3.8.15). 
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Table 3.8.15 
 
Factor scores of countries in group G0 
 
Country Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Bulgaria -8,57346 -3,11231 16,6617 -7,91526 
Ireland -4,59466 -2,03745 9,889087 -4,6338 
Greece -6,18016 -2,10764 12,08149 -4,99929 
Spain -7,2331 -1,94639 14,95269 -5,68803 
Croatia -7,0381 -2,74432 14,73392 -6,82967 
Hungary -5,6568 -1,53366 12,62578 -5,0966 
Poland -6,82421 -0,45129 12,26579 -3,65094 
 
 
 Stage 3:  Classification of group’s G0 countries by the probit 
model 
 
The probit regression analyzes the factor scores of countries from 
Table 3.8.15. These factor scores were multiplied by the regression 
coefficients in Formula 3.8.4. The probit regression analysis results allowed 
to classify all the group’s G0 countries into cluster 2, because Z > 0. 
 
Table 3.8.16 
 
Probit regression analysis results 
 
Country Z Cluster 
Bulgaria 11,28214 2 
Ireland 12,57339 2 
Greece 12,50332 2 
Spain 17,1654 2 
Croatia 14,03044 2 
Hungary 17,44141 2 
Poland 14,42087 2 
 
 
 Stage 4:  Prediction of NPLs in the EU countries 
 
 When the clusers of every country is known, further the discriminant 
analysis models can be applied for the prediction of NPLs changes in the 
EU countries. The discriminant functions (Formulas 3.8.5 and 3.8.6) were 
applied for the prediction of NPLs changes in cluster 1 (Table 3.8.17). 
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Table 3.8.17 
 
The prediction of NPLs changes in cluster 1 
 
Country L1 H1 Class ∆NPLs Prediction 
Belgium 3059,514 3054,677 L1 0,2 Correct 
Czech Republic 2877,675 2884,104 H1 0,6 Incorrect 
Denmark 2843,907 2842,517 L1 0,4 Correct 
Germany 3060,213 3054,159 L1 -0,3 Correct 
Estonia 2906,805 2900,463 L1 -1,2 Correct 
France 2870,781 2870,072 L1 0,3 Correct 
Italy 2969,259 2965,159 L1 2,3 Incorrect 
Cyprus 2835,887 2844,32 H1 5,1 Correct 
Latvia 2902,836 2893,506 L1 -0,2 Correct 
Lithuania 2546,725 2560,161 H1 -5,2 Incorrect 
Luxembourg 3063,318 3058,482 L1 -0,3 Correct 
Malta 3200,952 3197,573 L1 1,1 Correct 
Netherlands 3057,499 3053,65 L1 -0,5 Correct 
Austria 3083,647 3072,513 L1 0,4 Correct 
Portugal 3098,809 3098,905 H1 2,7 Correct 
Romania 3193,118 3220,321 H1 6,4 Correct 
Slovenia 2979,882 2983,273 H1 6 Correct 
Slovakia 2960,74 2949,721 L1 0,3 Correct 
Finland 3015,474 3008,518 L1 -0,1 Correct 
Sweden 3083,84 3080,788 L1 -0,1 Correct 
United Kingdom 2859,452 2853,776 L1 0,5 Correct 
 
The discriminant analysis results are in columns L1 and H1. The 
countries were classified into the class which has the higher value in these 
columns. The real changes of NPLs in 2009 – 2011 are given in column 
∆NPLs of Table 3.8.17. The classification threshold according to Table 
3.8.13 is 1,6%. The predictions were considered as correct: 
• If ∆NPLs < 1,6% and class is L1. 
• If ∆NPLs ≥ 1,6% and class is H1. 
Three countries in cluster 1 were misclassified (Chech Republic, 
Italy and Lithuania). The overall classification accuracy is 85,7%. 
 The discriminant analysis results of cluster 2 are in Table 3.8.18. All 
countries were classified into class H2 predicting the high growth of NPLs 
in year t + 2. Compared to the real changes of NPLs in 2009 – 2011 the 
prediction accuracy of model is 71,4%. Mostly the predictions warn about 
the high increase of NPLs because the model’s development sample was 
used with the low NPLs datum-level in 2008. So two of the counties did not 
reach the classification threshold, only cluster was set correctly (correct C 
in Table 3.8.18). Because there is no test sample of other years in EU with 
the low NPLs in all EU countries (Figure 3.8.1), the higher classification 
accuracy in further low NPLs in EU banks period is expected. 
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Table 3.8.18 
 
The prediction of NPLs changes in cluster 2 
 
Country L2 H2 Class ∆NPLs Prediction 
Bulgaria -16,5237 20,25207 H2 8,6 Correct 
Ireland -10,5506 11,24754 H2 6,3 Correct (C) 
Greece -13,6635 15,4863 H2 7,4 Correct 
Spain -15,9228 19,59577 H2 1,9 Incorrect 
Croatia -14,6215 17,69451 H2 4,6 Correct (C) 
Hungary -12,5616 15,12667 H2 6,7 Correct 
Poland -14,3621 16,82078 H2 0,4 Incorrect 
 
The research results of this chapter affirmed the dependence between 
NPLs and macroeconomic indicators changes in EU countries and it has 
proved that the percentage of non-performing loans in banks can be 
predicted applying the statistical analysis methods. The prediction errors of 
NPLs growth in analyzed data samples are not high what confirms the 
sufficient ability of developed models to predict the changes of non-
performing loans in banks of a country. Following the macroeconomic 
changes in a country banks can foresee the possible changes of NPLs in 
their loan portfolios. 
The overall empirical research of this study has shown that 
Lithuanian commercial banks in 2009 met the very serious problem of non-
performing loans. The loan portfolio quality deteriorated together with the 
economic conditions in the country what decreased the loan portfolio, 
interest income, net income and other financial results of commercial banks. 
The  research has proved that GDP, exports, imports, investments, 
compensation of employees, consumption expenditures of households and 
other macroeconomic ratios are the important factors of debtors‘ credit risk 
in banks. The decrease of Lithuanian enterprises revenue, profit, the growth 
of bankruptcies and unemployment had the very significant impact on banks 
performance in Lithuania. The changes of public finance indicators also 
allow to foresee the oncoming debtors‘ insolvency problems in banks. 
Analyzing the financial ratios of Lithuanian enterprises the statistical 
model for the bankruptcy prediction was developed. The multivariate 
adaptive regression splines and logistic regression methods allowed to 
achieve the overall classification accuracy of 96,92%. The supplementary 
sectorial analysis estimated the bankruptcy risk level of different industry 
sectors in the economic recession. The statistical analysis of Lithuanian 
districts highlighted the differences of bankruptcy risk for the enterprises 
working in different regions. The calculated average profitability, solvency 
and capital structure indicators of industry sectors before the bankruptcy 
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allow to foresee the oncoming unability to meet the financial obligations for 
banks when the rates of enterprises impend to the estimated values. 
The business and especially households over-indebtedness rates 
affirmed the possible problem of irresponsible borrowing in pre-crisis 
period. The growth of loan portfolio in Lithuanian banks until 2008 shows 
the former optimistic expectations about the future debt repayments that 
was stimulated by the growing macroeconomic indicators. But the 2009 
year‘s slump in Lithuanian economy caused the very heavy abilities to 
follow the signed credit agreements of debtors for banks. This research has 
suggested the relative indicators of households and business indebtedness 
that allow to foresee the possible problems in the future. The loan portfolio 
of banks to GDP ratio and other rates reaching the specified critical values 
can warn banks in advance about the possible debtors‘ insolvency. 
The non-performing loans growth since 2009 was observed in all 
European Union but the Lithuanian problem was outstanding. The loan 
portfolio of banks since 2008 in EU is decreasing but the capital adequacy 
indicators of banks are growing. This affirms the proper risk management 
after crisis in banks and their acquired experience in economic recession. 
The dependece of macroeconomic conditions in a country and the NPLs 
problem in EU banks was also proved in this study. The banks of countries 
with high macroeconomic indicators meet the less problems of NPLs. The 
economic downturn causes the growth of NPLs in almost all EU countries, 
so it can be concluded that the macroeconomic strength of a country is very 
important factor of NPLs problem in commercial banks. The developed 
statistical NPLs change prediction model allows to foresee the NPLs growth 
in a country. The research has proved that the statistical analysis techniques 
are able to find the dependences between the macroeconomics and NPLs. 
Having the macroeconomic rates of a country it is possible to foresee the 
NPLs change direction and approximate extent in future. 
 The research results of this study can help banks to manage the credit 
risk more effectively considering their macroeconomic environment and the 
business cycle effects. The requirements of Basel Committee on Banks 
Supervision in banks can be met more easily understanding the main 
macroeconomic factors causing the credit risk of debtors. The households 
also analyzing the results of this study can understand the risk of over-
indebtedness and insolvency when the economics of the country worsens. 
This knowledge managing the personal finance enables to avoid the critical 
debts burden and to keep the financial wealth in the households. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
1. The commercial banks as the main financial intermediaries play the 
very important role in the economics by accumulating and 
intermediating the financial resources, providing the credit operations 
and financial services, activating the financial flows what influences 
the economic development of a country. The efficient financial 
intermediation increases the ability of business enterprises to transfer 
the industry inputs into outputs that increases the growth of the whole 
economy. Conversely, the inefficient, loss-making and uncompetitive 
banks can increase the costs of capital in the economy what leads to the 
more expensive financing of projects in such an economy. The recent 
empirical researches with one accord agree that the growth rates of a 
country‘s economy are higher when the banks are able to perform their 
tasks in the financial systems effectively. The countries with more 
healthy financial systems achieve higher rates of economic growth and 
the statistical data clearly demonstrates that the origins of financial 
crises in the countries could be noticed by incompetent or inefficient 
operations of banks. As the credits are one of the main income sources 
for banks, the unrestrained credit policy causes the credit booms that 
are some of the best indicators of financial crises. The scientific studies 
proved that the credit booms reduce the financial stability in a country 
when in a recession banks start to scrutinize the borrowers severely and 
lend passively. At the same time, the limited loan supply affects 
economic development and further causes economic slowdown. 
Because of this, the global harmonization of prudential supervision 
enhancing financial stability and ensuring the performance of banks in 
different countries is very important. 
2. The researchers mainain that during the financial crisis, the more 
efficient banks demonstrated resilience to external shocks of 
macroeconomy, what leads to the fact that the economically efficient 
banks can withstand financial crises better than its inefficient 
counterpart and can contribute more to the efficient allocation of capital 
and the stability of the financial system. Because the commercial banks 
are clearly important to national and even global economic stability, the 
various indicators are necessary to identify a bank’s financial status and 
operating performance. The analysis has shown that the most important 
bank-specific characteristics include bank‘s assets, equity over total 
assets, return on assets and return on equity, loans-to-total assets, non-
performing loans, costs over income and costs over total assets. The 
impacts of these factors on bank efficiency depends on the specific 
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circumstances of the banking industry analysed. Although banks‘ 
performance measurement became quite complex, the key drivers of 
banks‘ performance remain earnings, efficiency, risk-taking and 
leverage. The Euopean Central Bank has developed the methodology 
for the measurement of commercial banks‘ performance where the 
measures are classified into three groups: traditional, economic and 
market-based measures of performance. Supplementing the internal 
performance indicators calculated by banks, the external independent 
banks‘ performance evaluation is also very important. The ratings 
attributed by the international rating agencies in one measure reflect the 
banks‘ activity results and the attractiveness of banks as investments. 
3. Banks are the the businesses of persistent taking risk and managing the 
risks they need to avoid, absorb risk or it can be transferred to other 
participants. In the scientific literature and banking practice there are 
many classifications of banks‘ risks and the main risks found in 
literature are: liquidity, credit, operational, market, exposure, 
investment, country, legal, reputational, strategic, counterparty, 
concentration and systemic risk. Considering the systemic factor, banks 
are considered not as isolated business entities, but as interacting 
institutions whose failure may produce externalities and put the 
system’s stability at risk. Compared to other sectors the systematic 
component of default is particularly significant in the banking industry. 
In strong macroeconomic shocks banks tend to experience a systemic 
failure, when a breakdown of the financial system is triggered by a 
strong systemic event, which severely and negatively impacts the 
economy in general. Due to the systemic nature of banking the adverse 
economic shock may cause significant losses in banks and the insolvent 
bank may default on its interbank payment obligations to other banks 
what causes more banks to fail. So the recent financial crisis prompted 
the banking supervisors to designate the credit risk management 
guidelines from the microprudential to a macroprudential approach 
aiming to ensure the stability of a whole financial system. 
4. The ability to assess the credit risk has the critical importance for banks 
because the default of even a small number of borrowers can cause the 
large loss which further leads to the insolvency of bank, so the 
managers of banks must to ensure that the credit risk management 
system is appropriately designed and implemented. Mainly banks 
assess the probability of default of debtors in one year. This probability 
of default arises from the potential that an obligor is either unwilling to 
perform on an obligation or its ability to perform such obligation is 
impaired. Within the banking sector the corrrectly estimated default 
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probability helps to reduce occurrences of non-performing loans and 
ensures the appropriate capital allocation. In credit risk management 
the regulatory capital can be calculated by the standardized approach or 
banks can develop their own internal ratings models. If a bank develops 
the own credit risk assessment model, the approval from the national 
supervisor s necessary to be allowed to use this approach in estimating 
capital for the risk exposures. The classification of loan applicants into 
the creditworthy and high default risk groups can be implemented also 
using the expert systems and  credit scoring models, but only the rating 
systems are relevant for the regulatory capital calculation. With a 
ratings-based credit risk assessment, the rating allows to determine the 
interest rate of the loan and the regulatory capital hold by bank for the 
particular loan depending on its riskiness. In the internal ratings models 
the default probability of debtors is usually obtained as a function from 
a set of financial and other variables that provide information about 
corporate clients: profitability, solvency, capital structure, etc. These 
financial ratios are widely used by banks, but the current financial crisis 
and the regulatory requirements prompt banks to consider the economic 
indicators. For the accurate credit risk assessment the data quality is 
very important which is measured by accuracy, completeness, 
timeliness, relevance, objectivity, believability, representational 
consistency, easily-understandable, accessibility and security. In 
addition, the research has shown that there are some particular 
peculiarities in the projects‘ credit risk assessment, where the financial 
and other data can be unavailable. In this case banks should evaluate 
the degree of innovation of the project, the professional skills of people 
who will manage the project, the capabilities, competences, and 
knowledge of firms involved in the project, the reaction of the target 
market to the introduction of new services and products. The important 
credit risk factor for banks is the over-indebtedness mostly of the 
households which refers to a situation where a household does not have 
enough money to pay debt and interests after other necessary 
expenditures have been paid. The information sharing between credit 
institutions can reduce the possible loss caused by such debtors‘ 
insolvency. Also in lending practice the higher credit risk is associated 
with collateral required by banks. 
5. The specific characteristics of debtors have the important influence on 
their likelihood to repay the debts, but the changes in economic 
environment must be also estimated in banks. The macroeconomic 
shocks can disimprove the banks’ balance sheets through the 
deterioration in quality of loan portfolios that can cause significant 
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losses for banks and may even cause the banking crisis. The researches 
of different countries affirmed that banks‘ loan portfolio quality can be 
explained by both specific borrowers‘ features ant the systemic 
macroeconomic conditions. The expansion phase of the economy is 
usually coincide with the relatively low proportion of non-performing 
loans in banks, as both the consumers and enterprises have the 
sufficient abilities to service their debts by their income and revenues. 
The sudden negative changes in markets and the whole economy affect 
the overall profitability of the firms. The growth of unemployment, the 
decrease of compensation of employees and the consumption 
expenditures throw households into the deep financial problems and 
insolvency, because in the economy the disposable income, corporate 
profits, and total spending are highly related. The banks also deepen the 
financial crises by themselves, because as the booming period 
continues, credit is extended to lower-quality debtors and subsequently, 
when the recession occurs, the growth of non-performing loans 
becomes inevitable. The unrestricted credit expansion harms banking 
performance and deteriorates NPLs dynamics due to the overheating of 
the economies. The recessions usually cause the asset prices fall and 
still, it is well known that poor asset quality is one of the major causes 
of bank failures. Thus, the macroeconomic shocks are inevitably 
transmitted to banks’ balance sheets through a worsening of their credit 
portfolio. Banks are vulnerable to external macroeconomic shocks 
because they mostly finance illiquid assets with liquid liabilities and 
such shocks are the main driver of financial crises. These dynamics of 
credit quality highlight the importance of credit risk modelling and 
monitoring considering the macroeconomic changes as an integral part 
of modern credit risk management solutions in banks. 
6. The Lithuanian commercial banks in 2009 met the problem of very 
high proportion of non-performing loans in their loan portfolios when 
this indicator reached 24% and it remained at almost this level until 
2010. However, since 2011 the constant decrease of NPLs in 
Lithuanian commercial banks was observed. The chain of other 
negative changes in Lithuanian banks‘ finance was concomitant. The 
profitable activity of Lithuanian banks suddenly feell into deep loss: the 
net loss in 2009 was 1 062,8 million EUR, in 2010 this loss decreased 
by 92,5% to 80 million EUR, in further years the profitable activity of 
banks was recovered. Before the economic downturn in 2008 the 
highest interest income of Lithuanian banks was 1 459,1 million EUR 
which in further years it decreased in average by 17,2% yearly until it 
reached only 568,8 million EUR in 2013. In 2009 the impairment of 
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loans and other receivables increased by 794,8% from 127,8 to 1 143,5 
million EUR and in 2010 it decreased to 201,2 million EUR. The ROA 
of Lithuanian banks from 1,4% in 2007 decreased to -3,9% in 2009 and 
in 2010 it remained negative. These empirical findings affirm the 
propositions of scientific publications that in the economic recession 
the NPLs and impairment of loans grow, the financial results of banks 
deteriorate and the Lithuanian banks have not assessed the credit risk of 
borrowers properly in the credits expansion period. This unfavourable 
situation caused a serious concern in banks‘ risks management because 
the disappearance of bank’s profitability caused the loss of defence 
against unexpected losses and it weakened the capital position of banks. 
That shows the importance of the safe capital base of banks in the 
economic downturn which  reduces the possibility of losses for the 
depositors and shareholders. 
7. This study highlighted the main macroeconomic rates of three groups 
(business, households and public finance) that should be included into 
the credit risk assessment models in banks. The analyzed 
macroeconomic indicators apparently have shown the fluctuations of 
business cycle and the 2009 year‘s downturn in Lithuanian economy. 
These indicators were the highest in year 2008 as it was the peak point 
of recent business cycle. In the most downturn of year 2009 the GDP, 
exports, imports and investments fell significantly. The aggregated 
business indicators of Lithuanian companies of revenue, net income, 
the number of profitable and loss-making companies, bankruptcies 
highly fluctuated. The credit risk of enterprises is directly related to 
their bankruptcy possibility, so the higher number of bankrupted 
companies means the increasing unability to fulfil the financial 
obligations for banks and other creditors. That undoubtedly causes the 
increase of credit risk and growth of non-performing loans. The 
statistics of Lithuanian enterprises bankruptcies is very unfavourable 
for banks because in case of bankruptcy a bank should expect to 
retrieve of only 2,7% loans without mortgage. The banks‘ economic 
environment indicators related to the households credit risk also should 
be analyzed in banks. The significant deterioration of the compensation 
of employees, consumption expenditures of households and the 
unemployment rate was observed in 2009. The growing compensation 
of employees stimulated to increase the consumption together with 
borrowing until 2008, when the significant proportion of the 
households‘ expenses in this period were financed by banks‘ credits. 
Therefore after the economics growth period the sudden deterioration 
of households‘ financial condition in 2009 – 2010 was evident. This 
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economic recession effect had negative impact to the households credit 
risk in Lithuania that suddenly met the lack of financial resources after 
short period of economic growth and reasonless expectations. The 
growth of non-performing loans in Lithuanian commercial banks is also 
related to the worsened economic indicators of Lithuanian public 
sector. This study suggests that the general government revenue, 
expenditures, budget deficit and general government debt can be the 
advantageous predictors of non-performing loans problem in banks. 
8. In credit risk management of banks the main problem is to assess the 
creditworthiness of loan applicants so the model for the classification 
of Lithuanian enterprises into default and non-default groups was 
implemented applying the multivariate adaptive regression splines and 
logistic regression methods. Aggregating these two methods it is 
possible to predict the enterprise‘s bankruptcy in next financial year 
with 96,92% probability. The additional advantage of the developed 
model is the consideration of industry sector’s risk in the economic 
downturn of the country. The canonical correlation analysis between 
the Lithuanian macroeconomic rates and the number of bankrupted 
companies in every industry sector has shown their high sensitivity to 
the changes in macroeconomic environment. The polynomial 
regression charts visualized the degree of bankrupted companies 
number fluctuations in the different stages of business cycle. The 
different values of calculated variation coefficients reflect the different 
credit risk for banks in particular industry sector when the economy 
deteriorates. That indicated the different sensitivity of enterprises losses 
to the economic environment, so the sectorial analysis was 
implemented that can help banks to identify the most risky sectors 
when the macroeconomic conditions of a country deteriorate. The 
industry sectors were classified into the most risky, the medium risk 
and the low bankruptcy risk groups. These findings can be useful for 
banks when the estimated default probability of company is acceptable 
for bank, but for the assessment of long term debt perspectives the 
impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on enterprises‘ credit risk 
changes is very important. The assessment of industry sectors riskiness 
in economic recession was also extended to the regional factor analysis 
which affirmed that the estimated consistent patterns of industry sectors 
risk is typical in all districts. But despite the not signficant sectorial 
riskiness differences in Lithuanian districts, the relative to comparison 
allowed to determine in what districts the enterprises of a particular 
sector are more risky. After that, the average financial ratios analysis 
results of this study can help banks to foresee the bankruptcy of 
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companies in the next financial year if their financial indicators reach 
the estimated values. 
9. The study affirmed that the ability to repay credits also depends on the 
debtor‘s indebtedness level. In Lithuania the average annual business 
loans growth rate in 2001 – 2008 was 32,4%, the households loans – 
69,2% every year. The growing Lithuanian economy stimulated to 
borrow because the credits were easily obtainable in banks. The 
recession of 2009 in Lithuanian economy started to reduce the annual 
borrowing amounts. The indebtedness rates were calculated to measure 
the changes of debt burden for Lithuanian business enterprises and 
households. These growth of indebtedness rates, especially related to 
the Lithuanian households, implicate the problem of irresponsible 
borrowing in the country when the economy is booming. The banks 
expected the high returns from loans irrrespective of the debtors‘ 
insolvency risk, while the borrowers had the easy access to credit and 
lack of financial knowledge. Because the irresponsible borrowing by 
credit institutions customers plays a role in creating the financial crises, 
the relative indebtedness rates were proposed in this study that were 
calculated using the indicators of of business and households loans, the 
overall banks‘ loan portfolio, the revenue of enterprises, GDP and 
compensation of employees. It can be concluded that the deterioration 
of banks’ loan portfolio is very probable when these relative indicators 
reach the estimated values. So the estimated critical indebtedness 
indicators before the economic downturn statistically can help for 
banks to foresee the similar non-performing loans problems in future. 
10. The study has shown that since 2009 the growth of non-performing 
loans not only in Lithuania, but also in other EU countries was 
observed. The average NPLs percentage of the EU banks in 2006 – 
2008 was stable in range 2,15 – 2,75%, but later this rate started to 
increase in average by 0,91% every year until in 2013 the NPLs 
reached 7,3%. But the statistics of NPLs in Lithuanian banks 
considering the context of European Union average in this period is 
outstanding. The research allows to maintain that the problem of high 
NPLs is typical in EU countries with lower GDP indicator while the 
countries with more developed economy have less problem of NPLs in 
commercial banks.  When the NPLs in overall EU like in Lithuania 
since 2009 increased, as a consequence the decreasing loan portfolio 
and growing deposits tendencies in the EU banks were observed.  
Despite the NPLs problem in the EU countries, the capital adequacy 
indicators of European Union banks since 2008 are growing what 
affirms that banks are able to absorb sufficient losses and the risk of 
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loss for depositors and shareholders is low. The Lithuanian banks‘ 
capital adequacy ratios in period of 2008 – 2013 were also growing 
with the small fluctuation in 2011 as in all EU. Despite the very high 
problem of NPLs compared to the EU average, in Lithuanian banks the 
capital adequacy rates since 2010 are higher than the average values in 
EU what point to the strong capital base and the ability of Lithuanian 
banks to withstand the economic recession. 
11. The ranking results of the EU countries in this study allowed to classify 
them into four groups according to the magnitude of NPLs problem in 
banks. The classification results affirm that Lithuania is one of the 
countries in the EU that has the most serious problems of NPLs in 
banking sector. The further analysis estimated the main macroeconomic 
factors that causes the negatively enlarged NPLs indicator in EU 
countries. The significant differences of relative average 
macroeconomic indicators in the groups of EU countries was observed. 
The macroeconomic indicators of GDP, exports, investments, 
compensation of employees, consumption expenditures of households 
and government in these groups constantly decrease compared to the 
estimated average NPLs growth. The dynamics of macroeconomic rates 
also affirmed that the deterioration of economic conditions in a country 
cause the growth of NPLs problem in banks. The commercial banking 
systems of EU countries with imperfect macroeconomic conditions 
suffer far more from debtors that are not able to meet their financial 
obligations. 
12. Finally, in this study the statistical model was developed to predict the 
proportion of non-performing loans in commercial banks of a country. 
The logistic and probit regression, cluster, factor and discriminant 
analysis methods were applied to solve the NPLs prediction problem. 
The model is applicable when the NPLs in a country of current year are 
at the basis level about 2,1% – 6,1%. The banks in year knowing the 
current non-performing loans in the country’s banking system and the 
changes of macroeconomic indicators can predict the possible NPLs 
growth. 
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